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Case Digest

BASHIRU POPOOLA V. THE STATE (2018)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • O. Rhodes-Vivour JSC
  • Kumai Bayang Aka’ahs JSC
  • John Inyang Okoro JSC
  • Amina Adamu Augie JSC
  • Paul Adamu Galinje JSC
Parties

Appellant:

  • Bashiru Popoola

Respondent:

  • The State
Suit number
SC.482/2013
Delivered on

Background

Bashiru Popoola was charged before the Oyo State High Court with the murder of Solomon Adeyemi, contrary to section 319 of the Criminal Code Law of Oyo State, 2000. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant, who was alleged to be having an affair with the deceased’s wife, went to the deceased’s residence on 8 April 2007 armed with a cutlass and an iron rod. He allegedly threatened to kill the deceased, attacked the deceased’s son with the cutlass, and, when the deceased came out of the house, struck him on the head with the iron rod. The deceased fell and died.

The appellant gave a different account. He denied attacking or striking the deceased and maintained that the deceased fell in the passage of the house, hit his head on the floor and died. He relied on the defence of accident. The trial court accepted the evidence of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. The appellant consequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the appellant’s statements, exhibits F3 and F4, which had allegedly been recorded through an interpreter who was not called as a witness, were properly admissible and whether their admission affected the conviction.
  2. Whether the prosecution evidence contained material contradictions concerning the manner of the deceased’s death, such that the evidence was equally consistent with the appellant’s guilt and innocence.
  3. Whether the defence of accident was established or supported by the evidence, thereby defeating the charge of murder.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that a statement recorded through an interpreter must ordinarily be tendered through the interpreter and the person who recorded it. If the interpreter is not called, the statement becomes documentary hearsay and is inadmissible under section 91(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The fact that the accused did not object to its admission does not confer admissibility on the statement, and a court should not act on evidence that is legally inadmissible.

However, the Court held that the wrongful admission of exhibits F3 and F4 did not warrant reversal of the conviction. The trial court and the Court of Appeal had relied principally on the direct and consistent eyewitness evidence of PW1 and PW2, not on the appellant’s statements. Section 251(1) of the Evidence Act provides that wrongful admission of evidence is not, by itself, a ground for reversing a decision where the appellate court is satisfied that the evidence could not reasonably have affected the decision.

The Court further held that a court must not select and prefer one of two materially conflicting prosecution accounts without properly resolving the conflict. Where a witness’s extra-judicial statement is inconsistent with testimony given on oath and no satisfactory explanation is offered, the evidence is unreliable. Nevertheless, the Court found no material contradiction in the prosecution’s case. PW3 was not an eyewitness and his evidence about the cause of death was hearsay. The only legally admissible prosecution account on the material event was that of PW1 and PW2, who witnessed the appellant strike the deceased.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution established all the essential ingredients of murder beyond reasonable doubt: the death of a human being, the fact that the death was caused by the appellant, and the requisite intention or knowledge that death would probably result from the act. The medical report, exhibit H, confirmed the death and the serious head injury. The evidence of PW1 and PW2 was accepted as credible, corroborative and conclusive on the central facts.

Applying section 316 of the Criminal Code, the Court held that the appellant’s conduct fell within the circumstances constituting murder, including an intention to cause death or grievous harm and the doing of an unlawful act likely to endanger human life. The appellant’s threat to kill the deceased, his arrival with a cutlass and iron rod, and his deliberate blow to the deceased’s head were circumstances from which intention could properly be inferred.

The defence of accident under section 24 of the Criminal Code failed because the appellant’s explanation was rejected as untrue. Where accident is raised in a murder case, the prosecution must show that the death was not accidental; here, the eyewitness evidence demonstrated that the death resulted from a deliberate assault. The Court also explained that manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being, whereas the facts established an intentional and dangerous act. A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, assessed objectively by reference to what a reasonable person would contemplate.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, including the appellant’s conviction for murder and sentence of death. The Court accepted the concurrent findings of fact of the two lower courts, finding no exceptional circumstance or perversity justifying interference.

Significance

The decision reinforces several important principles of Nigerian criminal evidence and procedure. It confirms the strict rule against admitting statements recorded through an interpreter unless the interpreter and relevant recorder are called to give direct evidence. It also demonstrates that an evidential error will not automatically invalidate a conviction where the remaining admissible evidence independently proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The case emphasises the special value of credible eyewitness testimony, the need to distinguish admissible evidence from hearsay, and the responsibility of trial courts to give reasons for believing or disbelieving witnesses. Finally, it clarifies that the presumption of intention may arise from the weapon used, the part of the body targeted and the surrounding conduct of the accused.

Counsel:

  • Mr. Adetunbi, with S. Abimbola and B. T. Onwubiko, for the Appellant
  • O. Abimbola, Attorney-General of Oyo State, with A. Gbadegesin, Solicitor-General, and Mrs. O. S. Tella P.S.C., for the Respondent