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Case Digest

CHUKWU V. AMADI (2008)

Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Port Harcourt Division

Coram
  • Tijjani Abdullahi JCA
  • Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun JCA
  • Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa JCA
Parties

Appellants:

  • Mr. Edmund Chukwu
  • Mr. Monday Chukwu
  • Mr. Okene Chukwu (representatives of the Rumuchukwu Family)

Respondents:

  • Chief J. S. Amadi
  • Mr. Evans Amadi
  • Mr. Wellington Amadi (for themselves and as representatives of the Rumuamadi Family)
Suit number
CA/PH/281/2001
Delivered on

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute over a parcel of land situated at Rumuwokerebe, Rumukwurushi, in Rivers State. The respondents, who were plaintiffs at the High Court, called the land “Ekwu Apamini” and claimed a customary right of occupancy, forfeiture of the appellants’ alleged customary tenancy, possession, damages for the harvesting of economic trees, and a perpetual injunction. The appellants, members and representatives of the Rumuchukwu Family, denied the respondents’ title and counter-claimed ownership of the land, which they called “Okporo Rumuchukwu Family Land,” together with damages and injunctive relief.

The dispute had deep historical roots. Both families traced their claims to a common ancestor, Wokerebe, but offered competing accounts of inheritance and possession. A significant confrontation occurred in 1963, when Randolph Etche, a member of the respondents’ family, entered the land to farm. The appellants resisted the entry and the matter was taken before a council of elders. Evidence was given that Randolph declined to take a traditional oath intended to test the competing claims, after which the appellants maintained possession of the land.

The High Court of Rivers State, Port Harcourt, delivered judgment for the respondents on 8 January 2001. It declared the respondents entitled to the customary right of occupancy, excluding a portion said to have been settled in the 1963 dispute, awarded them N60,000 damages for trespass and granted a perpetual injunction. The appellants appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether the respondents’ action was statute-barred under the Rivers State Limitation Edict, 1988.
  2. Whether the respondents had proved their title and were entitled to the declaratory, injunctive and monetary reliefs granted by the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that a limitation statute begins to run from the date on which the cause of action accrues. The writ of summons and statement of claim are ordinarily examined to determine the accrual date and whether the action was commenced within the prescribed period. On the pleadings, particularly paragraphs 4 and 24 of the statement of claim, the dispute appeared to have arisen in 1963, rather than in 1991 as argued by the respondents.

Nevertheless, the appellants did not specifically plead the statutory limitation defence or lead adequate evidence to establish it. Under the Rivers State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, a relevant limitation statute must be specifically pleaded where failure to do so could take the opposing party by surprise. Since limitation in relation to tort and contract operates as a defence that may be waived, the appellants were treated as having waived the defence. The first issue was therefore resolved in favour of the respondents, although the court’s reasoning recognised that the cause of action was connected with events in 1963.

On the substantive land issue, the court restated that a party seeking a declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his or her own case and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case. Title to land may be established by traditional evidence, documents of title, numerous and positive acts of ownership over a lengthy period, long possession and enjoyment, or possession of adjoining land in circumstances making ownership of the disputed land probable.

Court Findings

The appellate court found that the respondents’ traditional evidence was materially contradictory. Their witnesses differed on whether Chukwu or Chukwunta was the same person, whether Chukwunta died before Wokerebe, and who was entitled to inherit under Ikwerre custom. The trial judge had accepted the proposition that only Wokerebe’s sons who participated in his burial could inherit his property, but the Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not reliably establish that Chukwunta had predeceased Wokerebe or that the custom applied in the manner asserted.

The court further considered the appellants’ evidence of long possession and acts of ownership. The appellants had resisted the 1963 intrusion, occupied and used the land, maintained buildings, cultivated crops, possessed economic trees and exercised other acts consistent with ownership. Their account of inheritance through Chukwunta was regarded as clearer, more consistent and more credible than the respondents’ account. The appellants’ version was also supported by the history of the traditional arbitration and their continued possession after 1963.

The Court of Appeal criticised the trial judgment because it reproduced extensive testimony and counsel’s addresses but devoted comparatively little attention to evaluating the evidence and resolving the material factual conflicts. Although an appellate court ordinarily does not interfere with findings based on witness credibility, it may do so where findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on inadmissible or unreliable evidence, or result from a wrongful application of the evidence. In those circumstances, the appellate court may reappraise the record and draw proper inferences.

The court also observed that a custom which has been judicially noticed need not be proved in every case, but a party relying on it must still plead and prove facts bringing the case within the scope of that custom. Any customary rule that would dispossess or discriminate against persons merely because of the circumstances of their birth would be inconsistent with natural justice, equity and good conscience and would also raise constitutional concerns under sections 42 and 43 of the 1999 Constitution.

Conclusion

The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Rivers State High Court delivered on 8 January 2001 was set aside, Suit No. PHC/120/91 was dismissed, and the appellants’ counter-claim was granted. The appellants were awarded N30,000 costs against the respondents.

Significance

The decision illustrates the distinction between a limitation defence and the substantive merits of a land claim. It confirms that limitation must generally be specifically pleaded and proved, and that the defence may be waived in appropriate civil actions. It also reinforces the importance of consistent traditional evidence, corroborative acts of possession and the five recognised methods of proving title to land. Finally, it demonstrates that an appellate court is entitled to correct perverse or unsupported findings where the trial court has failed to properly evaluate the evidence.

Counsel:

  • E. Adele Esq. for the appellants
  • Chief N. Nwanodi SAN, with G. D. Gillis-Harry (Miss), for the respondents