HALADU V. STATE (2026)

Background

Haladu v. State concerned an appeal against the concurrent decisions of the High Court of Kano State and the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, convicting Ado Haladu of criminal conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death. The appellant was charged alongside his nephew, Ibrahim Habibu, and his brother, Habibu Haladu, under sections 97, 221 and 85 of the Penal Code of Kano State, 1991. The High Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to death by hanging. The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision, prompting the further appeal to the Supreme Court.

The prosecution’s case arose from the death of Mallam Haladu Adamu, an 85-year-old man and the appellant’s paternal grandfather. The deceased had purchased two bulls and placed them in the care of his son, Ado Haladu. It was alleged that Ado sold the bulls and shared part of the proceeds with the appellant and another co-accused. When the deceased later discovered that the bulls had not been stolen, as initially claimed, but had been sold, he threatened to use a traditional charm against the person responsible. The prosecution alleged that, fearing this threat, Ado confessed to the theft, sought forgiveness, and agreed to refund money allegedly paid to a traditional practitioner.

On the same day, the deceased was attacked at night in his home by unidentified persons. A prosecution witness, Sani Usman, responded to the deceased’s cries but did not see the attackers because the door was locked. The attackers fled when they heard the witness. The deceased was taken to hospital and died six days later. Medical reports stated that the cause of death was suffocation and strangulation. During police investigations, the appellant and the other accused persons made statements which were admitted as exhibits 2, 5 and 7A. Exhibits 2 and 7A were the English and Hausa versions of the appellant’s confessional statement.

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to affirm the conviction and sentence based substantially on the appellant’s confessional statements.
2. Whether the prosecution proved the offences of conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the confessional statements were inadmissible because they were allegedly involuntary or uncertified public documents.
4. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the concurrent findings of fact made by the courts below.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Nwosu-Iheme, J.S.C., delivering the leading judgment, held that the Constitution guarantees the presumption of innocence under section 36(5), while section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011 places the burden of proving criminal guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecution. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every fanciful or remote possibility. It requires compelling and conclusive evidence producing a high degree of probability, as explained in Miller v. Minister of Pensions and followed in Nigerian authorities.

The Court restated that culpable homicide punishable with death requires proof of three essential ingredients: first, that the deceased died; second, that the death resulted from the act of the accused; and third, that the act was intentional, with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was a possible consequence. The medical evidence established the death and its cause, while the appellant’s statements and the surrounding circumstances connected him and the co-accused to the attack.

The Court further held that criminal guilt may be established through any of three principal methods: a voluntary confessional statement, circumstantial evidence, or direct eyewitness testimony. An eyewitness is not indispensable. A voluntary and direct confession may, by itself, sustain a conviction, although the court must assess its credibility and evidential value. A later denial or retraction does not automatically render the statement inadmissible or worthless.

On voluntariness, the Court observed that the appellant did not object when exhibits 2 and 7A were tendered, and the prosecution witnesses were not cross-examined on alleged coercion. His challenge was raised only during his defence. In those circumstances, the lower courts were entitled to regard the subsequent challenge as belated and to find that no trial-within-trial was required. The trial court assessed the statements, found them credible, and the Court of Appeal correctly upheld that assessment.

Regarding documentary admissibility, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the original confessional statements required certification under section 104 of the Evidence Act. The original of a public document is admissible as primary evidence. Where the original is unavailable, the admissible secondary evidence is ordinarily a properly certified true copy and not an uncertified reproduction. Since exhibits 2 and 7A were the original statements, they were primary evidence and were properly admitted. The Court relied on the distinction between sections 86 and 104 of the Evidence Act.

Conspiracy, the Court held, is ordinarily proved by inference from the facts because direct evidence of an agreement is uncommon. In this case, the contents of the appellant’s statements disclosed an agreement with the co-accused to carry out the criminal plan. The surrounding facts, including the motive arising from the sale of the bulls, the coordinated attack, and the nature of the injuries, supported the inference of agreement and participation.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution proved the death of Haladu Adamu, established that the death resulted from suffocation and strangulation, and linked the appellant to the intentional attack through his confessional statements and circumstantial evidence. The Court applied the principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Attacking an elderly man with the intention of suffocating or strangling him justified the inference that the participants intended to cause death.

The Court also held that, once the prosecution had established the case beyond reasonable doubt, section 135(3) of the Evidence Act placed on the appellant the evidential burden of showing a reasonable doubt. The appellant did not present credible evidence capable of displacing the prosecution’s case. The Supreme Court emphasised that it would not disturb concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts unless the findings were shown to be perverse or there were special or exceptional circumstances. No such circumstances were demonstrated.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, delivered on 24 April 2015, which had affirmed the High Court judgment convicting the appellant of criminal conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death. The sentence of death by hanging therefore remained undisturbed.

Significance

The decision reinforces several important principles of Nigerian criminal procedure and evidence. It confirms that a properly admitted voluntary confessional statement can independently ground a conviction; that retraction at the defence stage does not automatically invalidate such a statement; and that an objection to voluntariness should ordinarily be raised when the statement is tendered. It also clarifies the evidential distinction between an original public document and secondary documentary evidence: certification is required for a certified true copy tendered in place of the original, not for the original itself. Finally, the judgment restates the demanding but practical standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the restraint exercised by the Supreme Court in reviewing concurrent factual findings.