AKINGBOLA & ANOR V. IGBE & ORS (2026)

Background

Akingbola v. Igbe concerned the competence of a libel action commenced before the High Court of Edo State. Mrs. Vero Igbe, the plaintiff at first instance, instituted proceedings against Erastus Akingbola and Access Bank Plc, arising from an interview allegedly granted by the 1st appellant, then an employee of Intercontinental Bank Limited, and published by Tell Communications Limited in Tell Magazine. Mr. Lucky Fiakpa and Tell Communications Limited were subsequently joined as defendants.

On 17 February 2003, the 1st respondent presented a writ of summons, a statement of claim and an ex parte application to the Registrar of the High Court. The writ was intended for service outside Edo State. The application for leave to issue and serve the writ outside the jurisdiction was granted on 20 March 2003. The proceedings thereafter continued, pleadings were exchanged, the matter went to trial and the 1st respondent gave evidence. At the close of her case, the appellants made a no-case submission.

The appellants argued that the statement of claim had been filed before the writ of summons was validly issued and was therefore void. They also contended, for the first time before the Supreme Court, that the writ itself was fundamentally defective because it appeared to have been signed in the name of “Ken E. Mozia & Co.” rather than in the name of an identifiable legal practitioner. The trial court rejected the appellants’ objections and overruled the no-case submission. The Court of Appeal, Benin Division, affirmed that decision. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the writ of summons and statement of claim validly commenced the action.
2. Whether the statement of claim filed before leave was granted to issue and serve the writ outside jurisdiction was void or merely irregular.
3. Whether a writ of summons signed in the name of a law firm, rather than by an identifiable legal practitioner, was competent.
4. Whether the jurisdictional objection could be raised for the first time at the Supreme Court without leave.
5. Whether the appellants’ grounds of appeal were incompetent because they were allegedly argumentative, narrative, or grounds of mixed law and fact.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The leading judgment was delivered by Adamu Jauro, J.S.C. The Court held that jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and determine a matter. It is fundamental and may be raised by any party, at any stage of the proceedings, or by the court suo motu. Although the general rule is that a fresh issue cannot be raised on appeal without leave, a challenge to jurisdiction is an established exception because proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are nullities.

The Court explained that an originating process is the process by which an action is commenced. At trial level, such processes generally include a writ of summons, originating summons, originating motion and petition; an appeal is commenced by a notice of appeal. A complaint that the originating process is incompetent is a complaint that the action was not commenced by due process of law, one of the essential conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.

On the signature, the Court drew a decisive distinction between endorsement and signature. A rule permitting a writ to be endorsed with the name of counsel or the counsel’s firm does not authorise the law firm itself to sign the process. A law firm is a business name and is not a legal practitioner recognised under the Legal Practitioners Act. Only an identifiable person who is a duly qualified and enrolled legal practitioner may sign a court process on behalf of a litigant.

Because the writ of summons in this case bore a signature above the name “Ken E. Mozia & Co.” and did not identify the individual legal practitioner who signed it, the process was fundamentally defective. The defect was not a mere procedural irregularity and could not be cured by participation in the proceedings, amendment of the pleadings, or the passage of time.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court rejected the 1st respondent’s preliminary objection. It held that the grounds of appeal, when read together with their particulars, complained principally of the application and interpretation of legal rules to settled and undisputed facts. They were therefore grounds of law, not grounds of mixed law and fact requiring prior leave under section 233(3) of the Constitution. The Court further stated that although grounds of appeal should be concise and should not ordinarily be argumentative or narrative, inelegant drafting does not automatically make them incompetent where their complaints can reasonably be understood.

The Court also held that the question concerning the validity of the writ could be considered even though it had not been raised before the lower courts and was not presented in the usual procedural form. The issue went directly to the court’s jurisdiction and could not be defeated by waiver or procedural technicality.

Once the originating writ was found incompetent, the action itself was incompetent from inception. Every subsequent step, including the trial, the ruling overruling the no-case submission and the decision of the Court of Appeal, was founded on a proceeding that had never been validly commenced. The Supreme Court accordingly struck out the suit and made no order as to costs.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and struck out the action in Suit No. B/100/2003. The decision confirms that a court process, particularly an originating process, must disclose the identity of the legal practitioner who signed it. A law firm’s name may appear as an endorsement or address of counsel where the applicable rules permit, but the firm cannot itself sign the process.

Significance

This decision is significant for Nigerian civil procedure and legal practice. It reinforces the strict jurisdictional consequences of commencing an action with a defective originating process. It also warns practitioners and litigants that the use of a firm’s trade name in place of the enrolled name of an individual legal practitioner may invalidate the entire proceedings. The judgment further restates the exceptional status of jurisdictional objections: they may be raised at any stage, including for the first time before the Supreme Court, because parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent, waiver, participation or prolonged litigation.