EVBARUESE V. UWAGBOE (2014)

Background

This decision arose from two consolidated appeals, numbered CCA/7A/2014 and CCA/12A/2014, against a ruling of the Uhunmwode Area Customary Court, Ehor, Edo State, delivered on 10 December 2013 in suit No. UACC/13/2013. The underlying dispute concerned the traditional office of Odionwere, meaning the eldest or senior traditional male authority, in Iguomon community.

Two interlocutory applications were filed. One application sought to restrain Mr. David Uwagboe from presenting himself, functioning or parading himself as Odionwere and to restrain other defendants from assisting him. Uwagboe’s application similarly sought to restrain another defendant from presenting himself for installation or functioning as Odionwere and to restrain the relevant community group from installing him. The applications were consolidated.

In its ruling, the trial Customary Court restrained the parties from carrying out activities connected with the office pending determination of the substantive action. However, it went further, on its own initiative, to appoint Pa. Aiyudubie Igbinovia, described as the second-in-command in the community, to act as Odionwere pending the determination of the substantive suit. The court acknowledged that Igbinovia was not eligible for the throne. He was also not a party to the proceedings, and no party had sought an order appointing him.

The affected parties appealed. The appeals were consolidated by the Customary Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the Customary Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under section 282(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, to entertain appeals concerning the trial court’s authority and procedure in the customary-law dispute.
2. Whether the trial court had power to suo motu appoint a person who was not a party to the proceedings as acting Odionwere.
3. Whether the appointment could properly be characterised as a consequential order flowing from the interlocutory injunctions.
4. In the second appeal, whether the trial court was entitled to restrain activities relating to the office and make an order not requested by any party.

Ratio Decidendi

The court held that customary law is generally a matter of fact to be established by evidence. Where the principal dispute involves customary law, ancillary questions of fact, procedure, jurisdiction and the manner in which the custom is proved are sufficiently connected with that customary-law issue to fall within the jurisdiction of a Customary Court of Appeal under section 282(1) of the Constitution. Customary law cannot realistically be separated from the facts and procedure required to establish it. The preliminary objections challenging the appellate court’s jurisdiction therefore failed.

The court further held that an appellate court is not bound to adopt counsel’s issues verbatim. It may reformulate or reframe them from the grounds of appeal where doing so promotes clarity, precision and brevity. Once grounds of appeal have been converted into issues for determination, arguments should be directed to the formulated issues rather than repeated mechanically under the original grounds.

On the substantive question, the court reaffirmed that a court is confined to the case and reliefs presented by the parties. It has no authority to make out a new case or grant a relief that no party claimed. A consequential order must genuinely flow from, and give effect to, a proper order already made; it cannot be used as a justification for introducing an independent and substantial order outside the scope of the applications.

Court Findings

The Customary Court of Appeal found that Pa. Aiyudubie Igbinovia was not a party to the action. No process had been filed by him, and no application had been made to join him as a party. Consequently, the trial court could not properly make an order in his favour or impose an order upon him. An order of court cannot ordinarily bind a person who is not before the court. The court also considered it contradictory and legally untenable that the trial court described Igbinovia as ineligible to occupy the traditional office and nevertheless appointed him to act in that capacity.

The proposed appointment was not a consequential order. The interlocutory applications sought restraint against the competing claimants and persons allegedly supporting them; they did not seek the appointment of an acting Odionwere. The appointment was therefore a new substantive direction, not an incident necessary to give effect to the injunctions. The trial court’s desire to prevent a perceived vacuum could not enlarge its jurisdiction or permit it to act as a charitable provider of unclaimed relief.

The appellate court also rejected the suggestion that the order could stand merely because the trial court was exercising discretion. Judicial discretion must be exercised according to law, within the issues submitted for determination, and on the evidence before the court. A discretionary order made without jurisdiction or outside the parties’ case is liable to be set aside.

Conclusion

Both preliminary objections were dismissed. The two appeals were allowed. The order of the Uhunmwode Area Customary Court appointing Pa. Aiyudubie Igbinovia as acting Odionwere of Iguomon village was set aside. The substantive suit, No. UACC/13/2013, was remitted to the Oredo Area Customary Court 2, Benin City, for hearing and determination de novo, with a direction that it receive accelerated hearing. Costs of N3,000 were awarded in favour of the appellants in each appeal.

Significance

The decision is important for customary appellate practice and the limits of judicial intervention in community leadership disputes. It confirms that the constitutional jurisdiction of a Customary Court of Appeal includes ancillary issues closely connected with proving and applying customary law. It also emphasises the adversarial nature of civil proceedings: courts must decide the controversy placed before them and cannot independently create a new dispute or grant relief to a stranger. Finally, the case clarifies that preserving order in a community, though a legitimate judicial concern, does not authorise the appointment of an ineligible non-party to a traditional office without pleadings, evidence, joinder and an opportunity for affected persons to be heard.