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Case Digest

NNANYELUGO CHIDI AROH V. PEOPLES’ DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) & ORS. (2013)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • W. S. N. Onnoghen JSC
  • Muhammad Saifullah Muntaka-Coomassie JSC
  • Nwali Sylvester Ngwuta JSC
  • Olukayode Ariwoola JSC
  • Musa Dattijo Muhammad JSC
Parties

Appellant:

  • Nnanyelugo Chidi Aroh

Respondents:

  • Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)
  • Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
  • Princess Stella Angwu
Suit number
SC.214/2012
Delivered on

Background

This appeal arose from a pre-election dispute concerning the nomination of a candidate for the Igbo Etiti/Uzouwani Federal Constituency. Nnanyelugo Chidi Aroh claimed that he won the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) primary election conducted on 12 January 2011 and was therefore entitled to be nominated for the National Assembly election scheduled for April 2011. He alleged that the PDP unlawfully replaced him, conducted or relied upon another primary process, and failed to issue him the relevant Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) nomination forms.

The appellant commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Abuja, by originating summons. He sought declarations that he was the duly nominated candidate, injunctions restraining the PDP from forwarding another candidate’s name to INEC, an order compelling the issue of nomination forms, and an order restraining INEC from publishing another candidate’s name. The respondents filed processes, including a preliminary objection challenging the competence of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.

The Federal High Court held that the affidavit evidence disclosed substantial and irreconcilable conflicts of fact which could not properly be resolved under the originating-summons procedure. Rather than determine the claims on the affidavits, the court ordered the parties to file pleadings and proceed to trial on the general cause list. The appellant appealed that procedural ruling to the Court of Appeal.

While that interlocutory appeal was pending, the appellant applied for leave to adduce fresh or further evidence. The evidence was a document which, according to the appellant, was central to the respondents’ case and would establish whether the PDP primary election had been cancelled. The Court of Appeal refused the application, principally because the substantive case had not yet been tried and the appellant could still tender the document before the Federal High Court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to refuse leave to adduce fresh evidence, having regard to the importance of the document and the overall justice of the case.
  2. Whether the Court of Appeal, by observing that the appellant could still present the evidence at the trial, had effectively determined the substantive appeal at an interlocutory stage.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that Order 4, rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 confers a discretionary power on the Court of Appeal to receive further evidence. That discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously. The appellate court’s task on a further appeal is not to decide whether it would have exercised the discretion differently, but to determine whether the lower court acted according to legal principles and rationally upon the relevant facts.

The Court restated the established requirements for admitting fresh evidence. The evidence should generally be evidence that could not, with reasonable care and diligence, have been obtained for use at the trial; it should be apparently credible; it should have an important, though not necessarily decisive, effect on the case; and it should be material and weighty enough that, if available, it might have influenced the decision of the lower court. The requirements operate cumulatively, not selectively. The evidence must also relate to a properly pleaded issue, subject to the recognised exceptions.

Applying those principles, the Court held that the appellant’s application was premature and misconceived. The appeal before the Court of Appeal was not an appeal from a final judgment after a trial on the merits. It concerned only the procedural question whether the conflicting affidavit evidence required the case to be transferred from the originating-summons procedure to pleadings and oral evidence. Since the trial had not begun, there was no prior evidential hearing from which evidence could properly be described as “fresh” or “additional.”

Court Findings

The Supreme Court agreed that the document remained available for tender at the Federal High Court. The appellant could introduce it during the trial ordered by that court, and admitting it at the interlocutory appellate stage would improperly bypass the trial process. The Court described the application as an attempt to overreach the trial court’s procedural order and warned against shortcuts that could distort the orderly presentation of evidence.

The Court also rejected the argument that the Court of Appeal had decided the substantive appeal merely by noting that the appellant could still tender the document at trial. That observation was relevant to the exercise of discretion and did not determine whether the Federal High Court was correct to order pleadings. Depending on the outcome of the pending appeal, the case could proceed either by affidavit evidence or by oral evidence on pleadings. The Court of Appeal could also exercise its statutory powers where appropriate.

The Supreme Court declined the invitation to invoke section 22 of the Supreme Court Act to determine the entire dispute. The substantive proceedings remained pending, the trial court had not heard evidence, and the interlocutory appeal had not yet been resolved by the Court of Appeal. It was therefore inappropriate for the Supreme Court to assume functions that should first be performed by the lower courts.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed as lacking merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of leave to adduce further evidence and ordered costs of N200,000 against the appellant in favour of each set of respondents.

Significance

The decision establishes that an application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal ordinarily presupposes a completed trial and a judgment on the merits. It cannot be used to introduce evidence in an interlocutory appeal where the substantive case is still pending and the applicant retains a full opportunity to present the evidence at trial. The case also reinforces appellate restraint: a court reviewing the exercise of discretion must examine whether the discretion was exercised judicially and judiciously, rather than substitute its own preferred decision. In addition, the judgment highlights the importance of pleadings, orderly trial procedure, and the prevention of procedural abuse in electoral and other contentious litigation.

Counsel

Counsel:

  • C. N. Nwagbo, Esq., with G. C. Ugwubweze, C. A. Ezugwu, M. C. Nwosu and I. L. Alege, for the Appellant
  • Chief Olusola Oke, with Chief A. O. Ajana and O. Akinyibo, Esq., for the 1st Respondent
  • T. O. Busari, Esq., with Adeola Adedipe, A. A. Usman and P. Whyte, for the 2nd Respondent
  • P. M. B. Onyia, Esq., for the 3rd Respondent