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Case Digest

MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLIMITED & MOBIL INCORPORATED OF USA V. MONOKPO & ORS. (NO. 2) (2001)

Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Calabar Division

Coram
  • Dennis Onyejife Edozie, JCA
  • Okwuchukwu Opene, JCA
  • Simeon Osuji Ekpe, JCA
Parties

Appellants:

  • Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited
  • Mobil Incorporated of USA

Respondents:

  • Chief Simeon Monokpo and Chief Hon. Joseph T. A. Nwi-Ue, for themselves and on behalf of numerous Ogoni communities
  • His Royal Highness Etebom Kay William Akanowo, Chief Richard Obediah Ayang, Prince Aniefiok Akpan Moenang, Etop William Akpanowo and Prince Ufok Frank Enoidem, for themselves and on behalf of fishing communities in Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State
Suit number
CA/139/2000
Delivered on

Background

This appeal arose from two consolidated actions before the Federal High Court, Calabar, concerning a crude oil spillage which occurred on 12 January 1998 from the appellants’ Idoho production platform and associated pipeline off Eket, on Nigeria’s Atlantic continental shelf. The respondents were numerous communities in Ogoni land, Rivers State, and fishing communities in Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State. They claimed substantial sums for ecological damage, injurious affection, shock, inconvenience, loss of amenities, surveys and expert reports. The claims were brought jointly and severally against Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited and Mobil Incorporated of the United States.

The respondents filed statements of claim, and the first appellant filed a statement of defence. The second appellant, however, did not file a defence. Instead, it filed a motion seeking to be struck out as an improperly joined party. That motion was not argued at the relevant time. After the suits were consolidated, the respondents called witnesses, including scientists and chartered valuers, tendered maps, scientific reports and valuation reports, and closed their case. The first appellant commenced its defence and called one witness. At that stage, the appellants filed a further motion seeking dismissal of the claims against the second appellant on the ground that no cause of action had been established against it.

The respondents responded with a cross-motion asking the court to dismiss the appellants’ application and enter final judgment against the second appellant. Before the motions were concluded, the second appellant attempted to file a statement of defence out of time and sought an extension of time to regularise it. The trial Judge required counsel first to complete the part-heard arguments on the existing motions. On 11 July 2000, the Federal High Court dismissed the second appellant’s application and entered judgment for the respondents against it for the amounts claimed, together with costs. The appellants appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether the motion to dismiss the claim against the second appellant was competent and whether the trial court ought to have considered it on its merits.
  2. Whether final judgment could properly be entered without a formal motion for judgment, affidavit evidence or two clear days’ notice.
  3. Whether judgment and substantial damages could be awarded after the respondents had called evidence, despite the absence of a defence from the second appellant.
  4. Whether the second appellant could be held liable merely because it was alleged to be the parent company of the first appellant.
  5. Whether the trial court improperly awarded costs without first hearing the parties or their counsel.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Federal High Court. It held that Order 12 rule 16 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000 concerned the addition, striking out or substitution of parties before trial or in a summary manner at trial. It did not authorise the type of application made by the second appellant to dismiss the action after the respondents had closed their case and while the defence was in progress. The application was therefore, in substance, an impermissible demurrer under the 2000 Rules.

The court further held that Order 54 rule 9(1), located among the miscellaneous provisions, did not clearly and unequivocally preserve the former procedural rules for every part-heard matter. The appellants could not simultaneously rely on the 1976 Rules and the 2000 Rules in the manner most favourable to their case.

Under Orders 28 rule 4 and 38 rule 11, where a defendant defaults in pleading in a claim for unliquidated damages, judgment may be entered and the damages assessed. Order 38 rule 11 expressly provided that no motion for judgment was necessary. Accordingly, the respondents’ cross-motion was merely surplusage. The absence of a supporting affidavit and the failure to give two clear days’ notice did not invalidate the judgment, because the court possessed power to enter judgment at or after trial without a formal application.

Court Findings

The court found that the second appellant had failed to file a defence and was therefore deemed to have admitted the material averments in the respondents’ statements of claim. Evidence cannot properly be led on behalf of a party who has filed no pleadings because no issues have been joined. Any evidence outside the pleadings, or evidence inconsistent with them, must be disregarded as going to no issue. The first appellant’s defence could not be treated as the second appellant’s defence, particularly because the parties were sued jointly and severally.

The court also held that the respondents’ evidence was not untested or speculative. They called expert witnesses, produced scientific and valuation reports, tendered maps and other exhibits, and their witnesses were cross-examined. In the absence of contradictory evidence from the second appellant, the trial court was entitled to act on the unchallenged evidence. The fact that the respondents had proceeded to trial did not prevent them from obtaining judgment by default of pleadings after closing their case.

On liability, the court rejected the appellants’ argument that the second appellant could only be liable vicariously as the parent company of the first appellant. The respondents’ case was that both appellants owned the relevant oil fields and pipeline and were jointly and severally liable as owners for the damage caused by the rupture. The claim was therefore not founded on vicarious liability, and it was unnecessary to establish the first appellant’s liability before judgment could be entered against the second appellant.

Finally, the court held that costs are discretionary and may be assessed and awarded by the trial court after judgment or a ruling without requiring the parties to make formal submissions on the issue. A complaint ordinarily available regarding costs is that they are excessive or inadequate, but that complaint was not properly raised by the appellants’ grounds of appeal.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Federal High Court’s judgment against Mobil Incorporated of USA. It also awarded costs of N5,000 in favour of each group of respondents against the appellants.

Significance

The decision restates important Nigerian civil-procedure principles: a litigant must file a defence or risk admission of the claim; parties are bound by their pleadings; courts may rely on unchallenged evidence; and a formal motion for judgment is unnecessary where the applicable rules permit judgment at or after trial. It also emphasises that litigants must remain consistent in the case they present and cannot interrupt part-heard proceedings by introducing a new procedural position designed to improve their case. In environmental and mass-damage litigation, the case is particularly significant because it recognises that properly pleaded expert and community evidence may support substantial damages where the opposing party has neither joined issue nor produced contradictory evidence.

Counsel:

  • H. O. Ajumogobia, Esq., for the Appellants
  • L. E. Nwosu, Esq., for the Respondents