DR. MARTINS BABATUNDE FABUNMI V. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN & ANOR (2026)

Background

This appeal concerned the dismissal of Dr. Martins Babatunde Fabunmi, a lecturer employed by the University of Ibadan. On 29 July 2010, the University issued him a query alleging that he had demanded sexual gratification from a student, Miss Thelma Uzomah Adoseh, before awarding her a score for a Bachelor of Education research project. The appellant denied the allegation in his reply. He was subsequently invited before several disciplinary bodies, including the Students Disciplinary Committee for Jointly Committed Offences, the Central Students Disciplinary Committee, a Panel of Investigation and the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee.

The appellant contended that he was eventually dismissed without being supplied with the reports of the disciplinary committees and that the procedure violated his right to fair hearing. The dismissal letter was dated 30 June 2011 but, according to the appellant, was served on him on 13 July 2011. He commenced proceedings at the National Industrial Court seeking, among other reliefs, the quashing of the committees’ findings, declarations that his dismissal was unlawful and unconstitutional, reinstatement, and payment of his salaries and entitlements.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the action was statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. The National Industrial Court upheld the objection and dismissed the suit. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, but the respondents challenged the competence of that appeal on the ground that the appellant had not obtained the Court of Appeal’s prior leave. The Court of Appeal upheld the objection and nevertheless considered the merits of the appeal. It dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether leave of the Court of Appeal was required before the appellant could appeal against the decision of the National Industrial Court.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to consider the merits after upholding the objection that it lacked jurisdiction.
3. Whether the appellant’s action before the National Industrial Court was statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that appeals from the National Industrial Court are governed principally by sections 240 and 243 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, together with section 9 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. The Court of Appeal possesses exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the National Industrial Court, but the right of appeal is constitutionally limited.

An appeal lies as of right where it raises a question of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution in relation to a matter within the National Industrial Court’s jurisdiction. An appeal in a criminal matter within section 254C(5) and (6) of the Constitution also lies as of right. In other civil matters, however, an appeal can only be brought with the leave of the Court of Appeal where such appeal is prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

The Court rejected the appellant’s attempt to characterise his appeal as one involving fair hearing. It explained that the true nature of a ground of appeal must be determined by reading the ground together with its particulars and identifying the actual complaint. The grounds filed in the Court of Appeal challenged the correctness of the trial court’s decision on limitation, the date on which the cause of action accrued, and the evidential basis of the ruling. They did not complain directly about a constitutional violation of fair hearing. The fair-hearing complaint went to the substantive employment dispute, whereas the appeal before the Court of Appeal concerned the preliminary question whether the action was statute-barred. Leave was therefore required.

Because no leave was sought or obtained, the appeal before the Court of Appeal was incompetent. Failure to satisfy that condition precedent deprived the Court of Appeal of jurisdiction.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court further held that the Court of Appeal, as an intermediate appellate court, was entitled to express its views on the merits after sustaining the jurisdictional objection. This approach avoids unnecessary remittal if a superior court later disagrees with the jurisdictional ruling. The Supreme Court therefore found no error in the Court of Appeal’s decision to consider and determine the substantive issues in the alternative.

On limitation, the Court held that section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act is a statutory limitation provision. An action against a person for an act done in pursuance of public duty or authority must be commenced within three months of the act, neglect or default complained of, subject to the statutory exception concerning continuance of damage or injury. The appellant’s cause of action accrued on 30 June 2011, the date on the dismissal letter. His suit, filed on 6 October 2011, was therefore instituted outside the three-month period and was statute-barred. The Court treated the limitation question as distinct from the appellant’s allegation that the letter was physically served on 13 July 2011.

Conclusion

The appeal lacked merit and was dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. The Supreme Court awarded costs of N2,000,000 against the appellant in favour of the respondents. Although Justice Abba Aji expressed the view that the incompetent appeal ought properly to be struck out, the operative outcome of the Court was dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the lower court’s judgment.

Significance

The decision is significant for litigants challenging decisions of the National Industrial Court. It confirms that merely mentioning fair hearing or fundamental rights in pleadings does not automatically create an appeal as of right. Courts will examine the substance of the grounds and their particulars. It also reinforces the strict consequence of failing to obtain leave where leave is required: the appeal is incompetent and the appellate court lacks jurisdiction. Finally, the judgment illustrates the strict application of the three-month limitation period under the Public Officers (Protection) Act to claims arising from acts performed by public institutions or officers in the exercise of public functions.