Background
Haruna Jato, the second accused person at trial, was prosecuted alongside Aliyu Yahaya before the High Court of Kogi State for criminal conspiracy and armed robbery, contrary to sections 97(1) and 298(c) of the Penal Code Law of Kogi State. The prosecution alleged that on 14 January 2011, at Asaya in Kabba/Bunu Local Government Area, the accused persons conspired to rob Abbas Onimisi, a commercial motorcycle operator. According to the evidence, the accused persons engaged the victim to transport them, then one restrained him while Jato produced a jack-knife and threatened him. The victim surrendered his Jincheng motorcycle, valued at N120,000, and Jato also took N21,000 from him.
The victim escaped and alerted his friend, who mobilised others to search for the robbers. Shortly afterwards, the accused persons crashed the stolen motorcycle. Jato sustained injuries and was taken to hospital and subsequently to the police station. He made an extra-judicial statement, admitted as exhibit A2, in which he described the agreement with his co-accused, the threat with a knife, the taking of the motorcycle and the subsequent accident. The trial court convicted both accused persons. Jato received concurrent sentences of three months’ imprisonment for conspiracy and five years’ imprisonment plus a fine of N1,000, or six months’ imprisonment in default, for armed robbery. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, leading to the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue
The Supreme Court treated the appeal as raising one central question: whether the Court of Appeal was right to affirm Jato’s conviction and sentence. The arguments principally concerned the admissibility and evidential value of exhibit A2, the alleged absence of corroboration, the proof of conspiracy and armed robbery, and the prosecution’s failure to tender the knife and recovered motorcycle.
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every essential element of a criminal charge beyond reasonable doubt, and that this burden remains throughout the trial. The prosecution may discharge it through circumstantial evidence, eyewitness testimony, a confessional statement, or a combination of these forms of evidence.
The Court defined a confession as an admission by an accused person stating or suggesting that he committed the offence charged. A voluntary, direct and positive confession, once properly established, may by itself support a conviction. Although a retraction at trial does not make the statement inadmissible, the court must evaluate the confession with care. The recognised practical test includes asking whether facts outside the confession show that it may be true, whether the accused had the opportunity to commit the offence, whether the account is possible and likely to be true, and whether it is consistent with facts independently established at trial.
On the evidence, exhibit A2 was not an isolated or unreliable admission. It substantially corresponded with the victim’s unchallenged testimony concerning the robbery, the use of a knife, the taking of the motorcycle, the accident and Jato’s arrest and treatment. The confession therefore satisfied the relevant safeguards and was properly relied upon.
For armed robbery, the prosecution had to establish three matters: that a robbery occurred, that it was committed while armed, and that Jato was the robber or one of the participants. The testimony of PW1, reinforced by exhibit A2, proved each ingredient beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy was also established because it consists of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act. Direct evidence of the agreement is rarely available; the meeting of minds may be inferred from the conduct of the accused persons before, during and after the offence.
Court Findings
The objection to exhibit A2 was based only on the alleged form on which it was recorded, rather than on involuntariness, coercion or denial that Jato made the statement. The trial court rejected that objection and admitted the statement. Jato did not appeal against that interlocutory ruling. The Supreme Court held that an unchallenged finding or decision of a lower court continues to subsist between the parties, whether right or wrong, and could not be reopened indirectly in the further appeal.
The Court further held that failure to tender the knife used during the robbery or the recovered motorcycle was not fatal. The materiality of such physical exhibits depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, the eyewitness account, the appellant’s confession and the surrounding circumstances provided overwhelming evidence of guilt. The absence of the objects did not create a reasonable doubt.
Finally, the Supreme Court emphasised its established restraint in disturbing concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeal. Intervention is justified only where the findings are perverse, unsupported by the record, or affected by a substantial error of law or fact resulting in a miscarriage of justice. No such circumstance was shown.
Conclusion
The appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming Jato’s conviction and sentence by the High Court of Kogi State was affirmed.
Significance
The decision reaffirms several important principles of Nigerian criminal law. It confirms that a voluntary and unequivocal confession can sustain a conviction, even without extensive independent corroboration, although courts should ordinarily look for supporting facts. It also clarifies that conspiracy may be inferred from coordinated conduct and need not be proved by evidence of a formal or physical meeting. The judgment demonstrates that the non-production of a weapon or stolen property will not automatically defeat an otherwise credible prosecution case. Finally, it reinforces the finality accorded to concurrent factual findings and to unchallenged decisions of lower courts.
Counsel:
- John Ogwu Adele Esq. for the appellant
- Friday Ameh Esq., Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Kogi State, for the respondent