MATTHEW NWALU V. THE STATE (2018)

Background

Matthew Nwalu was the driver of Professor Ferdinand Ukah, who died in a motor accident on 8 October 1996 while travelling from Enugu to Mgbowo. The prosecution alleged that Nwalu deliberately stage-managed the accident in order to kill the deceased and make the death appear accidental. He was charged with murder under section 274(1) of the Criminal Code, Laws of Anambra State of Nigeria, 1986, applicable to Enugu State.

The prosecution called seven witnesses, but none was an eyewitness to the alleged killing. Nwalu testified as the sole defence witness and maintained that the death resulted from an accident. His account was that, while attempting to avoid potholes, he lost control of the vehicle, which hit a roadside tree and somersaulted. The High Court of Enugu State rejected his account, relied substantially on circumstantial evidence, convicted him, and imposed sentence for murder. The Court of Appeal, Enugu Division, affirmed the conviction. Nwalu appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the lower courts was sufficiently strong, compelling, positive and conclusive to establish that Nwalu intentionally caused the death of Professor Ukah.
2. Whether the prosecution proved all the essential ingredients of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether material contradictions and competing explanations in the prosecution’s evidence ought to have been resolved in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that circumstantial evidence can sustain a criminal conviction only where it points unequivocally, positively, unmistakably and irresistibly to the guilt of the accused. The established facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Circumstantial evidence that permits another reasonable inference, such as the occurrence of an accidental death, is insufficient to support a conviction for murder.

The Court reaffirmed that the burden of proving guilt remains throughout on the prosecution and does not shift to the accused. Under section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the prosecution may prove its case through eyewitness testimony, a voluntarily made confession or admission, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of these methods. Whichever method is used, every ingredient of the offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution was required to establish that the deceased was dead, that his death was caused by an unlawful act or omission of the appellant, and that the act or omission was intentional, with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. Proof that Nwalu may have driven negligently or dangerously could not, without more, establish the intention or knowledge required for murder.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the evidence did establish the death of Professor Ukah and could arguably connect the accident to the appellant’s negligence. It did not, however, establish beyond reasonable doubt that Nwalu intentionally caused the accident or possessed the necessary intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

The evidence of the prosecution witnesses created substantial doubt. The medical evidence was not inconsistent with injuries sustained when a vehicle occupant was violently thrown against the interior of a vehicle during an accident. The Vehicle Inspection Officer observed extensive damage to the vehicle, punctured tyres, skid marks and the presence of potholes near the scene. These facts were consistent with Nwalu’s account that he lost control while trying to avoid potholes.

There was also a material contradiction between the evidence of the investigating police officer and other prosecution witnesses. While some witnesses referred to a burst tyre and an accidental cause, the investigating officer maintained that there was no burst tyre and suggested that the accident had been deliberately caused. Importantly, the investigating officer had initially recommended that Nwalu be prosecuted for reckless or dangerous driving under section 45 of the Road Traffic Act, rather than murder. This recommendation and the physical evidence supported an alternative explanation of accidental death caused, at most, by careless or dangerous driving.

The trial court failed to properly evaluate the competing versions and did not adequately explain why it preferred the prosecution’s inculpatory theory over the appellant’s exculpatory account. A court must test the evidence of both sides against each other and give reasons for preferring one version. It cannot arbitrarily ignore evidence favourable to the accused. The failure to perform that duty rendered the concurrent findings of the lower courts perverse.

The Court further held that where the prosecution itself places before the court both inculpatory and exculpatory versions of the same criminal incident, and does not resolve the conflict, it has failed to discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, even strong suspicion, cannot replace proof. Any doubt arising from the material contradictions had to be resolved in favour of Nwalu.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was neither compelling nor conclusive. The conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal were set aside. Matthew Nwalu was acquitted and discharged.

Significance

The decision is significant for Nigerian criminal law because it illustrates the strict limits on the use of circumstantial evidence in a murder prosecution. It confirms that the “last seen” principle does not automatically establish guilt, particularly where the accused’s presence with the deceased is explained by an ordinary relationship such as employment and driving. The prosecution must still prove causation, unlawfulness and the specific mental element of murder. The judgment also emphasises the judicial duty to confront contradictions, evaluate defence evidence fairly and give the accused the benefit of every reasonable doubt.