ETENG OTU UJANG V. THE STATE (2017)

Background

Eteng Otu Ujang was prosecuted before the High Court of Cross River State for the murder of Ukpa Udop, contrary to section 319 of the Criminal Code applicable in Cross River State. The incident arose from a disagreement at a Christian crusade held at Abini Village on 18 November 2004. Christian pamphlets had been distributed to persons attending the crusade. The deceased allegedly took or seized a pamphlet connected with the appellant, and an argument followed when efforts to retrieve it proved unsuccessful.

The appellant reported the disagreement to the deceased’s mother. She pleaded with him to forgive the deceased and avoid further trouble, but the appellant allegedly rejected her pleas and stated that she would cry even more. A fight subsequently broke out between the appellant and the deceased. PW4 attempted to intervene and testified that the appellant injured him with a dagger. PW1 later arrived at the scene after hearing the deceased cry out. He found the deceased lying in a pool of blood with a serious injury to his head. The deceased identified the appellant as the person who had wounded him with a knife. The deceased was taken to a clinic, where he was confirmed dead.

The appellant denied intentionally killing the deceased. He relied substantially on provocation and self-defence, asserting that the deceased had attacked him first and that other persons at the scene had used machetes during the struggle. The trial court rejected his account, convicted him of murder and imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, leading to the further appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to affirm the admission and use of the appellant’s alleged confessional statements, Exhibits C, D and G, without conducting a mandatory trial-within-trial after the appellant objected that the statements were obtained involuntarily through threat or inducement.
2. Whether, notwithstanding the disputed confessions, the prosecution proved the charge of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the offence, within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, 2011. However, relevance alone is insufficient. Under sections 28 and 29 of the Act, a confession must also have been obtained voluntarily and in circumstances that do not make it unreliable.

Where an accused person represents to the trial court that a confession was obtained by oppression, threat, inducement, torture, degrading treatment or other conduct likely to render it unreliable, the court must determine the issue of voluntariness before admitting the statement. Section 29(3) permits the court to require the prosecution to prove voluntariness, while the judicial rule applied by the Court makes a trial-within-trial the proper procedure where voluntariness is challenged. The prosecution, not the accused, bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntarily made.

The Court further held that a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence where the circumstances are compelling, cogent and irresistibly point to the accused, and exclude reasonable co-existing circumstances consistent with innocence. Contradictions will only create reasonable doubt when they are material and go to the substance of the charge. Minor differences concerning matters such as the precise description of a knife do not necessarily undermine the prosecution’s case.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the appellant had promptly objected to the confessional statements on the ground that they were obtained through threat. The trial judge nevertheless placed the burden on the defence to prove the alleged threat and admitted the statements without conducting a trial-within-trial. The Supreme Court held that this approach was erroneous. Exhibits C and D, and the disputed confessional material generally, were wrongly admitted and could not properly be relied upon to establish guilt. The Court therefore resolved the first issue in favour of the appellant and directed that the improperly admitted confessional statements be expunged from consideration.

That conclusion did not dispose of the appeal because the prosecution had adduced independent evidence. The testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW4 established a sequence of events linking the appellant to the fatal assault: the initial quarrel, the appellant’s refusal to accept the deceased’s mother’s intervention, his threatening words, the subsequent fight, and his use of a sharp weapon against PW4 while PW4 attempted to stop the fight. The deceased’s identification of the appellant before death was treated as a dying declaration under section 40(1) of the Evidence Act. It related directly to the cause and circumstances of the deceased’s death and identified the person responsible.

The Court held that the evidence, viewed cumulatively, formed a compelling chain of circumstances pointing to the appellant as the person who inflicted the fatal injury. The appellant’s own account also placed him at the scene and confirmed that he was involved in the fight. The alleged inconsistencies between witnesses about the location of the incident and whether the weapon was a dagger or jack knife were considered immaterial. The prosecution was not required to produce the actual weapon, provided the evidence showed that a lethal weapon had been used.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had upheld the appellant’s conviction and death sentence. The Court made clear that the confessional statements were improperly admitted, but found that the remaining evidence, particularly the dying declaration, testimony concerning the fight and the surrounding circumstantial evidence, proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Significance

The decision reinforces the statutory protection against involuntary confessions in Nigerian criminal trials. A timely objection alleging threat or oppression cannot be dismissed merely because the accused has not yet independently proved the allegation; the allegation triggers the need for a trial-within-trial, during which the prosecution must establish voluntariness. The case also demonstrates that the exclusion of a confession does not automatically result in an acquittal where other admissible evidence independently establishes every essential element of the offence. It confirms the evidential value of a dying declaration in a murder trial, the permissibility of conviction on strong circumstantial evidence, and the principle that only material contradictions capable of generating reasonable doubt will defeat a prosecution case.