MALLAM SULYMAN AREMU V. MR. FELIX ANUSIONWA (2016)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute over a 25-metre portion of land in Ilorin, Kwara State. The appellant had acquired the larger parcel of land in 1977. On the advice of the Kwara State Ministry of Lands and Housing, part of the land was excised as a setback to the riverbank. The Ministry subsequently allocated the excised area, on a temporary basis, to the respondent, who began constructing shop spaces thereon and obtained a Certificate of Temporary Occupancy.

The appellant objected to the respondent’s occupation and development of the land. He instituted a criminal complaint against the respondent for criminal trespass before Upper Area Court I, Ilorin. The respondent was discharged in that proceeding and thereafter brought an action before the Kwara State High Court. He claimed N1,417,938 for the alleged destruction of his structures and building materials, N700,000 for malicious prosecution and N400,000 as general damages. The appellant denied liability and counterclaimed N500,000 for unlawful detention and defamation, alleging that the respondent had falsely reported to the police that he and another person threatened to kill him.

The High Court found for the respondent, granted his claims and dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the appellant’s prosecution of the respondent for criminal trespass, and his subsequent exercise of the right of appeal, were activated by malice and constituted malicious prosecution.
2. Whether the appellant established his counterclaim for unlawful detention and defamation.
3. Whether the respondent was entitled to the general damages awarded by the trial court, including damages for the alleged destruction of his structures.

Ratio Decidendi

To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, a claimant must establish, among other matters, that the prosecution was instituted without reasonable and probable cause, that it terminated in the claimant’s favour, and that it was actuated by malice. Malice in this context includes the absence of an honest belief in the charge preferred. The fact that a defendant initiated criminal proceedings, and that the proceedings ended in the claimant’s discharge, does not by itself prove malice.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving malice. The appellant had a genuine dispute concerning the ownership and status of the setback. The evidence showed that the appellant believed the disputed area remained part of his land, particularly because the area had originally been excised for riverbank protection and there was an issue concerning notice, compensation and the Ministry’s subsequent allocation. In those circumstances, the complaint of criminal trespass and the appeal against the decision of the Area Court could not properly be characterised as malicious.

The court further reaffirmed that damages must flow from a legally established wrong. General damages are presumed to arise from the wrong complained of, but there must first be proof that the defendant committed the relevant wrong. A claimant cannot receive double compensation for the same injury under different heads of damages.

Court Findings

The appellate court found that the trial court wrongly inferred malice from the appellant’s initiation of the criminal proceedings and his decision to appeal. The appellant’s conduct was supported by an honest belief in his claim to the land and by circumstances capable of providing reasonable grounds for reporting the respondent. The finding of malicious prosecution was therefore set aside.

The award of damages relating to the alleged destruction or removal of the respondent’s structures was also set aside. The respondent did not produce sufficiently reliable evidence proving that the appellant destroyed the structures. The trial court had itself questioned or rejected aspects of the evidence on that point but nevertheless proceeded to award damages. That approach was inconsistent with the evidential burden resting on the claimant.

The court also held that the two awards of general damages were legally unsustainable. Where a claimant has been fully compensated under one head for a particular injury, awarding another sum for the same injury amounts to double compensation, which the law does not permit.

On the appellant’s counterclaim, the Court of Appeal declined to grant relief. Although the respondent had admitted reporting the appellant to the police over an alleged threat to life, the appellant still failed to establish the essential elements of unlawful detention and defamation. A report made to the police for investigation is not, without more, publication to the general public and therefore does not ordinarily constitute defamation. It is the police who must investigate the report and decide what action is appropriate. The court also observed that the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is generally entitled to respect, although an appellate court may interfere where the evaluation of evidence is perverse or unsupported by the record.

Conclusion

The appeal was allowed in part. The decision of the High Court granting the respondent’s claims for malicious prosecution and damages was set aside. However, the dismissal of the appellant’s counterclaim for unlawful detention and defamation was affirmed. Each party was ordered to bear his own costs.

Significance

The decision clarifies that a failed criminal complaint does not automatically give rise to malicious prosecution. The claimant must prove malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause. It also emphasises the importance of proving pleaded facts through admissible evidence; facts not supported by testimony may be treated as abandoned. Finally, the case restates the prohibition against double compensation and confirms that a bona fide report to the police is not equivalent to defamatory publication to members of the public.