ATIKU ABUBAKAR GALADIMA V. THE STATE (2026)

Background

This appeal concerned the conviction of Atiku Abubakar Galadima for culpable homicide punishable with death under section 221(b) of the Sokoto State Penal Code. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant, who was a cousin and close associate of the deceased, Barrister Surajo Abubakar, went to the deceased’s home on 3 June 2012 and took him away on a motorcycle. The deceased was allegedly expected to accompany the appellant to make a payment for land. He was last seen alive in the appellant’s company. Several days later, the deceased’s body was discovered at Dundaye Village.

When the deceased’s wife, relatives and villagers went to the appellant’s house to ask what had happened, the appellant allegedly lied about the deceased’s whereabouts, escaped by scaling a wall and subsequently remained away for approximately four years. Upon his return, he was arrested and prosecuted. The Sokoto State High Court convicted him after a trial in which the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered two exhibits. The Court of Appeal, Sokoto Division, affirmed the conviction and sentence on 7 September 2020. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues for Determination

1. Whether the Court of Appeal properly applied the doctrine of last seen in determining the appellant’s guilt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence and was right to affirm the findings of the trial court.

The Supreme Court consolidated the controversy into a single question: whether the Court of Appeal was right to uphold the conviction and sentence on the basis that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt, essentially through the doctrine of last seen.

Appellant’s Arguments

The appellant argued that there was no eyewitness to the killing and no confessional statement. He maintained that although the deceased was last seen with him, that fact alone could not establish that he caused the death or acted intentionally with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was a probable consequence. He contended that the prosecution was required to prove all three elements of culpable homicide: the death of the deceased, causation by the appellant’s act, and the requisite intention or knowledge.

He further challenged the identification of the body, the absence of an autopsy or medical evidence, and the alleged inference that he had robbed the deceased. He submitted that his departure from the village was motivated by fear of mob violence rather than consciousness of guilt. He also contended that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate the evidence and failed to consider all possible defences available to him.

Respondent’s Arguments

The State submitted that the circumstantial evidence was overwhelming and formed an unbroken chain pointing to the appellant. It relied on the evidence of the deceased’s wife, relatives and the appellant himself, which established that the appellant was the last person seen with the deceased. The State argued that the appellant had a duty to explain how the deceased met his death, particularly because he admitted taking the deceased to Dundaye Village, where the body was later found.

The respondent also relied on the appellant’s alleged lies, his unexplained flight for four years, the quarrel between him and the deceased, and the disappearance of money reportedly carried by the deceased. It argued that medical evidence was unnecessary because the evidence of multiple cuts and slaughtering was sufficient to establish the cause of death. Finally, the State urged the Supreme Court not to interfere with the concurrent factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt under section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 and that this burden reflects the constitutional presumption of innocence under section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require mathematical certainty; it requires a high degree of probability and proof of all the ingredients of the particular offence.

For culpable homicide punishable with death, the prosecution must establish that the deceased is dead, that the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused, and that the act or omission was intentional, with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. These elements must coexist before a conviction can stand.

The Court explained that the doctrine of last seen is a judicially developed principle and not a statutory provision. It raises a rebuttable presumption that the person last seen with the deceased bears responsibility for the death, particularly where the deceased is subsequently found dead and the accused fails to give a credible account of what occurred. The doctrine does not operate automatically or in isolation. The prosecution must first prove, by credible evidence, that the accused was the last person seen with the deceased and that the surrounding circumstances create a complete and compelling chain pointing irresistibly to guilt while excluding reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.

The Court further held that, once the relevant facts were established, the appellant was expected to explain how he and the deceased parted company and what happened thereafter. His account that he had a misunderstanding with the deceased and left him in the same bush where the body was found was inadequate. His failure to provide a meaningful explanation, together with his alleged lies and prolonged disappearance, supported the inference of guilt.

Court’s Findings

The Court accepted that the first element—death—was proved through the evidence of PW3, who identified the deceased. It rejected the appellant’s challenge based on the fact that the deceased’s wife did not view the body. The Court also held that the absence of medical evidence was not fatal because the physical condition of the body and the testimony describing several cuts and wounds sufficiently demonstrated a violent death.

The Court found that the evidence established that the appellant took the deceased to Dundaye Village, that the deceased was not seen alive afterwards, and that his body was later recovered in that vicinity. The appellant admitted having a disagreement with the deceased in the bush but did not explain the nature of the disagreement or what happened after he left. The courts were entitled to consider his lies to the deceased’s family and his disappearance for about four years as significant circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court also emphasised the rule concerning concurrent findings of fact. Such findings will not ordinarily be disturbed unless the appellant demonstrates that they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on irrelevant considerations, or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The appellant failed to establish any such error. The trial court had considered the available defences, and the Court of Appeal had properly reviewed the record before affirming the conviction.

Decision and Conclusion

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision delivered by Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme, JSC, dismissed the appeal for lacking merit. It affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had upheld the Sokoto State High Court’s conviction of the appellant for culpable homicide punishable with death and the sentence imposed.

Significance

The decision illustrates the evidential importance of the last seen doctrine in Nigerian homicide trials. It confirms that a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence where the circumstances form a coherent and irresistible chain linking the accused to the death. However, the judgment also recognises that the doctrine is rebuttable and cannot dispense with the prosecution’s duty to prove the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. It further reinforces the Supreme Court’s reluctance to overturn concurrent factual findings in the absence of a demonstrated miscarriage of justice or patent perversity.