IKINE V. EDJERODE (2001)

Background

This appeal concerned the traditional method of selecting the Senior Odion of Uwherun Clan in the Ughelli area of present-day Delta State. The respondents, representing Erovie Quarter and its traditional leadership, commenced Suit No. UHC/9/88 at the Ughelli High Court. They sought declarations that, under the native law and custom of Uwherun, the Senior Odion could be appointed only from Erovie Quarter; that Erovie was the only ruling house; and that the appointment and gazetting of Chief Olori Edjerode, who came from Ehere Quarter, was contrary to Uwherun customary law and therefore invalid. They also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from acting as Senior Odion.

The appellants applied for dismissal of the action on three principal grounds: that it was statute-barred under section 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Bendel State 1976; that the High Court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was a chieftaincy matter; and that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of court process. Their abuse argument relied on an earlier action, Suit No. UHC/34/87, involving substantially similar reliefs. That earlier suit, however, had been discontinued and struck out with costs.

The High Court accepted the appellants’ objections and dismissed the respondents’ case. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and ordered a retrial before another judge. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the respondents’ action was barred by the six-year limitation period.
2. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the declaratory reliefs endorsed on the writ.
3. Whether the action was frivolous, vexatious, oppressive or an abuse of the judicial process.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. On limitation, the Court held that a cause of action arises when there is a person capable of suing, a person capable of being sued, and all material facts necessary to establish the claimant’s entitlement have occurred. The mere promulgation of Bendel State Legal Notice No. 88 of 1979, which codified the customary law relating to succession to the Senior Odion title, did not by itself create an actionable dispute. The cause of action arose when the appointment of Chief Edjerode was made and approved in 1985, because that was when the respondents became concretely aggrieved. Consequently, the action filed in 1988 was not statute-barred.

The Court further held that the 1963 Constitution had gone into abeyance upon the commencement of the 1979 Constitution and could govern only causes of action arising while it was in force. Since the respondents’ cause of action arose in 1985, the 1979 Constitution applied. Its provisions conferring judicial jurisdiction and modifying inconsistent existing laws meant that ouster clauses in the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Law 1979 of the former Bendel State could not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction where they conflicted with the Constitution.

In relation to jurisdiction, the Court emphasised that jurisdiction is determined primarily by the plaintiff’s claim. Where pleadings have not yet been filed, the court examines the reliefs endorsed on the writ of summons. The respondents were not asking the court to perform the administrative function of making or registering an official chieftaincy declaration. Rather, they asked the court to determine, on evidence, what the existing Uwherun customary law was and whether the challenged appointment complied with it. That was a justiciable question within the High Court’s jurisdiction.

Court Findings

The Court distinguished between an administrative declaration made under a Chiefs Law and a judicial finding about the content and application of customary law. Courts cannot usurp the statutory responsibility of a chieftaincy committee to formulate or register a declaration of customary law. They can, however, hear a claim seeking a declaration that a particular customary rule exists and apply that rule to the facts. The words “chief” or “chieftaincy” in a claim do not automatically oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

The Supreme Court also rejected the allegation of abuse of process. Abuse requires a lack of bona fide and proper use of judicial process, commonly demonstrated by the simultaneous prosecution of two or more actions between the same parties concerning the same subject matter, in a manner calculated to annoy, harass or oppress the opposing party. Although the respondents initially had two suits, they discontinued the earlier action and it was struck out before the appellants’ objection was determined. The later suit was therefore a substitute proceeding, not an attempt to maintain parallel litigation. The appellants could not rely on the discontinued suit as an enduring basis for dismissal after benefiting from its striking out.

The Court also reiterated that a reply brief is not an opportunity to repeat arguments already made in the appellant’s brief. Its proper function is to answer new points raised in the respondent’s brief.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The respondents’ action was held not to be statute-barred, the Delta State High Court had jurisdiction to entertain it, and the proceedings did not constitute an abuse of court process. The matter was ordered to proceed to trial before another judge of the Delta State High Court. The respondents were awarded costs of N10,000 against the appellants.

Significance

Ikine v. Edjerode is significant for Nigerian limitation law, constitutional jurisdiction and customary-law adjudication. It establishes that limitation time does not ordinarily run from the enactment of a dormant law or subsidiary instrument; it begins when the instrument is implemented in a way that creates an actual grievance. It also confirms that pre-existing statutory ouster provisions must yield where they are inconsistent with a later Constitution. Finally, the decision protects access to the courts in customary-law disputes by clarifying that courts may determine and apply existing custom even though they cannot themselves perform an administrative chieftaincy function.