Background
On 28 March 2014 in Kichikpa village, Niger State, the appellant, Mairo Danladi, administered a poisonous substance called ‘otapiapia’ to her three-month-old co-wife’s infant, Musa Danladi. The baby fell ill, was taken to a chemist, then to General Hospital Kafin Koro, where he died later that day. The appellant confessed to her husband, Danladi Shaba, who reported the matter to the village head and police. She was charged with culpable homicide punishable with death under section 221(a) of the Niger State Penal Code.
At trial, the prosecution called five witnesses (PW1–PW5) including police officers and the infant’s mother; the appellant testified as DW1 without calling other witnesses. Two confessional statements made at the police station were admitted as Exhibits B and C over a defence of non-est factum. The trial court convicted and sentenced her to death on 6 November 2019. On 21 December 2020, the Court of Appeal (Abuja Division) dismissed her appeal. She then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the appellant’s confessional statements were involuntary, obtained by threat and intimidation, and thus inadmissible.
- Whether medical evidence was required to prove the infant’s death by poisoning.
- Whether the prosecution proved culpable homicide beyond reasonable doubt in light of alleged gaps or contradictions.
Ratio Decidendi
- A confession, when direct, positive and voluntary, is admissible and may alone sustain a conviction if corroborated by minimal external evidence. Non-est factum does not bar admissibility.
- Medical evidence is not mandatory where death is immediate or the cause is obvious from admitted facts; no novus actus interveniens interrupted causation here.
- Evaluation of evidence is primarily for the trial court; concurrent findings of fact by trial and appellate courts will only be upset if perverse or giving rise to a miscarriage of justice.
Court Findings
Admissibility of Confession: The defence only objected to non-est factum at trial, not to voluntariness under section 29 of the Evidence Act. A trial within trial was aborted by defence counsel’s change of ground. Exhibits B and C were therefore validly admitted as voluntary confessions. The Supreme Court refused to exclude them.
Medical Evidence: The Court held that medical proof is unnecessary where a death occurs almost immediately after poison administration. The chain of causation was unbroken, and no evidence suggested an intervening cause like pre-existing anaemia.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The prosecution discharged its burden under section 135 of the Evidence Act. The infant’s death, the appellant’s intentional act of poisoning, and her knowledge of its probable fatal result were all established by confession and uncontradicted witness testimony. Minor inconsistencies in witnesses’ accounts did not impair the strong admissible evidence.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions. The Court held that the appellant’s confessional statements were properly admitted, medical evidence was not required, and the prosecution proved culpable homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
Significance
This decision underscores that voluntary confessions, when direct and unchallenged on proper grounds, remain the strongest evidence. It clarifies that medical proof is not always essential in homicide where causation is clear and immediate. The judgment reinforces the appellate deference accorded to trial findings on credibility and fact-evaluation, limiting interference to instances of clear perversion or miscarriage of justice.