Abuse of Court Process under Nigerian Law

Abuse of court process generally refers to the improper use of judicial proceedings to harass, irritate, oppress or annoy another party, or to interfere with the due administration of justice. It is not limited to cases where the process is entirely frivolous or without any legal foundation.

There is no exhaustive definition or closed category of what constitutes an abuse of court process. The concept is flexible because abusive conduct may arise in different forms and circumstances. As the Supreme Court observed in CPC v. Ombugadu, the category of abuse is of “infinite variety” and cannot be exhaustively defined.

Abuse may occur where a party institutes multiple proceedings involving the same parties, subject matter and issues, particularly where a subsequent action is intended to frustrate or overreach an earlier proceeding. It may also arise where a party uses a procedurally competent right in an oppressive or improper manner.

In Saraki v. Kotoye, the Supreme Court explained that where a party has a right to institute an action, the abuse may lie not in the existence of that right but in the multiplicity and manner in which it is exercised. Ordinarily, the subsequent action—not the first properly instituted action—is treated as abusive.

Abuse may also be established where a process is filed without any legal or factual foundation. The resulting abuse lies, among other things, in the inconvenience and expense imposed on the opposing party in defending a recklessly incompetent process.

The Supreme Court has described abuse of court process as the improper use of the machinery of justice to the irritation and annoyance of an opponent. Examples include instituting multiple actions on the same subject matter against the same party and seeking substantially identical reliefs in different proceedings. See Adegbanke v. Ojelabi & Ors.

The consequence of a finding of abuse is ordinarily dismissal. In Adamu v. Nigerian Air Force, the Supreme Court described abuse as a fundamental vice which is punished by an order of dismissal. The court may also impose substantial or punitive costs where the conduct has wasted judicial time or caused unnecessary expense.

The Jokolo decision

A recent decision of the Supreme Court illustrates that abuse of court process is not confined to the filing of multiple substantive actions.

In Jokolo v. Governor of Kebbi State (2026) (opens in a new tab), the applicant sought to review and set aside an earlier final judgment of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC/266/2017. He alleged, among other things, that the earlier judgment had been procured through a fraudulent misrepresentation of section 4(3) of the Kebbi State Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law. He also argued that the judgment had been reached per incuriam, denied him access to court and fair hearing, and asked the Supreme Court to constitute a fresh panel to rehear the appeal.

The application was brought under Order 20 rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules 2024 and the inherent powers of the Court.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the application and held that it constituted a gross abuse of the process of the Court.

The Court made the following important findings:

1. The slip rule is limited.
   Order 20 rule 4 is intended to correct clerical mistakes, accidental slips or omissions, or to ensure that an order properly reflects the decision actually made by the Court. It is not a mechanism for re-arguing an appeal or changing the substantive reasoning or outcome of a judgment.
2. The Supreme Court cannot sit on appeal over its own final judgment.
   Although the Supreme Court possesses an inherent power to correct or, in exceptional circumstances, set aside its judgment, that power cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction over its own decision. Once the Court has finally determined an issue and its decision has been embodied in an effective judgment, it is generally functus officio in respect of that issue.
3. Final judgments cannot be reopened merely because a party considers them erroneous or unjust.
   The applicant’s complaints were directed at the substance of the earlier judgment rather than at any clerical error. The application therefore sought a second opportunity to argue the appeal under the guise of a review.
4. A party cannot relabel an unsuccessful legal argument as fraud.
   The alleged misrepresentation concerned the interpretation and application of section 4(3) of the Kebbi State Chiefs Law. The issue had already been argued by the parties and considered by the Supreme Court in the original appeal. The Court held that a party cannot, after losing, describe an opponent’s previously argued legal position as “fraud” simply because the Court accepted that position.
5. A request to constitute a fresh panel may itself be abusive.
   The request that the Supreme Court reconstitute itself and rehear an appeal already finally determined was held to be impermissible. Entertaining such applications would undermine finality, create uncertainty and permit endless litigation.
6. Counsel may be personally sanctioned.
   The Court criticised the application as frivolous, vexatious and procedurally incompetent. It ordered the applicant’s counsel to pay ₦50 million personally to the respondents within 90 days. Counsel was also required to file a certificate of compliance, failing which he would lose the right of audience in Nigerian courts until compliance.

The decision is significant because it extends the practical understanding of abuse of court process beyond the traditional example of duplicative actions. A proceeding may be abusive where it seeks to undermine a final judgment through a procedure that is legally unavailable, particularly where the process is used to re-litigate issues already determined.

The decision also reinforces the constitutional finality of Supreme Court judgments under section 235 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended. The final court is not an avenue for endless self-review, and dissatisfaction with the reasoning or outcome of a decision does not, without more, justify reopening the case.

General principles of abuse of court Process under Nigerian Law

The following principles may therefore be drawn from the authorities:

• Abuse of court process is a misuse of judicial proceedings.
• The category is not closed and must be determined according to the facts of each case.
• Multiplicity of actions involving the same parties, subject matter and issues may amount to abuse.
• A subsequent action may be abusive even where the claimant originally had a right to sue.
• The abuse may lie in the manner and multiplicity of exercising a legal right.
• A process lacking a reasonable legal or factual foundation may be abusive.
• An application cannot be used to circumvent the finality of a judgment.
• The slip rule permits correction of accidental slips and clerical errors, not substantive review.
• Re-labelling an unsuccessful argument as fraud does not, without proof of genuine extrinsic fraud, justify setting aside a final judgment.
• The usual consequence of abuse is dismissal, although punitive or personal costs may also be imposed.
• Counsel has a professional duty not to file frivolous, speculative or procedurally incompetent processes.

Selected Nigerian authorities on abuse of court process

• Jokolo v. Governor of Kebbi State (2026) (opens in a new tab) — abuse through an impermissible attempt to review a final Supreme Court judgment and constitute a fresh panel.
• Governor of Kebbi State v. Jokolo (2025) (opens in a new tab) — the substantive appeal arising from the Gwandu Emirate dispute.
• CPC v. Ombugadu & Anor (2013) LPELR-21007(SC).
• Saraki & Anor v. Kotoye (1992) LPELR-3016(SC).
• Adegbanke v. Ojelabi & Ors (2021) LPELR-54992(SC).
• Adamu v. Nigerian Air Force & Anor (2022) LPELR-56587(SC).
• African Reinsurance Corporation v. JDP Construction Ltd (2003) LPELR-215(SC).
• Amaefule v. The State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 156.
• Okafor v. Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 659.
• Messrs NV Scheep v. The MV “S-Araz” (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 622.