Background
This appeal concerned a claim for compensation arising from the compulsory acquisition of land in Akwa Ibom State. The appellants were traditional rulers, chiefs and community representatives suing for themselves and on behalf of the Ekid people of Eket and Esit Eket Local Government Areas. They claimed interests in land known as Stubbs Creek Forest, also referred to as Ine or Okoiyak. In 1997, the Government of Akwa Ibom State acquired approximately 189.224 hectares for purposes connected with the facilities and oil exploration activities of Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
The appellants submitted a valuation claim for ₦379,998,000 as compensation for unexhausted improvements on the land. Mobil allegedly paid ₦65,000,000 to the Akwa Ibom State Government, from which ₦18,300,000 was paid to part of the community as unexhausted royalties. The appellants maintained that they were not paid the compensation due to them and commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Uyo, seeking the claimed sum and interest from 30 July 1997 until payment.
Mobil and the State Government challenged the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction, arguing that compensation for improvements on acquired land fell within section 39 of the Land Use Act 1978 and could only be determined by the High Court of the State. The Federal High Court rejected the objection, assumed jurisdiction and entered judgment for the appellants on 27 March 2014. The Court of Appeal, Calabar, reversed that decision on 13 July 2018, holding that the Federal High Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue
The principal issue was whether the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellants’ claim, having regard to the true subject matter of the suit. The appellants also raised subsidiary complaints concerning Mobil’s status as a proper party, service of originating processes, the addresses stated in the notice of appeal, personal service and the alleged failure to obtain leave to appeal on grounds of mixed law and fact.
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Nwosu-Iheme, J.S.C., delivering the leading judgment, held that jurisdiction is the legal authority of a court to hear and determine a matter. It is a threshold issue which must be resolved before the merits are considered. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are a nullity, regardless of how carefully or competently they may have been handled.
The Court reaffirmed the distinction between procedural and substantive jurisdiction. Procedural defects may, in appropriate circumstances, be waived by a party’s conduct; substantive jurisdiction, however, derives from the Constitution or an enabling statute and cannot be waived. Applying the principles in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim, the Court stated that jurisdiction requires a properly constituted court, a subject matter within the court’s competence, commencement by due process and compliance with any condition precedent.
Jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the claimant’s case, particularly the reliefs endorsed on the writ and developed in the statement of claim, not by the identities, designations or governmental status of the parties. Courts must read the pleadings as a whole to ascertain the real cause of action. The Federal High Court is a court of enumerated, not general, jurisdiction under section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Its jurisdiction therefore exists only where the subject matter fits within one of the constitutionally or statutorily specified areas.
The appellants attempted to rely on section 251(1)(n), concerning mines and minerals, oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. The Court rejected that argument. The claim as pleaded was not for damages caused by oil exploration, nor for an injunction or relief directly regulating mining operations. It was specifically a claim for compensation representing the value of unexhausted improvements on acquired land, together with interest.
Section 39(1)(b) of the Land Use Act expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings to determine questions concerning persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under the Act. Section 51 defines “High Court” for this purpose as the High Court of the State concerned. Consequently, the claim belonged in the Akwa Ibom State High Court, not the Federal High Court.
Court Findings
The Court found that the presence of Mobil, NNPC or the Government of Akwa Ibom State as parties did not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. Nor did the fact that the land was acquired for an oil-related purpose transform a land-compensation action into a matter within section 251(1)(n). The substance of the relief claimed remained compensation for unexhausted improvements on land.
The Court further affirmed the settled position that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to determine ordinary land disputes, declare title to land, adjudicate claims for compensation for land or improvements, or determine trespass to landed property, irrespective of the parties involved. Because the want of subject-matter jurisdiction was decisive, the Supreme Court considered the remaining complaints about proper parties, service and appellate procedure academic and declined to determine them.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal was right to set aside the judgment of the Federal High Court. The appeal was dismissed unanimously, and the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Appeal No. CA/C/323/2014 was affirmed. No order as to costs was made.
Significance
The decision reinforces the constitutional limits of the Federal High Court and provides important guidance for disputes arising from land acquisition connected with petroleum operations. The decisive question is the legal character of the claim as pleaded, not the commercial or industrial purpose for which the land was acquired. A claim framed as compensation for unexhausted improvements under the Land Use Act must be brought before the appropriate State High Court. Litigants must therefore select the forum by carefully analysing the reliefs sought and the statute conferring jurisdiction, since neither participation by a federal agency nor an oil-related factual background can enlarge the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction.
Counsel:
- Enyinmfor Nwoka, Esq. – for the appellants
- Ituah Imhanze, Esq., with Jessica Iyoka, Esq. and Ozioma Soludo, Esq. – for the 1st respondent
- Dr. Okiemute Akpomudje, Esq. – for the 2nd respondent
- J.J. Akpan, Esq. – for the 3rd respondent