AYO ADEGBITE V. THE STATE (2017)

Background

Ayo Adegbite was charged before the High Court of Ondo State with the murder of Theophilus Afolabi, contrary to section 316 and punishable under section 319 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 30, Vol. II, Laws of Ondo State, 1978. The allegation was that, on 7 November 2009, along the Ilu-Abo/Ajegunle Road, the appellant emerged from a bush and poured acid on the deceased. The deceased was taken to hospital and died on 6 December 2009 from injuries sustained in the attack.

The prosecution called five witnesses and tendered several documentary exhibits, including statements attributed to the deceased and statements made by the appellant during police investigation. The prosecution’s case substantially depended on evidence from the deceased’s wife, the investigating police officers and other witnesses that the deceased had identified the appellant as his attacker. The appellant denied the allegation and relied principally on an alibi, asserting that he was elsewhere when the attack occurred. The High Court convicted him and sentenced him to death. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, leading to the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue

The principal issue was whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who poured acid on the deceased and was therefore criminally responsible for his murder.

Applicable Law and Ratio Decidendi

The majority of the Supreme Court, in the lead judgment delivered by Galinje JSC, held that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every essential element of a criminal charge beyond reasonable doubt. This burden arises from section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, which guarantees the presumption of innocence, and section 135(2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The burden remains on the prosecution and does not shift to the accused.

For a murder conviction, the prosecution must establish that the deceased died, that the death was caused by the accused, and that the act causing death was intentional or was done with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm would probably result. The Court recognised that the prosecution is not required to call every person who may have some connection with the facts. It has discretion to determine the number of witnesses necessary to prove its case. However, the prosecution must call any vital witness whose evidence is material and may determine the case one way or the other. On the facts, the majority considered that the witnesses called were sufficient and that the unidentified “Ogoja boy” was not shown to be a specific, readily identifiable vital witness.

The majority further held that the trial court was best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses because it saw and heard them testify and observed their demeanour. An appellate court should not substitute its own assessment for that of the trial court where the evidence has been properly evaluated. The concurrent findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal were therefore entitled to substantial respect and could only be disturbed if shown to be perverse, unreasonable, legally erroneous, procedurally defective or productive of a miscarriage of justice.

Court Findings

The majority accepted the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 that the deceased consistently identified the appellant as the person who attacked him. The courts below found that the deceased and appellant knew each other well, including the appellant’s voice, and that this supported the reliability of the identification. The appellant’s late alibi was also considered weak because it was raised only in his third statement to the police, after he had learned of the deceased’s death. The Court held that an accused who relies on alibi must raise it promptly during investigation and provide adequate particulars of his whereabouts, including persons, places and information capable of meaningful police verification.

The majority concluded that the prosecution proved the causal connection between the appellant’s act and the deceased’s death, as well as the requisite intention or knowledge. It also rejected arguments based on speculation, including the suggestion that the deceased would necessarily have shouted the appellant’s name during the attack. Courts must decide cases on established facts and law, not conjecture.

Dissent

Eko JSC dissented. In his view, the prosecution evidence contained material and unexplained inconsistencies concerning the identity of the attacker. He relied on conflicting accounts in the deceased’s alleged statements, the newspaper report, police exhibits and the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Some evidence suggested that the attacker was unknown, while other evidence attributed the attack to the appellant. Eko JSC held that the court could not selectively accept one version and reject another where the inconsistencies remained unexplained. He also considered that the appellant’s alibi evidence had not been properly investigated and that prior hostility between the appellant, the deceased and prosecution witnesses affected the reliability of the identification evidence.

Accordingly, Eko JSC found that the concurrent findings were perverse and that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, and no other person, committed the attack. He would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and entered a verdict of not guilty.

Conclusion

By a majority, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, thereby maintaining the appellant’s conviction and death sentence for murder. Eko JSC dissented and ordered the appellant’s discharge and acquittal.

Significance

The decision restates important Nigerian criminal law principles on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the ingredients of murder, the limited obligation to call witnesses, the treatment of alibi, and the reluctance of appellate courts to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. It also illustrates the judicial tension between deference to trial-level credibility findings and the duty to examine whether contradictions in identification evidence create a reasonable doubt.