INSPECTOR DANTALLE MOHAMMED V. KANO STATE (2018)

Background

Inspector Dantalle Mohammed and other accused persons were prosecuted before the High Court of Kano State in connection with the abduction and repeated rape of Hindatu Sani, who was sixteen years old when she testified. The charges included conspiracy, abduction and rape under sections 97(1), 273 and 283 of the Penal Code, with related counts also referred to in the record. Three alleged perpetrators were reportedly still at large. The prosecution called five witnesses, including Hindatu Sani, who testified as PW5 and gave an account of being taken from a motorcycle at night, transported in a police vehicle, detained at various locations and subjected to repeated sexual assaults by the appellant and other men.

The appellant denied the allegations and challenged the credibility of PW5. He also argued that her evidence was not corroborated, that the medical report tendered as Exhibit A was improperly admitted because its maker was not called, and that a written statement allegedly made by PW5 had been withheld. His no-case submission was dismissed by the trial court. Following his defence, he was convicted and sentenced. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the Supreme Court on the central question whether the testimony of PW5 had been sufficiently corroborated.

Issues

1. Whether the evidence of PW5, the prosecutrix, was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of other prosecution witnesses and the other evidence before the court.
2. Whether corroboration is legally mandatory before a conviction for rape can be entered under Nigerian law.
3. Whether the appellant had established any exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal.
4. Whether sections 167(d) and 232 of the Evidence Act, 2011 could be relied upon in relation to the alleged withheld statement of PW5.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The lead judgment, delivered by Nweze JSC, held that corroboration is not a statutory requirement for securing a conviction for rape. There is no provision in the applicable criminal legislation or the Evidence Act requiring the evidence of a prosecutrix to be corroborated before a conviction may be sustained. Nevertheless, corroboration is highly desirable as a matter of prudence because it assists the court in assessing the reliability of the allegation and reduces the danger of acting on unconfirmed testimony.

The Court explained that corroboration means evidence which supports the testimony of the victim. It need not be direct evidence proving every aspect of the prosecution’s case, nor must it independently establish the whole offence. It is sufficient if the additional evidence supports the prosecutrix’s account in a material respect and connects the accused with the alleged crime. In this case, PW1 gave evidence concerning the appellant’s involvement at the office near Jifatu Stores, while PW2 testified concerning the complainant’s detention and repeated sexual abuse. The trial court also relied on admissions attributed to the appellant and the co-accused, as well as the medical report, Exhibit A.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the evidence of PW5 was cogent and remained substantially intact under cross-examination. The testimonies of PW1 and PW2 supported material parts of her narrative, including the places to which she was taken and the appellant’s participation. The appellant’s own statements and admissions further connected him with the relevant events. Accordingly, even on the cautious approach traditionally adopted in rape cases, there was sufficient supporting evidence.

The Court rejected the argument that a conviction could not rest on the uncorroborated evidence of a prosecutrix. Earlier decisions had expressed the matter inconsistently, but the modern and authoritative position is that a credible and reliable account by the victim may, by itself, ground a conviction. The proper caution is that it may be unsafe to convict on uncorroborated evidence where the court is not satisfied as to its truth; it is not an inflexible rule that corroboration must exist in every rape prosecution.

Eko JSC additionally addressed the alleged previous written statement of PW5. Under section 232 of the Evidence Act, a witness must be confronted with the relevant portions of a previous written statement if it is intended to contradict or impeach the witness. Where the statement is in the possession of the prosecution, the accused should follow the proper procedure, including a notice to produce where appropriate. The presumption under section 167(d) cannot be invoked casually or without compliance with that procedure. These provisions embody procedural fairness and give a witness an opportunity to explain an alleged inconsistency.

The Court also reaffirmed that it will not ordinarily disturb concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeal. Under Order 2 rule 32 of the Supreme Court Rules, exceptional circumstances must be shown before the Supreme Court will review the evidence for a third time. The appellant failed to demonstrate perversity, substantial miscarriage of justice or any other exceptional basis for intervention.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had upheld the appellant’s conviction and sentence for the offences established against him. The concurrent findings that PW5 was credible and that her evidence was materially supported were left undisturbed.

Significance

This decision is important authority on the evidential treatment of rape allegations in Nigeria. It clarifies that corroboration is not a compulsory legal precondition to conviction, although supporting evidence remains desirable as a matter of judicial prudence. It also confirms that corroborative evidence may be slight, indirect or circumstantial, provided it materially supports the complainant’s testimony and implicates the accused. The case further illustrates the Supreme Court’s reluctance to reopen concurrent factual findings and emphasizes that statutory presumptions concerning withheld evidence cannot replace the procedural safeguards governing cross-examination and production of documents.