ALLIED PEOPLES MOVEMENT V. INEC & ORS. (2023)

Background

Allied Peoples Movement (APM), a registered political party and participant in the 2023 presidential election, commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Abuja, challenging the qualification of Mr. Peter Gregory Obi as the presidential candidate sponsored by the Labour Party. APM contended that Mr. Obi had resigned from the Peoples Democratic Party on 24 May 2022, joined or became sponsored by the Labour Party shortly before that party’s presidential primary on 30 May 2022, and consequently could not have satisfied the membership and registration requirements allegedly arising from section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022.

APM sought declarations that Mr. Obi was disqualified or ineligible to contest the election, orders restraining INEC from recognising or publishing his name, and an order disqualifying him as the Labour Party’s candidate. INEC did not participate in the proceedings at the trial court. The Labour Party and Mr. Obi opposed the suit and filed objections challenging, among other matters, APM’s locus standi, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, the limitation period applicable to pre-election litigation, the justiciability of the complaint, and alleged abuse of court process.

The Federal High Court dismissed the preliminary objections and also dismissed APM’s originating summons on the merits. Both sides appealed: APM filed the main appeal, while the Labour Party filed a cross-appeal against the refusal of its objection. The Court of Appeal considered the cross-appeal first because it raised threshold questions concerning jurisdiction and competence.

Issues

1. Whether APM, being a rival political party and not an aspirant in the Labour Party’s primary election, had locus standi to challenge the nomination and sponsorship of Mr. Obi.
2. Whether the action was statute-barred under section 285(9) of the Constitution, which requires every pre-election matter to be filed within 14 days of the relevant event, decision or action.
3. Whether the failure of the Federal High Court to pronounce on every ground of objection occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
4. Whether the suit constituted an abuse of court process because of an earlier action filed by APM.
5. Whether section 131(c) of the Constitution, read with sections 29 and 77 of the Electoral Act, imposed a requirement that a presidential candidate must have been on a political party’s membership register for at least 30 days before its primary.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the cross-appeal and struck out the main appeal. It held that pre-election litigation is not an “all-comers” proceeding. Section 285(14) of the Constitution and the Electoral Act identify the persons entitled to institute particular categories of pre-election actions. An aspirant may challenge non-compliance by a political party in the conduct of its primary, while a political party may challenge INEC where INEC disqualifies its candidate or fails to comply with electoral law in matters such as nomination, election timetables, voter registration and other preparatory activities.

APM did not fall within either category relevant to its complaint. It was not an aspirant who participated in the Labour Party primary. Further, its complaint was not that INEC had disqualified its own candidate or failed to perform a statutory electoral duty. Rather, APM alleged that the Labour Party and Mr. Obi had breached section 77 of the Electoral Act. That complaint concerned the internal affairs and nomination process of a rival party. Section 285(14)(c) did not confer standing on APM to ask the court to compel INEC to disqualify a rival party’s candidate on that basis.

The court distinguished between locus standi and cause of action. Locus standi concerns the legal capacity of the claimant to bring the proceedings; without it, the court lacks jurisdiction regardless of the apparent merits of the complaint. The court also reiterated that nomination and sponsorship are ordinarily internal affairs of a political party, subject to the statutory exception allowing an aspirant who participated in the relevant primary to seek redress.

Court Findings

On limitation, the court held that the action was not statute-barred. A cause of action arises when the operative wrongful act is complete. Although APM relied on events occurring in May 2022, its pleaded complaint was directed principally at INEC’s publication of Mr. Obi’s name in the final list of presidential candidates on 20 September 2022. Since the action was filed on 30 September 2022, it was brought on the eleventh day and therefore within the constitutional 14-day period. A cause of action was distinguished from a right of action: limitation may remove the enforceable remedial right while leaving the underlying cause of action legally unenforceable.

The court further held that the earlier suit did not establish abuse of process. Abuse requires improper, frivolous, vexatious or oppressive use of judicial procedure, including substantially duplicating proceedings involving the same parties, subject matter and issues. The earlier proceeding involved the legality of replacing vice-presidential nominees and the use of a placeholder, whereas the present suit concerned the qualification of a presidential candidate. The parties, issues and subject matter were materially different.

On the merits, the court affirmed that section 131(c) of the Constitution requires a presidential candidate to be a member of a political party and to be sponsored by that party. Sections 131 and 137 contain the constitutional qualifications and disqualifications for the presidency. The court refused to read into section 131 a further requirement that the candidate’s name must have appeared on the party register for at least 30 days before the primary. Section 77 of the Electoral Act requires political parties to maintain membership registers and submit them to INEC, but it does not expressly make 30-day membership a constitutional qualification or provide that breach automatically disqualifies a presidential candidate.

APM also failed evidentially. It proved Mr. Obi’s resignation from the Peoples Democratic Party but did not produce the Labour Party’s membership register, establish when the register was submitted to INEC, or prove that Mr. Obi’s name was absent from it. The court could not infer or speculate about the contents of a document that was not produced. The burden of proof remained on APM to establish the alleged breach before any evidential burden could shift to the respondents.

The court held that INEC was under a statutory duty to accept and publish candidates submitted by political parties in accordance with sections 29(3) and 32(1) of the Electoral Act. Its publication of Mr. Obi’s name was therefore compliance with, not non-compliance by, INEC. A political party cannot transform a challenge to a rival party’s primary into a complaint against INEC under section 285(14)(c).

Conclusion

The cross-appeal succeeded. The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the Federal High Court on the issue of competence and struck out APM’s action for want of jurisdiction because APM lacked locus standi. Although the court considered the main appeal in the alternative, it found the challenge unmeritorious: Mr. Obi satisfied section 131(c), was not shown to fall within any disqualification under section 137, and the alleged breach of section 77 was neither proved nor capable of being used by a rival political party to attack his nomination. The main appeal was consequently struck out, with costs of N200,000 awarded to each of the Labour Party and Mr. Obi.

Significance

The decision reinforces the restricted character of Nigerian pre-election litigation. It confirms that rival political parties cannot litigate over the internal nomination processes of another party merely by alleging breaches of electoral legislation. It also emphasises that constitutional qualifications cannot be enlarged by judicial interpretation or by importing additional requirements from an ordinary statute. Finally, the judgment illustrates the importance of locus standi: even a carefully pleaded and timely claim will fail where the claimant is not among the persons whom the Constitution or Electoral Act authorises to sue.