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Case Digest

MOAVEGA IGBA V. THE STATE (2017)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad JSC
  • Mary Ukaego Peter-Odilli JSC
  • Olukayode Ariwoola JSC
  • Kumai Bayang Akaahs JSC
  • Amina Adamu Augie JSC
Parties

Appellant:

  • Moavega Igba

Respondent:

  • The State
Suit number
SC.528/2013
Delivered on

Background

Moavega Igba was the second accused person before the High Court of Benue State, Makurdi. He and Michael Ankpergher were prosecuted for conspiracy to cause death and culpable homicide punishable with death, contrary to sections 97 and 221 of the Penal Code. The prosecution’s case was that Kyernum Kervo was accused of stealing goat meat at a burial ceremony. He was arrested and handed over to the appellant and the first accused, who were expected to take him to the police. Instead, the prosecution alleged that they took him to the bank of a stream, tied his hands and legs, covered him with grass and palm leaves, and set him on fire.

The prosecution called seven witnesses and tendered several exhibits, including the appellant’s statements to the police, admitted as exhibits C and D, the first accused’s statement, exhibit B, and the medical report, exhibit A. The appellant’s statements were admitted after a trial-within-trial in which the court determined that they had been voluntarily made. In exhibit C, the appellant gave a detailed account of how the deceased was taken to the stream, tied, covered with grass and burnt. At trial, however, he retracted the confession and claimed that an angry mob seized the deceased from him and the first accused and killed him.

The High Court rejected the defence, convicted both accused persons and sentenced them to death. The Court of Appeal, Makurdi Division, affirmed the conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the prosecution proved all the ingredients of conspiracy and culpable homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
  2. Whether the discrepancy between the date stated in the charge, 19 October 2002, and the date established by the evidence, 19 May 2002, rendered the charge incompetent or caused a miscarriage of justice.
  3. Whether the appellant could properly be convicted on a retracted confessional statement.
  4. Whether the evidence of the eyewitness and medical witness contained contradictions sufficient to create reasonable doubt.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court, in a lead judgment delivered by Akaahs JSC, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Court held that a direct, positive and unequivocal confessional statement may, in an appropriate case, ground a conviction by itself. Where the confession has been retracted, the court may still rely on it if it was voluntarily made and is supported by evidence outside the confession indicating that it is true.

The Court identified the relevant tests for determining the reliability of a retracted confession: whether there is independent evidence showing that it is true; whether it is corroborated; whether the facts stated are likely to be true; whether the accused had the opportunity to commit the offence; whether the confession is physically and circumstantially possible; and whether it is consistent with established facts. Applying those tests, the Court found exhibit C reliable. It corresponded with the eyewitness account of PW2, the evidence of PW4 concerning the appellant’s involvement in the arrest, and the medical evidence that the deceased suffered extensive burns.

The Court further held that the use of the phrase “on or about” in a charge means that the precise date of the offence need not necessarily be proved. An error concerning the date will not vitiate a charge unless it misled the accused or occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Since the appellant understood the incident relied on by the prosecution and himself gave evidence about the events of 19 May 2002, the discrepancy was immaterial.

Court Findings

The Court found that the prosecution proved the essential elements of culpable homicide. First, the deceased died. Secondly, his death was caused by the acts of the appellant and the first accused. Thirdly, the burning was intentional, or was at least an act done with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. The medical report showed that the deceased had suffered second-degree burns covering virtually the whole body.

The Court rejected the argument that PW2’s reference to stabbing created a material contradiction. The central and consistent evidence was that the deceased had been set ablaze. The absence of stab wounds did not undermine the prosecution’s case because stabbing was not the established cause of death. The Court also observed that where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence is not indispensable, although in this case the medical evidence materially supported the prosecution’s account.

The Court held that a deceased person’s body need not always be produced before a conviction for murder or culpable homicide can be entered, provided compelling direct or circumstantial evidence establishes that the person died and that the accused caused the death. Here, the body was in fact examined, and the evidence of PW2, exhibit A and the appellant’s own confession formed a compelling evidential chain.

Reasonable doubt was described as a doubt founded on reason and arising from the evidence or absence of evidence. It is not fanciful, imaginary or speculative doubt. The Court concluded that the appellant’s alternative account of mob action was an afterthought and could not displace the prosecution’s consistent evidence. It also declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal because those findings were supported by credible evidence and were neither perverse nor affected by any grave miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the appellant’s conviction and sentence of death for conspiracy to cause death and culpable homicide punishable with death under sections 97 and 221 of the Penal Code. The Court held that the prosecution had discharged its burden of proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Significance

The decision restates important Nigerian criminal-law principles on the evidential value of confessions, including the treatment of confessions that are later retracted. It confirms that corroboration is especially important where an accused withdraws a confession, but that corroboration may arise from ordinary surrounding facts and need not take any particular form. The case also illustrates that discrepancies concerning dates or subsidiary details will not automatically defeat a criminal charge where the accused was not misled and the identity of the incident is clear. Finally, it reinforces the narrow circumstances in which the Supreme Court will disturb concurrent findings of fact and clarifies that reasonable doubt must be rationally grounded rather than based on conjecture.

Counsel:

  • A. A. Ibrahim, with M. E. Ebute and I. E. Iyang, for the Appellant
  • F. M. Ebofuame Nezan, with Chibuzo Chima, for the Respondent