HAJIA YINUSA BAKARI V. DEACONESS (MRS) FELICIA ARINOLA OGUNDIPE & ORS. (2020)

Background

This appeal concerned the ownership and sale of a three-bedroom duplex at Block D44, Flat 3, Zone D Extension, Apo Legislative Quarters, Abuja. The first respondent, Deaconess Felicia Arinola Ogundipe, had served in the Federal Civil Service for 35 years and retired on 15 January 2004 as Director of Library Services of the Supreme Court. During her service, she had occupied the property as official quarters. Following the Federal Government’s monetisation policy, which included the sale of government residential houses, she expressed an intention to purchase the house and claimed a right of first refusal.

The relevant authorities, particularly the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory and the Federal Capital Development Authority, rejected her application on the ground that she had retired and was no longer a serving career civil servant. She was subsequently invited to participate in a public bidding exercise as a member of the general public. She submitted a bid, but while she was abroad receiving medical treatment, the property was purportedly awarded to Hajia Yinusa Bakari. On her return, Ogundipe discovered that her application had allegedly been misplaced. She was later given another form and submitted it with a bank draft. She was eventually served with a quit notice and commenced proceedings at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.

The trial court dismissed her claims, holding that she was not entitled to exercise a right of first refusal and that Bakari had validly won the property through the bidding process. The Court of Appeal, by a majority decision, reversed that judgment. It held that Ogundipe was entitled to fair consideration, that the purported sale to Bakari was invalid, and that the evidence showed Ogundipe’s bid to be the only valid public bid. Bakari appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory and the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction, having regard to the parties and the nature of the claims.
2. Whether the action was statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.
3. Whether the statement of claim, signed without identifying the person who signed it for counsel, was incompetent.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal granted reliefs that were not claimed.
5. Whether the Court of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence and correctly determined which party submitted the valid winning bid.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. Under section 299 of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Capital Territory has the status of a state for constitutional purposes. The Minister of the Federal Capital Territory occupies a position comparable to that of a state governor, while the Federal Capital Development Authority is an agency of the Federal Capital Territory, not an agency of the Federal Government for purposes of section 251(1) of the Constitution. Since the principal reliefs were not directed against the Federal Government or any of its agencies, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory had jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court is determined principally by the plaintiff’s claim and the reliefs sought.

The court further held that the Public Officers Protection Act did not bar the action. Although section 2(a) generally requires proceedings against public officers to be commenced within three months, the statutory protection does not apply to actions for the recovery of land. Ogundipe’s action was substantially concerned with recovering possession of the house and challenging the validity of its sale. It was therefore not statute-barred.

The alleged defect in the statement of claim was procedural rather than substantive. Court processes should identify counsel’s signature, name, representation and law firm. However, Bakari had failed to object at the earliest opportunity. She filed a defence, participated fully in the trial, called evidence, defended the trial judgment on appeal and raised the objection only at the Supreme Court. Her conduct amounted to waiver and estoppel by conduct under section 169 of the Evidence Act.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court approved the Court of Appeal’s reassessment of the evidence because the trial court had failed to evaluate the documentary evidence adequately. Documentary evidence was especially important because the dispute depended substantially on letters, bid documents, public notices and payment receipts. The respondents acknowledged that Ogundipe had submitted a bid, whereas Bakari failed to produce the bid document allegedly submitted by her. The court applied the principle in section 149(d) of the Evidence Act that where available evidence is withheld, it may be presumed that the evidence would be unfavourable to the party withholding it.

The receipts relied upon by Bakari showed payments made after the alleged opening of the bids and did not establish that her bid had been accompanied by the required ten per cent bid bond. The Court of Appeal was therefore entitled to conclude that Bakari had not proved the existence of a valid bid and that Ogundipe’s bid was the only valid public bid. The Supreme Court also held that the order directing Ogundipe to pay the bid price of N10,100,000 and associated legal charges was a valid consequential order. A consequential order gives effect to the judgment and must flow naturally from the reliefs and findings made by the court.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed that the purported sale of the property to Bakari was null and void, designated Ogundipe as the winning bidder, ordered restoration of possession to her and directed her to pay the bid amount and legal charges within 90 days. No order as to costs was made.

Significance

The decision clarifies the constitutional status of Abuja and the boundary between the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. It also confirms that limitation statutes must be applied according to the true nature of the claim, that procedural objections may be waived by conduct, and that appellate courts may reevaluate documentary evidence where a trial court’s evaluation is inadequate. The case further illustrates that courts cannot grant unclaimed substantive reliefs, but may make consequential orders necessary to implement the judgment.