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Case Digest

AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Adamu Jauro, J.S.C. (Presiding)
  • Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein, J.S.C.
  • Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru, J.S.C.
  • Jamilu Yammama Tukur, J.S.C.
  • Abubakar Sadiq Umar, J.S.C. (Leading Judgment)
Parties

Appellant:

  • Emmanuel Ameh

Respondent:

  • The People of Lagos State
Suit number
SC/1416/2016
Delivered on

Background

This appeal concerned the conviction of Emmanuel Ameh for conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery simpliciter. The appellant and another accused person were originally prosecuted before the High Court of Lagos State, Ikeja, on charges of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery under sections 403(a) and 402(2)(a) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap. C17, Laws of Lagos State, 2003. The alleged incident occurred on 27 June 2007. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant and his confederates pretended to operate a taxi service and conveyed the victim, PW1, to an intended destination. During the journey, the vehicle diverted from its route. When PW1 became suspicious and attempted to leave, the appellant and the others attacked and beat her, taking her rings and cash before abandoning her by the expressway.

During the struggle, PW1’s mobile telephone fell inside the vehicle. Shortly afterwards, the vehicle was involved in an accident, and the police took possession of it and conveyed the appellant to hospital. A call to PW1’s phone was received by the police, leading to the victim’s contact with the investigating officers. The co-accused identified the appellant as his associate, and the police arrested the appellant. The prosecution called PW1 and two police witnesses. The investigating police officer tendered the appellant’s extra-judicial confessional statement, together with the attestation of a superior police officer concerning its voluntariness. The statement was admitted without objection.

The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the use of firearms or an offensive weapon necessary to sustain the charge of armed robbery. It nevertheless found the evidence sufficient to establish conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery, convicted the appellant of those lesser offences, and sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to affirm the finding that the prosecution proved the offences against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
  2. Whether PW1 properly identified the appellant, particularly in circumstances where no formal identification parade was conducted.
  3. Whether alleged inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 created reasonable doubt.
  4. Whether the appellant’s confessional statement could be relied upon despite his later denial of making it and whether there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy.
  5. Whether the respondent’s purported “preliminary point” challenging the competence of one ground of appeal was procedurally valid.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court reaffirmed that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove every ingredient of a criminal offence beyond reasonable doubt. Robbery under section 15(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act means stealing accompanied by a threat or actual use of violence against a person or property in order to obtain, retain or facilitate the stealing of the property. Its essential elements are: a robbery; threat or actual violence; stealing of property capable in law of being stolen; and the accused’s participation as the robber or one of the robbers.

The Court held that criminal participation may be established by a voluntary, direct and unequivocal confessional statement, complete and irresistible circumstantial evidence, or credible eyewitness evidence. Any one of these modes may be sufficient. A voluntary and unequivocal confession can, by itself, ground a conviction, although corroboration is desirable. A later retraction does not automatically destroy the evidential value of a confession, provided the court is satisfied that it is true.

Where an accused disputes an extra-judicial statement, the complaint should be raised when the statement is tendered. If the statement is admitted, the trial court must assess its weight at judgment, applying the relevant tests, including the six-way test associated with R v. Sykes. In this case, the appellant neither objected to the tendering of the statement nor challenged the investigating officer’s evidence on its making and attestation. His denial during his defence was therefore belated. The Court further stated that failure to challenge material prosecution evidence in cross-examination may amount to an admission, unless the evidence is inherently incredible.

Court Findings

On identification, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a formal identification parade was indispensable. The appellant was found in the vehicle used in the robbery shortly after the incident and after the victim had been attacked inside that vehicle. The vehicle itself was the relevant scene of the crime. In addition, PW1 gave direct evidence identifying the appellant and describing his position in the vehicle and the particular acts he performed during the attack. Her evidence was not effectively challenged. The Court held that these circumstances sufficiently connected the appellant with the robbery and made the absence of an identification parade immaterial.

The alleged contradiction concerning whether PW1 or her father called the missing telephone was considered minor and peripheral. It did not undermine the undisputed facts that the telephone was found in the vehicle, that PW1 had been assaulted and robbed, and that the appellant was arrested in connection with the vehicle shortly afterwards. A contradiction will only assist an accused where it is material, substantial and affects an ingredient of the offence or a central aspect of the prosecution’s case. Trivial inconsistencies do not create reasonable doubt.

The Court also held that the prosecution evidence comprised the appellant’s confession, PW1’s eyewitness testimony and the evidence of the investigating police officers. That body of evidence was cogent, credible and mutually corroborative. The concurrent findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal were consequently entitled to respect, and no basis existed for appellate interference.

The respondent’s preliminary point attacking only one ground of appeal was discountenanced. A respondent seeking to terminate an appeal for incompetence must file a proper preliminary objection. Where the challenge concerns only particular grounds while other competent grounds remain capable of sustaining the appeal, the proper procedure is a motion on notice directed at those grounds. A preliminary objection is intended to terminate the appeal in limine and is not the appropriate procedure for selectively attacking grounds while leaving the appeal otherwise competent.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court answered the central question in the affirmative, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 20 May 2016. The appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery, together with the sentence of twenty-one years’ imprisonment with hard labour, was upheld.

Significance

The decision is significant for Nigerian criminal practice because it clarifies the evidential consequences of failing to object to a confessional statement when it is tendered. It also confirms that a conviction may rest solely on a true, voluntary and unequivocal confession, though independent evidence may strengthen the prosecution’s case. The judgment further explains that identification must be assessed in the totality of the circumstances and that a parade is not automatically required where the accused is found in circumstances closely linking him to the crime. Finally, it provides an important procedural reminder that preliminary objections must be properly formulated and used to challenge the competence of an appeal, while objections to individual grounds should ordinarily be brought by motion on notice.

Counsel:

  • Dr. Emeka Akabogu, Esq. – for the Appellant
  • Ibrahim Lawal, Esq., with the fiat of the Attorney-General of Lagos State – for the Respondent