AMOS V. OKOYA (2019)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute concerning the vacant stool of the Oba of Ibereko in Badagry Local Government Area of Lagos State. Following the death of the former Oba, the Idi-Aro Ruling House was invited to nominate candidates. The ruling house nominated Prince Joel Olowode Amos, the 1st appellant, Oba Adewale Okoya, the 1st respondent, and several other candidates. The original kingmakers selected the 1st appellant. However, petitions alleging bias, bribery, fraud and procedural irregularities were made against the kingmakers and the selection exercise.

The Lagos State authorities investigated the complaints and invoked section 19 of the Obas and Chiefs Law, Cap. 02, Laws of Lagos State 2003. The existing kingmakers were dissolved and a five-member panel was appointed to perform their functions. That panel eliminated the 1st appellant and ultimately selected the 1st respondent, whose appointment was approved by the State Government and published in the official gazette. The 1st respondent was thereafter installed as Oba of Ibereko.

The appellants commenced an action at the High Court of Lagos State, alleging, among other matters, that the process leading to the 1st respondent’s selection breached the 1st appellant’s right to fair hearing. The 1st respondent filed a preliminary objection contending that the appellants lacked locus standi to sue. The High Court upheld the objection and struck out the action. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the High Court ought to have adjourned its proceedings after being notified of the appellants’ pending application for stay of proceedings before the Court of Appeal.
2. Whether the High Court’s failure to adjourn rendered its ruling incompetent.
3. Whether sections 1 and 18 of the Tribunal of Inquiry Law, Cap. TG, Laws of Lagos State 2003, totally ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court over the chieftaincy dispute.
4. Whether the appellants, particularly the 1st appellant, possessed locus standi to institute the action based on the facts pleaded in the statement of claim.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that statutory ouster of jurisdiction may be absolute or conditional. A conditional ouster merely imposes a condition precedent before a court may be approached; it does not completely eliminate the court’s constitutional jurisdiction. A community reading of sections 1 and 18 of the Tribunal of Inquiry Law showed that the provisions were intended to regulate or limit recourse to the regular courts, rather than totally deprive the High Court of jurisdiction.

The court further held that it would be unjust to require the appellants to return to the same panel whose report had already made adverse findings against the 1st appellant. In the circumstances, the appellants were entitled to seek judicial redress directly.

On locus standi, the court reaffirmed that standing means the legal capacity to institute proceedings. A claimant must demonstrate a special, non-speculative interest that has been adversely affected by the act or omission complained of. In chieftaincy litigation, standing may arise from a family or ruling-house interest, or from an individual’s personal claim to the stool. The court must determine standing primarily from the claimant’s pleadings, especially the statement of claim, and not from an assessment of whether the claim will ultimately succeed.

Court Findings

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellants’ argument that the trial court was bound to act on a letter notifying it of the pending application for stay. The letter had been addressed personally to the trial judge, although it was sent through the registrar, and there was no indication that copies had been served on the opposing parties. It therefore constituted an improper ex parte communication concerning a pending proceeding.

The letter contravened the Judicial Code of Conduct and rules 31(5) and 34 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007. A lawyer must not send a written communication to a judge without simultaneously furnishing the opposing lawyer with a copy, and must not act in a manner that suggests an attempt to obtain special consideration. The trial court was correct to disregard the letter. The Court of Appeal nevertheless distinguished this issue from the question of standing and found that the appeal succeeded on the jurisdictional and locus standi issues.

In examining the amended statement of claim, the court found that the 1st appellant had pleaded that he was a member of the Idi-Aro Ruling House, that the ruling house was entitled to produce the Oba, that he had been nominated and selected by the original kingmakers, and that his subsequent elimination by the replacement panel was unfair and contrary to fair-hearing requirements. These facts disclosed a real and legally protected interest.

The other appellants, however, did not sufficiently establish an independent legal interest in the stool. The 2nd appellant, although head of the ruling house, did not show a separate basis for suing where the dispute was principally between the 1st appellant and the 1st respondent as competing candidates. The 3rd to 5th appellants, who were kingmakers, also failed to demonstrate the necessary standing to maintain the action in their personal capacities.

Conclusion

The appeal was allowed. The ruling of the High Court of Lagos State delivered on 27 October 2009 in Suit No. BD/36/2007, striking out the action for want of locus standi, was set aside. The suit was remitted to the High Court for hearing on the merits before another judge. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Significance

The decision is important in Nigerian chieftaincy law because it confirms that a person directly nominated or selected for a traditional stool has sufficient standing to challenge an allegedly unlawful or unfair process that deprives him of the position. It also clarifies that standing is assessed from the pleadings and concerns the claimant’s interest, not the ultimate merits of the dispute. The judgment further illustrates that statutory schemes referring disputes to tribunals will not readily be interpreted as completely abolishing the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Finally, it emphasises the procedural and ethical requirement that communications to a court about pending applications must be made transparently, through proper court channels and with notice to all parties.