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Case Digest

KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS V. MISS YETUNDE ZAINAB TOLANI (2019)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili JSC
  • Kumai Bayang Aka’ahs JSC
  • Kudirat Motonmori O. Kekere-Ekun JSC
  • Amiru Sanusi JSC
  • Ejembi Eko JSC
Parties

Appellants:

  • Kwara State Judicial Service Commission
  • Hon. Justice Timothy Oyeyepo, Chairman, Kwara State Judicial Service Commission
  • Mrs. Olalere, Secretary, Kwara State Judicial Service Commission
  • Attorney-General of Kwara State

Respondent:

  • Miss Yetunde Zainab Tolani
Suit number
SC.63/2010
Delivered on

Background

Miss Yetunde Zainab Tolani was appointed by the Kwara State Judicial Service Commission as a Magistrate Grade II on Grade Level 10. Her appointment letter was dated 23 December 2004, she accepted the appointment on 24 December 2004, and she assumed duty on 27 December 2004. Shortly afterwards, the Commission received a petition from a person identified as Abdul-Rasaq Tunde Raji alleging that she had misrepresented her marital status in her application by describing herself as single. The petition was forwarded to her for a response. The Commission considered her explanation unsatisfactory and, by letter dated 8 February 2005, purported to withdraw or terminate her appointment.

The respondent commenced proceedings at the High Court of Kwara State, seeking declarations that the termination was unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void, an order setting aside the termination letter, reinstatement, payment of salaries and allowances, and an injunction restraining further interference with her appointment. The trial court found the termination wrongful and awarded limited monetary relief, including salary for the period worked and one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Court of Appeal went further, holding that the respondent’s employment had statutory flavour and ordering her reinstatement. The Judicial Service Commission and the other appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the respondent’s appointment was terminated because of a proved misrepresentation or lie concerning her marital status.
  2. Whether the respondent’s employment as a Magistrate Grade II was protected by statute and therefore clothed with statutory flavour.
  3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to order reinstatement rather than restrict the respondent’s remedy to damages.
  4. Whether the Court of Appeal’s reliance on certain international instruments and its reasoning materially vitiated its judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. It held that employment has statutory flavour where two elements coexist: first, the employer is established by the Constitution or statute; and second, the Constitution, statute, or regulations made under it prescribe the terms governing the employee’s appointment, discipline, and termination.

The Kwara State Judicial Service Commission was established under section 197(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, while paragraph 6(c), Part II of the Third Schedule empowered it to appoint, dismiss, and exercise disciplinary control over magistrates and other judicial-service staff. The Commission had also made the Kwara State Judicial Service Commission Regulations 1980. In addition, section 8(2), (3), and (f) of the Kwara State Criminal Procedure Code recognised the office of a Magistrate Grade II and provided for appointment by the Judicial Service Commission in accordance with the Constitution and applicable legislation.

Because the respondent’s appointment and discipline were governed by this constitutional and regulatory framework, her employment was not an ordinary common-law master-and-servant relationship. The Commission was consequently required to comply strictly with the prescribed disciplinary procedure before terminating her appointment. A failure to do so rendered the purported termination invalid and entitled her to reinstatement.

Court Findings

The Court found that marital status was not a condition for appointment as a Magistrate. The Commission’s own witness, its Secretary, admitted that marital status was not a factor considered in appointing magistrates. The allegation that the respondent had lied on oath was based principally on an unsubstantiated petition from an unidentified or faceless petitioner. The petitioner was not called to substantiate the allegation, and the Commission did not establish the alleged misconduct in accordance with law.

Under sections 131(1) and 132 of the Evidence Act 2004, the party asserting a fact bears the burden of proving it. The Commission could not rely on an unsupported accusation, particularly where the allegation involved an alleged criminal offence. The Supreme Court described the Commission’s reliance on the anonymous petition and on an irrelevant fact as unreasonable and perverse. A judicial or quasi-judicial body must act fairly, rationally, and in accordance with natural justice. Perversity is not an acceptable attribute of a body exercising disciplinary or judicial functions.

The Court also distinguished “wrongful” from “unlawful” termination. In ordinary master-and-servant employment, wrongful termination may ordinarily lead to damages because the termination remains effective. However, where employment is protected by statute, termination contrary to the governing law or regulations is null and void, and reinstatement is the appropriate remedy.

The Supreme Court further held that an appellate court will not reverse a correct decision merely because some reasons given for reaching it are erroneous. An error will vitiate a judgment only where it causes a miscarriage of justice or materially affects the decision. The Court of Appeal’s references to international treaties did not affect the correctness of its conclusion.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s order reinstating Miss Tolani to her position as Magistrate Grade II and upheld the legal consequences of the invalid termination. No order as to costs was made in the lead judgment.

Significance

This decision reaffirms the protection accorded to employees whose appointments are governed by constitutional or statutory provisions. It confirms that a statutory employer cannot avoid procedural safeguards by describing a termination as a “withdrawal,” “probationary termination,” or administrative action. Judicial Service Commissions, as bodies exercising disciplinary and quasi-judicial powers, must rely on proved facts, observe fair hearing, and comply strictly with applicable regulations. The case also illustrates that where statutory employment is unlawfully terminated, reinstatement—not merely damages—is ordinarily the proper remedy.

Counsel:

  • J.A. Mumini (DPP), with A.B. Daramola, for the appellants
  • Salman Jawondo, with Abduwasiu Lawal and Andrew Apeh, for the respondent