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Case Digest

BELLO V. MINISTER, F.M.H. & U.D. (2025)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Uwani Musa Abba Aji, J.S.C. (Presiding)
  • Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa, J.S.C.
  • Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, J.S.C. (Leading Judgment)
  • Chidiebere Nwaoma Uwa, J.S.C.
  • Mohammed Baba Idris, J.S.C.
Parties

Appellant:

  • Alhaji Mustapha Bello

Respondents:

  • The Minister, Federal Ministry of Housing & Urban Development
  • The Attorney-General of the Federation
Suit number
SC.67/2010
Delivered on

Background

This unanimous decision concerned a dispute over residential property on Gongola Road, Kaduna South, Kaduna State. Alhaji Mustapha Bello commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Kaduna, by originating summons. He claimed that the property occupied by employees or tenants of the first respondent was Plot 25, rather than Plot 39, and that he held the valid statutory right of occupancy over it. He sought the occupants’ ejectment, damages for unlawful occupation at the rate of N500,000 per annum from 2000 until vacation, and a perpetual injunction against re-entry.

Bello’s case was founded on documents tracing the property from Kaduna Textiles Limited. The company had occupied the land and constructed two duplexes and associated buildings on it. Bello asserted that he acquired the unexpired residue of the company’s interest and subsequently obtained a certificate of statutory right of occupancy from the Kaduna State Government. When the buildings became vacant after riots in Kaduna, employees of the first respondent moved into them. Those occupants maintained that they occupied Plot 39 and stated that the first respondent had acquired the property from another person. Bello disputed that description and obtained clarification from the Surveyor-General of Kaduna State, who confirmed that the relevant land was Plot 25, identified by the same beacon numbers appearing on the competing survey plans, and that Plot 39 did not exist in the official plans or records.

The respondents filed a preliminary objection, arguing that the action was contentious and unsuitable for determination by originating summons. They also filed a counter-affidavit and documents. The Federal High Court overruled the objection and entered judgment for Bello. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal in part, set aside the judgment, and ordered a trial de novo before another Federal High Court judge by writ of summons. Bello appealed to the Supreme Court, while the respondents cross-appealed on the issue of the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction.

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Appeal correctly entertained the respondents’ ground challenging the use of originating summons without requiring leave.
  2. Whether the action was unsuitable for originating summons because it involved disputed facts, land ownership and alleged unlawful occupation.
  3. Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to set aside the trial judgment and order a fresh trial by writ of summons.
  4. Whether the Federal High Court had jurisdiction under section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, over the claim against Federal Government agencies concerning land, injunction and damages.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the form by which an action is commenced does not automatically determine its competence. Although originating summons is ordinarily appropriate where the principal question concerns the interpretation of a written law, instrument or document, or where substantial factual controversy is unlikely, the use of an allegedly unsuitable procedure is not invariably fatal. Once the procedure has brought the parties’ real dispute before the court and no miscarriage of justice has occurred, the decisive consideration is whether the dispute was fairly and properly determined on the evidence.

The Court further held that proceedings commenced by originating summons are not confined rigidly to affidavit evidence. With leave, the court may receive oral evidence where competing affidavits disclose a material factual conflict requiring clarification. However, oral evidence is unnecessary where the material facts are undisputed or where documentary evidence attached to the affidavits sufficiently resolves the apparent dispute. If a fact requiring proof remains unresolved and the party bearing the burden of proof cannot establish it from the affidavit evidence, the consequence is failure of proof on that fact, not necessarily nullity or denial of fair hearing.

On the status of the challenged interlocutory ruling, the Court held that a decision is final if it conclusively determines the rights of the parties on the particular issue before the court, even if made during an interlocutory stage. The trial court’s ruling that originating summons was a proper method of commencement finally determined that procedural question and could not be revisited by the trial court or a court of coordinate jurisdiction. An appeal against that determination was therefore appealable as of right, and leave was not required on the ground that it concerned law, facts, or mixed law and facts.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had adopted an overly technical approach by concentrating on the general unsuitability of originating summons for hostile proceedings without examining whether the case had in fact been fairly tried and whether the respondents had suffered any miscarriage of justice. The affidavits and exhibits showed that both parties were referring to the same physical property. Both survey plans contained the same beacon numbers, while the Surveyor-General’s letter reconciled the apparent difference between Plot 25 and Plot 39 by confirming that the official records recognised Plot 25 and did not recognise Plot 39.

The respondents did not produce documentary evidence establishing ownership by the first respondent or by any third party. Their position was substantially a claim to remain in occupation, rather than a fully documented competing title. The material chain of title, the certificate of statutory right of occupancy, the survey plans, and the official clarification were sufficient for the Federal High Court to determine the controversy without a retrial. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that there was no substantial unresolved dispute of material fact and no procedural injustice caused by the originating summons.

The Court also rejected the appellant’s attempt to alter the basis of his argument on further appeal. The appellant had argued at the Court of Appeal that leave was required because the issue was fresh; before the Supreme Court, he argued instead that leave was required because the ground challenged an interlocutory decision filed outside the prescribed period. A party cannot present a new or inconsistent case on appeal, since an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings at first instance. In any event, the Court found the decision to be final on the procedural issue and thus appealable as of right. It also held that a decision not appealed against is accepted by the parties as conclusive and binding.

On jurisdiction, the Court interpreted section 251(1)(r) broadly. The provision confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over actions or proceedings challenging the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. The word “any” was not subject to an exclusion for decisions relating to land. The constitutional proviso also permits actions for damages, injunction or specific performance against the Federal Government or its agencies. Accordingly, the fact that the dispute concerned land did not remove it from the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction where the claim challenged the respondents’ administrative act of allocating or permitting occupation of the buildings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed Bello’s appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and restored in full the judgment of the Federal High Court, Kaduna, which had granted the reliefs sought by Bello. The respondents’ cross-appeal challenging jurisdiction was dismissed for lack of merit.

Significance

The decision confirms that Nigerian courts should not invalidate proceedings merely because the claimant selected the wrong originating process, particularly after the case has been fully heard and no miscarriage of justice is demonstrated. It clarifies that originating summons may be used where documentary evidence resolves apparent factual disagreements and that oral evidence may be called with leave when genuinely necessary. The judgment also provides an important test for distinguishing final from interlocutory decisions and reinforces the rule that parties must remain consistent with the case presented at trial. Finally, it affirms the Federal High Court’s broad constitutional jurisdiction over executive or administrative decisions of Federal Government agencies, even where those decisions concern land and the reliefs include ejectment, injunction or damages.

Counsel:

  • A. C. Amaechi, Esq. – for the Appellant
  • Victoria Alonge, Esq., with John Jelabi, Esq., Chinelo Obiekwe, Esq. and Victor Balogun, Esq. – for the Respondents