RUTH ADEHWE AWETO V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2018)

Background

Ruth Adehwe Aweto was the Provost of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan, while Adekanye Komolafe was the institution’s Bursar. They were prosecuted before the High Court of Oyo State for offences under section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and her co-accused prepared and submitted nominal rolls and budget proposals which falsely presented 41 casual employees as permanent members of staff. On the strength of those representations, the Federal Government released approximately N7,041,861.15 annually for their salaries and emoluments, although the workers were in fact paid approximately N3,690,000.00 as casual staff.

The prosecution called five witnesses and tendered documentary evidence. The appellant and the co-accused testified and called additional witnesses. The trial court acquitted the appellant on counts 1 to 4 but convicted her on counts 5 to 8, imposing one year’s imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division, affirmed the conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the High Court of Oyo State had jurisdiction to try the appellant, having regard to sections 251(1)(a) and (p), and 251(3) of the 1999 Constitution.
2. Whether the prosecution proved the necessary corrupt intent and other ingredients of the offence under section 17(1)(c) of the ICPC Act 2000.
3. Whether the omission of the word “corruptly” in the Court of Appeal’s reproduction of the statutory provision affected the validity of the conviction.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the State High Court possessed jurisdiction to try offences created under the ICPC Act. Section 251(1) of the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court principally in specified civil causes and matters. Although section 251(3) gives the Federal High Court jurisdiction over criminal causes and matters connected with the subject matters in subsection (1), it does not expressly state that such criminal jurisdiction is exclusive. The use of the words “shall also have and exercise jurisdiction” demonstrates that the Federal High Court’s criminal jurisdiction in this area is not to the exclusion of State High Courts.

The Court further relied on sections 61(3) and 26(2) of the ICPC Act. Section 61(3) permits the Chief Judge of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory to designate courts to hear offences under the Act, while section 26(2) provides that prosecutions under the Act are initiated by, or deemed to be initiated by, the Attorney-General of the Federation. In accordance with Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation, the ICPC may prosecute offenders in properly designated State High Courts.

On the substantive offence, the Court explained that the prosecution had to establish that the accused knowingly gave an agent, or knowingly used, a receipt, account or other document containing a false, erroneous or defective material statement, with the intention of deceiving the principal or another person. The prosecution was not required to prove that the money obtained through the misrepresentation was personally recovered from, or retained by, the accused. Deception and the intentional presentation of materially false information were sufficient.

Intent is a state of mind and is rarely proved by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the accused’s conduct, the surrounding circumstances and the chain of events leading to the offence. The appellant’s own defence admitted that the 41 employees had not yet been converted to permanent staff when the budget proposals were submitted, that their true status was known, and that the difference between the amount released and the amount paid to them was used to meet other salary shortfalls. Those admissions required no further proof and supported the inference of dishonest and corrupt intent.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court rejected the jurisdictional objection and held that the High Court of Oyo State was competent to entertain the charges. The Court also rejected the argument that the evidence failed to establish mens rea. The false description of casual workers as permanent staff, despite knowledge of their actual status, was sufficient evidence from which an intention to deceive the Federal Government could be inferred.

The Court considered the omission of the word “corruptly” in the Court of Appeal’s reproduction of section 17(1)(c) to be immaterial. The trial court had properly referred to and applied the complete statutory provision, and the appellant had not shown that she was misled or suffered a miscarriage of justice. The omission was treated as a typographical or incidental error that did not affect the substance of the decision. The Court also observed that a reply brief is limited to answering new points raised in the respondent’s brief and must not be used to reopen arguments already made.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had upheld the appellant’s conviction and concurrent one-year sentences on counts 5, 6, 7 and 8. The majority judgments treated the State High Court’s jurisdiction and the appellant’s conviction as settled. One concurring judgment referred to remitting the matter for the appellant to enter her defence, but the operative disposition of the Court was that the appeal lacked merit and was dismissed.

Significance

The decision confirms that prosecution of offences under the ICPC Act is not confined to the Federal High Court. It also clarifies the relationship between section 251(3) of the Constitution and the statutory jurisdiction of designated State High Courts. Substantively, the case illustrates that section 17(1)(c) focuses on knowingly presenting materially false documents with an intention to deceive, rather than on proof that the accused personally benefited from, or repaid, the resulting financial loss. Admissions by an accused may independently establish facts essential to the prosecution’s case, and fraudulent intent may properly be inferred from objective circumstances and conduct.