ILAMI ARUGU & 19 ORS V. RIVERS STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2010)

Background

The appellants were persons who claimed to have been validly nominated by their political party as candidates for chairmanship and councillorship positions in the Rivers State Local Government Election originally scheduled for 3 November 2007. They commenced an action at the Rivers State High Court seeking declarations that their nominations remained valid, that the cancellation of the earlier party primaries was unlawful and unconstitutional, and that any fresh primaries or replacement of their names was void. They also sought injunctions restraining the Rivers State Independent Electoral Commission from conducting the election without their participation or from accepting other candidates.

The defendants challenged the competence and jurisdiction of the action. Their objections relied substantially on earlier judgments of Diepiri J. in suits numbered PHC/1383/2007, PHC/1503/2007 and PHC/1575/2007. Those judgments had dealt with the legal status and constitution of the Rivers State Independent Electoral Commission and had nullified actions taken by the Commission in relation to the proposed local government election. The trial court held that the earlier judgments constituted a legal impediment to the appellants’ claims. It struck out suit No. PHC/30/2008, stating that the appellants had to obtain leave to appeal against the earlier decisions and successfully challenge them before pursuing their own claims.

The appellants appealed. The second and third defendants also filed a cross-appeal, seeking to sustain the trial court’s decision on additional grounds.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court was right to treat the earlier judgments as a bar to the appellants’ action, even though the appellants were not parties to those proceedings.
2. Whether judgments of courts of coordinate jurisdiction were binding or merely persuasive in the subsequent proceedings.
3. Whether an appeal, or merely the filing of an appeal, could suspend or restore rights affected by an existing judgment.
4. Whether the cross-appeal was competent where the cross-appellant had not obtained the leave required by sections 241 and 242 of the Constitution.
5. Whether a party seeking affirmation of a judgment on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court was required to file an appropriate respondent’s notice under Order 9 rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that an appeal lies as of right under section 241(1)(b) of the Constitution where the grounds involve questions of law alone. In other cases, leave is required under section 242(1). Failure to obtain leave where it is mandatory renders the appeal incompetent. The cross-appeal was therefore struck out because the cross-appellant had obtained only extensions of time and had not obtained leave to appeal.

The court further held that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and operative until set aside on appeal or otherwise vacated. The filing of an appeal does not, by itself, nullify the judgment or remove its legal consequences.

Although decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction are not binding precedents on one another, they may be persuasive. The trial Judge was entitled to follow and apply the reasoning in the earlier judgments. More importantly, those judgments were judgments in rem. A judgment in rem determines the status of a subject matter or legal institution and binds persons generally, whether or not they were parties to the original proceedings, insofar as their interests are affected.

Court Findings

The court rejected the appellants’ argument that they could disregard the previous judgments simply because they were not parties to them or were allegedly unaware of the proceedings. The earlier decisions had pronounced upon the legal status of the Electoral Commission and its authority to conduct the relevant local government election. Since the appellants’ claimed rights depended upon acts undertaken by that Commission, their interests were directly affected by the judgments in rem.

The court also struck out the appellants’ preliminary objection challenging the joinder of the fifth to twenty-sixth respondents. Those respondents had previously obtained an order joining them to the appeal, and no appeal had been filed against that order. The order consequently remained subsisting. The attempt to challenge it again amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court of Appeal, which had a duty to prevent vexatious or duplicative proceedings.

The cross-appeal was independently incompetent because it did not properly complain against the dismissal of the action and instead sought to have the judgment affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. Under Order 9 rule 2, the proper procedural course was to give notice that the judgment should be affirmed on other grounds, specifying those grounds.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the substantive appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision striking out the action. The cross-appeal and the preliminary objection directed at the joined respondents were also struck out. The court emphasised that the appellants’ alleged electoral rights could not be enforced while the judgments invalidating the relevant legal foundation remained in force.

Significance

The decision illustrates the distinction between judgments in personam and judgments in rem in Nigerian civil procedure. It confirms that a judgment determining the legal status of a public body or institutional authority may bind non-parties whose interests depend on that status. It also reinforces the procedural importance of obtaining leave to appeal where constitutionally required, the continuing force of an order until set aside, and the obligation of litigants to use the correct respondent’s notice rather than an incompetent cross-appeal. The case is consequently significant for electoral litigation, jurisdictional objections, abuse of process and the effect of prior judgments on subsequent proceedings.