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Case Digest

AUWAL ABDULLAHI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2017)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Amiru Sanusi JSC
  • Olabode Rhodes-Vivour JSC
  • Musa Dattijo Muhammad JSC
  • Chima Centus Nweze JSC
  • Paul Adamu Galinje JSC
Parties

Appellant:

  • Auwal Abdullahi

Respondent:

  • Federal Republic of Nigeria
Suit number
SC.844/2015
Delivered on

Background

This appeal concerned the validity of the appellant’s arraignment and the consequences of alleged procedural defects in a criminal trial. Auwal Abdullahi and his co-accused, Isiaku Salisu, were arrested by the Joint Military Task Force on 17 January 2010 in the Dilimi area of Jos North Local Government Area, Plateau State. They were reportedly found with dangerous weapons while participating in the burning of houses and the destruction of property. They were subsequently prosecuted before the Federal High Court, Jos Division, on a two-count charge relating to conspiracy under section 518 of the Criminal Code Act and terrorism under section 15(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004.

The trial court initially proceeded on both counts. The prosecution called four witnesses, while the accused persons did not testify personally but called one defence witness. The trial court convicted both accused persons and imposed terms of imprisonment, ordering the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction on the first count but affirmed the conviction and sentence for the terrorism count. Abdullahi then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the Federal High Court had properly assumed jurisdiction to try and convict the appellant, notwithstanding the alleged failure to conduct a valid arraignment.
  2. Whether the decision of the trial court was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.

Although two grounds of appeal were filed, the appellant’s counsel formulated a single issue focused on whether the arraignment, conviction and sentence were legally valid. The Supreme Court treated the second ground as abandoned because no separate issue was distilled from it.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that a valid arraignment under section 36(6) of the 1999 Constitution, section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act requires four essential steps: the accused must be placed before the court unfettered unless the court orders otherwise; the charge must be read and explained to the accused in a language he understands, to the satisfaction of the court; the accused must be called upon to plead immediately; and the plea must be recorded immediately.

These requirements are mandatory because they protect the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial and ensure that he understands the case he has to meet. A failure to comply with a fundamental requirement may render the trial defective, null and void. However, the Court distinguished a substantive failure from a merely formal omission in the court record. It held that the law does not require a charge to be read separately to each accused person where several accused persons are jointly charged. Joint reading and explanation are permissible, provided that each accused understands the charge and individually enters a plea.

Court Findings

The record showed that the charge was read and explained to Abdullahi and his co-accused in a language they understood, with the assistance of an interpreter, and that each accused pleaded not guilty. When the prosecution later withdrew the first count, the trial judge, out of caution, directed the registrar to read and explain the remaining charge again before separately recording the pleas of the accused persons.

The Court rejected the complaint that the plea was not recorded separately. It relied particularly on Cyril Udeh v. The State, holding that it would be absurd to insist that a jointly charged information must be read separately to every accused person. The relevant statutory provisions use language that, when interpreted in context, permits joint reading of the charge while still requiring individual pleas.

The Court also considered the omission of an express statement that the charge had been read and explained “to the satisfaction of the court.” It accepted that such a statement is good and desirable practice, but held that its absence does not automatically invalidate the arraignment. The test is whether the circumstances show that the accused understood the charge and was not misled or prejudiced. Abdullahi pleaded not guilty, was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and produced no evidence that he failed to understand the charge or suffered a miscarriage of justice.

Applying section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, the Court further held that where a judicial or official act is shown to have been performed in a substantially regular manner, the formal requisites for its validity are presumed to have been complied with. The arraignment was both a judicial and official act, and the record demonstrated substantial regularity.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal upholding Abdullahi’s conviction and sentence on the terrorism count. The Court concluded that the appellant had been validly arraigned and that the alleged omissions in the record were not fatal to the proceedings.

Significance

The decision reinforces the importance of proper arraignment in Nigerian criminal procedure while discouraging the defeat of substantial justice by technical objections that cause no prejudice. It confirms that the constitutional and statutory requirements must be observed, but also clarifies that courts will examine the substance of the proceedings. Jointly reading a charge to co-accused persons is not unlawful, and failure to use particular formulaic words in recording the arraignment will not by itself nullify a trial where the accused understood the charge, pleaded to it and was not misled. The judgment also illustrates the operation of the presumption of regularity under section 168(1) of the Evidence Act.

Counsel:

  • Mr. A. I. George – for the Appellant
  • Mr. Charles Ihua-Maduenyi, with Lindy Ihua-Maduenyi (Miss) – for the Respondent