IDU GODWIN EMEKA V. HON. LYDIA CHUBA-IKPEAZU & ORS. (2017)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute concerning the nomination of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate for the Onitsha North/South Federal Constituency of Anambra State in the 28 March 2015 House of Representatives election. Hon. Lydia Chuba-Ikpeazu asserted that she had emerged as the party’s candidate and that the PDP’s National Working Committee had approved and forwarded her name to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). She alleged that her name was unlawfully withdrawn and substituted with that of Idu Godwin Emeka.

INEC published a list which omitted Chuba-Ikpeazu’s name and included Emeka’s name. Chuba-Ikpeazu consequently commenced proceedings by originating summons against the PDP, INEC and the National Working Committee, seeking declarations that the substitution was unlawful and a mandatory order compelling recognition of her as the party’s candidate. Emeka applied to be joined as a defendant and was joined, but Chuba-Ikpeazu did not amend her originating process to claim reliefs specifically against him. Emeka also did not file a counterclaim asserting an independent right to the nomination.

The Federal High Court granted Chuba-Ikpeazu’s reliefs and, because the election had already been held and the PDP had won the seat, ordered consequential reliefs including the cancellation of Emeka’s certificate of return and the issuance of a certificate of return to Chuba-Ikpeazu. The Court of Appeal dismissed Emeka’s appeal and affirmed the trial court. He appealed further to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to treat the appellant’s brief as incompetent under Rule 10(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that Chuba-Ikpeazu, rather than Emeka, was the PDP candidate for the constituency and had been unlawfully substituted.
3. Whether the concurrent factual findings of the Federal High Court and Court of Appeal warranted interference by the Supreme Court.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the plaintiff’s case determines the cause of action. In proceedings commenced by originating summons, the court determines the cause of action by examining the reliefs sought and the affidavit in support. Chuba-Ikpeazu’s case was specifically directed at the alleged unlawful substitution by the PDP and its National Working Committee; it was not an action requiring the court to conduct a fresh contest between Chuba-Ikpeazu and Emeka over who won the party primary.

The Court further held that a party who voluntarily applies to be joined but fails to file a counterclaim cannot later complain that the pleadings do not establish a positive claim in his favour. Since Emeka had not counterclaimed and the originating summons had not been amended to make a case against him, there was no proper legal foundation upon which he could obtain a declaration that he was the lawful candidate.

On the evidence, the Court accepted certified documents obtained from INEC showing that Chuba-Ikpeazu’s name and particulars had been submitted by the PDP. The failure of the PDP and its National Working Committee to produce the original minutes of the meeting at which the candidate was ratified justified the application of section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The presumption was that evidence withheld by a party would, if produced, be unfavourable to that party.

Court Findings

The Court rejected the argument that an alleged “extract” of the minutes satisfied the order requiring production of the minutes or the relevant portion of them. An extract must be a genuine portion of the original record; it cannot be a separate or substituted document that does not form part of the original minutes.

The Court also clarified section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011. A certified copy of a public document is admissible where it bears the required certificate, date, subscription by the responsible public officer, official title and seal where legally authorised. The law does not require a certified true copy itself to be separately signed after certification. Properly certified copies of INEC documents were therefore admissible as secondary evidence.

The Supreme Court distinguished Okafor v. Nweke. In that case, the signature appeared above the name of a law firm, which was not a legal practitioner. In the present matter, the signature appeared above the name of Paul Erokoro SAN, an identifiable legal practitioner. The relevant court process was consequently not invalid merely because other names appeared in the signature area.

The Court stated that affidavit depositions must contain facts within the deponent’s knowledge or information believed to be true, and must not contain legal arguments or conclusions. However, the preliminary objections based on alleged defects in the affidavits and grounds of appeal did not justify striking out the appeal. Ground 24, from which no issue had been formulated, was struck out.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that Chuba-Ikpeazu established, on the balance of probabilities, that she was the PDP’s duly approved candidate and that her name had been unlawfully substituted. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were supported by credible and admissible evidence. Emeka failed to demonstrate perversity, miscarriage of justice, substantial error or violation of principle sufficient to warrant appellate intervention. The appeal was dismissed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, and the consequential orders remained in force. There was no order as to costs.

Significance

The decision reinforces several important principles of Nigerian electoral and civil procedure. It confirms that declaratory reliefs are proved by the preponderance of evidence, that authentic public records may resolve apparent conflicts in affidavit evidence, and that adverse inferences may arise where a party with custody of crucial evidence deliberately withholds it. It also emphasises that appellate courts will rarely disturb concurrent findings of fact and that a joined party must properly define and pursue an independent claim, including by counterclaim where necessary.