HON. MURTALA USMAN KARSHI V. HON. SULEIMAN ALHASSAN GWAGWA (2022)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute concerning the nomination of the All Progressives Congress candidate for the chairmanship election of the Abuja Municipal Area Council. At the party primary conducted on 23 April 2021, Hon. Suleiman Alhassan Gwagwa was initially declared the winner with 110 votes, while Hon. Murtala Usman Karshi was recorded as having 106 votes. Karshi challenged the result before the party’s appeal committee, contending that seven of the nine votes declared invalid had been cast in his favour. The appeal committee accepted that argument, added the seven votes to his total, and declared Karshi the winner with 113 votes.

The APC subsequently forwarded Karshi’s name to INEC by a letter dated 25 May 2021. The letter was received by INEC on 28 May 2021 and the relevant information was later published. Gwagwa, who maintained that he had won the primary and that the party had unlawfully substituted Karshi for him, commenced proceedings by originating summons on 9 June 2021. He sought declarations, orders setting aside the substitution, and mandatory orders compelling INEC and the APC to recognise him as the lawful candidate.

The trial court upheld the defendants’ preliminary objection and held that the action was statute-barred under section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution, which requires every pre-election matter to be filed within 14 days of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, held that the suit was competent, invoked section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004, and granted several of Gwagwa’s reliefs. Karshi and the other appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. When did the cause of action accrue in a case challenging the wrongful substitution of a candidate?
2. Whether the suit filed on 9 June 2021 was statute-barred under section 285(9) of the Constitution.
3. Whether, after evidence had been presented, the court was confined to the originating processes in determining limitation.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to invoke section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and determine the substantive dispute.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court, in the lead judgment delivered by Agim JSC, allowed the appeal. It held that the real complaint was not merely the later forwarding or publication of Karshi’s name by APC and INEC. The substance of the complaint was the decision replacing Gwagwa, who had initially been declared winner, with Karshi as the party’s candidate. The evidence, particularly the appeal committee report and related exhibits, established that Gwagwa was present at the appeal hearing on 24 April 2021 and knew that the committee had declared Karshi the winner.

Consequently, the cause of action accrued on 24 April 2021, when the replacement decision was made and Gwagwa became aware of it. The proceedings commenced on 9 June 2021, approximately 47 days later, well outside the constitutionally prescribed 14-day period. The action was therefore statute-barred and incompetent.

The Court also affirmed that where a limitation objection is determined after evidence has been received, the court must consider all relevant processes and evidence before it, and not artificially restrict itself to the originating summons. This approach prevents parties from disguising a stale pre-election claim by presenting it as a challenge to a later administrative act. The Court distinguished earlier authorities which treated submission of a rival’s name to INEC as the accrual date where that was the first point at which the successful aspirant became aware of the substitution. It held that those cases did not establish an inflexible rule applicable regardless of the evidence.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal failed to resolve material factual disputes concerning the composition of the appeal committee, Gwagwa’s attendance at the hearing, the committee’s verdict, and the date on which the substitution occurred. Exhibits produced by the appellants and INEC were materially identical and showed that Gwagwa had participated in, and was aware of, the appeal process. His contrary account was held to be unsupported and misleading.

The Court further reiterated the requirements for jurisdiction stated in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim: proper constitution of the court, jurisdiction over the subject matter, absence of any disabling feature, and commencement of the action by due process and satisfaction of any condition precedent. Since the action was statute-barred, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine its merits. The Court of Appeal therefore had no proper basis for using section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to grant substantive reliefs.

Conclusion

The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 3 December 2021 was set aside, including the declarations and consequential orders made in favour of Gwagwa. The judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, which held that the action was statute-barred and struck it out, was restored. Karshi remained the APC candidate whose name had been submitted to INEC. Gwagwa was ordered to pay costs of N5,000,000 to the first and second appellants. The cross-appeal was struck out as academic.

Significance

The decision is significant in Nigerian electoral law because it explains how the 14-day limitation period for pre-election disputes is calculated. The court must identify the true event, decision or action complained of, rather than accept the claimant’s description of a later event if the evidence shows that the grievance had crystallised earlier. It also confirms that courts may examine the complete evidential record when a limitation objection is considered after trial or alongside the merits. The ruling reinforces the constitutional policy favouring speedy resolution of pre-election disputes and warns litigants that inaccurate framing of a claim cannot revive an action already barred by time.