JEGA V. EKPENYONG (2025)

Background

This appeal concerned competing claims to Plot 3267, Asokoro District, Cadastral Zone A04, Abuja. In 2003, Salisu Ibrahim Jega obtained a right of occupancy over the property from the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. The grant was formalised in 2005 by a 99-year Certificate of Occupancy, tendered as Exhibit P1. Jega subsequently appointed Dr. Sanni Umar Abubakar as his attorney in relation to the property, and evidence showed that Jega paid ground rent and other charges and exercised acts of ownership.

In 2012, the attorney discovered that Ekanem Ekpenyong had entered the land and was preparing to fence and develop it. Jega commenced proceedings initially against unknown trespassers. Following the identification of Ekpenyong, the writ and statement of claim were amended. Jega sought declarations of his title, cancellation of Ekpenyong’s later right of occupancy dated 12 March 2012, injunctive relief and N100 million in damages for trespass and dispossession. Ekpenyong denied liability and counter-claimed for a declaration that he was the owner of the same plot by virtue of his later right of occupancy, together with injunction and damages.

The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, granted Jega’s claims and struck out the counter-claim as incompetent. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the action was incompetent and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Jega appealed to the Supreme Court. Ekpenyong also filed a preliminary objection, arguing that the notice of appeal had not been personally served on him.

Issues

1. Whether the trial action was competent, properly constituted and within the jurisdiction of the High Court, including whether Jega had locus standi and whether the Minister of the FCT was a necessary party.
2. Whether Jega pleaded and proved the identity of the land in dispute.
3. Whether Ekpenyong established that Jega’s Certificate of Occupancy was forged.
4. Whether Jega’s earlier Certificate of Occupancy prevailed over Ekpenyong’s later right of occupancy.
5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Jega was not entitled to the reliefs claimed.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the preliminary objection and allowed the appeal. It held that service of a notice of appeal through the respondent’s counsel, at the address supplied for service, was sufficient where the respondent had actual notice of the appeal and had participated in the proceedings by filing processes. The right to personal service is procedural and may be waived. By taking steps in the appeal before objecting, Ekpenyong had waived any irregularity. The Court distinguished procedural jurisdiction, which may be waived, from substantive jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by consent or waiver.

The Court further held that Jega had locus standi. Locus standi means the legal capacity to institute proceedings based on a sufficient interest in the subject matter and the threatened infringement of civil rights. The question is determined principally from the statement of claim and the reliefs sought, not from the likelihood of success. Jega’s pleaded interest under Exhibit P1 and the alleged trespass were sufficient to confer standing.

The non-joinder of the Minister of the FCT did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Although a necessary party is one whose presence is required for the dispute to be fairly and conclusively determined, non-joinder is generally an irregularity where competent parties are already before the court. The resulting judgment may not bind the absent party, but it is not automatically a nullity. Both Jega and Ekpenyong were natural persons with legal personality and were proper parties to the trespass and title dispute.

Court Findings

On identification of the land, the Court reaffirmed that a claimant seeking a declaration of title must identify the disputed land with certainty, ordinarily through a survey plan or sufficiently precise oral and documentary evidence. However, identity becomes a contested issue only where the opposing party specifically disputes the location, area, size or description. Ekpenyong did not make identity an issue in his defence. More significantly, his counter-claim for ownership of the same plot was inconsistent with any assertion that the land could not be identified. The parties were effectively agreed on the identity of the property.

The allegation of forgery failed. Forgery involves making a false document or altering a genuine document for use as genuine. In civil proceedings, an allegation of forgery must be pleaded with particulars and proved beyond reasonable doubt. The party alleging forgery should ordinarily produce both the genuine document and the counterfeit or forged document. Ekpenyong supplied neither adequate particulars nor the alleged false Certificate of Occupancy. The ministerial committee report said to support the allegation was not properly tendered as an exhibit. The Court therefore held that the Court of Appeal’s finding of forgery was contrary to the pleadings and evidence and was perverse.

Although a Certificate of Occupancy is not conclusive proof of title, it is prima facie evidence of the interest stated in it. The court must still examine its genuineness, execution, stamping, registration, the grantor’s authority, the grantor’s interest and the legal effect of the document. Exhibit P1 satisfied those requirements. Since both parties traced their interests to the Minister of the FCT, the doctrine of priority applied: the earlier interest prevails over the later one. Exhibit P1, issued in 2005, preceded Exhibit D4, issued in 2012. The Minister could not confer a superior interest in 2012 after having already granted the relevant interest in 2005. The maxim nemo dat quod non habet therefore operated against the respondent’s later grant.

The Court also held that possession cannot cure a failed root of title. Once Ekpenyong’s documentary title failed, his alleged acts or length of possession could not establish ownership against Jega’s superior title.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/A/603/2018 and restored the judgment of the High Court of the FCT in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/283/2012. The preliminary objection was dismissed, the appeal was allowed, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the appeal.

Significance

The decision is significant for Nigerian land and civil procedure law. It confirms that a later right of occupancy cannot displace an earlier valid grant from the same government grantor; that documentary title must nevertheless be tested for validity rather than accepted automatically; and that possession cannot substitute for proof of title. It also reinforces the demanding evidential burden attached to allegations of forgery. Procedurally, the judgment adopts a practical approach to service of appellate processes, recognising service through counsel, actual communication and waiver where no miscarriage of justice is shown. Finally, it emphasises that courts should determine jurisdiction carefully but should not treat non-joinder or technical irregularities as fatal where the essential parties are before the court and the dispute can fairly be resolved.