JOHN ISURU AJAYI DAUDU V. ADAM SHELU & ORS. (2018)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute concerning the succession to the stool of the Ogiewa, also referred to as the Ogieare or Ogieawa, of Atte in Akoko-Edo Local Government Area of Edo State. John Isuru Ajayi Daudu, the appellant, was nominated for installation as the next clan head. The first to eleventh respondents, claiming to represent the Irhofio and Ewure ruling houses, commenced proceedings at the High Court of Edo State. They contended that the stool was rotational between the two ruling houses and that it was the turn of the Irhofio Ruling House to produce the next clan head.

The respondents challenged Bendel State Legal Notice No. 162 of 1979, which purported to regulate succession to the stool by restricting eligibility to the Imioveka family, described as a segment of the Ewure Ruling House. They argued that the Legal Notice was inconsistent with the native law and custom of Atte and had been made without giving the affected communities an opportunity to be heard. They sought declarations, injunctions, and an order restraining the recognition or installation of the appellant under the disputed declaration.

The appellant and the twelfth to fourteenth respondents defended the validity of the Legal Notice. The appellant also counterclaimed for declarations that his selection complied with the registered declaration, that Imioveka was the only ruling house, and that the respondents were estopped from challenging the Legal Notice. The High Court rejected the defence and counterclaim, declared the chieftaincy declaration a nullity, and set aside the appellant’s appointment. The appellant filed the main appeal, while the state officials filed a cross-appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction and competence to nullify a registered chieftaincy declaration contained in Bendel State Legal Notice No. 162 of 1979.
2. Whether the registered declaration constituted the exclusive constitutional statement of the customary law governing succession to the Atte chieftaincy.
3. Whether the action was statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, which prescribes a three-month period for actions against public officers.
4. Whether the cross-appeal could be treated independently and whether its principal issue had been overtaken by the determination of the main appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a validly made and registered chieftaincy declaration generally operates as the constitution of the relevant community concerning the customary law applicable to the specified chieftaincy. Courts ordinarily cannot formulate or substitute another customary law where such a declaration remains valid. The responsibility for making and registering a chieftaincy declaration is an administrative function of the executive, not a judicial function.

However, the legal protection given to a registered declaration is not absolute. A court has jurisdiction to examine and invalidate it where the declaration was fraudulently made, violates the Constitution or applicable legislation, or was produced through a process that offended fundamental procedural requirements, including fair hearing. Fraud includes deliberate acts, omissions, concealments, or misrepresentations through which an unfair or unconscionable advantage is obtained. Fraud may vitiate even the most solemn legal proceedings.

The court further held that the claimants had pleaded and proved that they were not notified of, or given an opportunity to participate in, the commission of inquiry whose recommendations formed the basis of the Legal Notice. The trial court’s finding of denial of fair hearing had not been challenged by the appellant and was therefore deemed accepted. That breach supplied a proper basis for the High Court to adjudicate upon and nullify the registered chieftaincy declaration.

On limitation, the court held that the three-month period under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law begins when the cause of action accrues, not automatically on the date an administrative instrument was made. The cause of action arose in May 2009, when steps were taken to nominate and install the appellant under the disputed Legal Notice. The suit filed on 16 June 2009 was consequently commenced within time. In addition, statutory protection is not a blanket shield for public officers who act illegally, in bad faith, in flagrant abuse of office, or in a manner producing continuing injury.

Court Findings

The court held that the High Court did not improperly make a new chieftaincy declaration. Rather, it exercised jurisdiction to review the validity of an existing declaration after finding that the process leading to its registration denied the affected parties fair hearing. The trial court was therefore competent to declare Bendel State Legal Notice No. 162 of 1979 invalid and to set aside the appellant’s purported appointment.

The court also held that a cross-appeal is a distinct and independent appeal, similar in some respects to a counterclaim. Nevertheless, where the determination of the main appeal resolves the central issue in the cross-appeal, the appellate court may deal with that issue summarily to avoid repetition and unnecessary use of judicial time. The limitation issue remained live and was resolved against the state respondents.

Conclusion

The main appeal and the cross-appeal were both dismissed. The judgment of the High Court of Edo State, sitting at Igarra in Suit No. HIG/18/2009 and delivered on 6 June 2013, was affirmed. The court awarded costs of N100,000 against John Isuru Ajayi Daudu in favour of the first to eleventh respondents.

Significance

The decision clarifies the relationship between customary law, executive chieftaincy declarations, and judicial review in Nigeria. Although a registered declaration is normally decisive evidence of the customary law governing a traditional stool, it cannot be insulated from judicial scrutiny where it was made in breach of fair hearing or through fraud, illegality, or constitutional violation. The case also confirms that limitation statutes protecting public officers must be applied by reference to the date on which the actionable wrong occurs, particularly where an earlier instrument is only later invoked to threaten or implement a chieftaincy appointment.