OBAYEMI TOYIN V. AROGUNDADE SAMUEL MUSA & ORS (2019)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute concerning the primary election conducted by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) on 29 November 2014 for the Ado-Ekiti Constituency I seat in the Ekiti State House of Assembly. Obayemi Toyin participated in the primary alongside other aspirants, including the persons later joined as respondents. The appellant alleged that one of the aspirants was ineligible because he had presented a forged certificate. He also complained that his name had been removed or substituted without a lawful substitution process or the conduct of another primary election. According to him, Arogundade Samuel Musa was presented as the party’s candidate and was issued a certificate of return, notwithstanding the alleged irregularities.

The appellant commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Ado-Ekiti, by originating summons on 10 April 2015. He sought declarations concerning the validity of the primary, the eligibility of the competing aspirants, the effect of the alleged forged documents, and his own entitlement to be recognised as the PDP candidate. He also sought orders directing INEC to withdraw the certificate of return issued to the opposing candidate and issue one to him. The Federal High Court delivered judgment on 4 July 2016 and granted the reliefs claimed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Ado-Ekiti Division, delivered judgment on 29 December 2017, allowed the respondents’ appeal, and set aside the trial court’s judgment. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue

1. Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal when the appeal had not been disposed of within 60 days from the date on which the notice of appeal was filed, as prescribed for appeals in pre-election matters by the 1999 Constitution, as altered by the Fourth Alteration Act No. 21 of 2017.
2. Whether the constitutional time limit applied to the appeal notwithstanding that the underlying cause of action arose from the 2014 primary election and the Fourth Alteration took effect later.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the respondents’ preliminary objection. The notice of appeal was filed on 23 March 2018, while the appeal came up for hearing on 7 November 2018. The Court regarded the appeal as a pre-election appeal and applied the constitutional provision requiring such an appeal to be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of filing. The judgment refers to section 2(13) of the Fourth Alteration No. 21 Act and, in the judgments of some members of the Court, to section 285(12) of the Constitution as altered. The wording considered was clear: an appeal from a decision in a pre-election matter must be heard and disposed of within 60 days from filing.

The Court held that the provision was a limitation rule which directly affected the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Once the prescribed period expired without the appeal being heard and determined, the appeal became incompetent and the Court was divested of jurisdiction. The Court calculated that the appeal had gone beyond the statutory period, with relevant processes being served on or about the 76th day after filing.

Court Findings

The appellant argued that applying the Fourth Alteration to his case would give it retrospective effect because the primary election and the cause of action arose in 2014. The Supreme Court rejected that argument. It distinguished between the law applicable to a cause of action and the law governing the jurisdiction and procedure of a court at the time proceedings are instituted and heard. Although the substantive law relating to a cause of action is generally the law in force when that cause of action arose, jurisdiction is determined by the law conferring jurisdiction at the relevant time the court is called upon to act.

The Court further explained that the general presumption against retrospectivity does not ordinarily prevent a procedural enactment from having immediate effect. A provision prescribing the time within which proceedings must be heard and concluded does not change the character of the cause of action or take away a substantive accrued right; it regulates court procedure and case management. Therefore, the constitutional time limit applied to the pending appeal once the amendment had taken effect.

In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on the principles in Adah v. N.Y.S.C. and Olutola v. University of Ilorin concerning the distinction between cause-of-action jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction. It also followed the limitation-law reasoning in Amadi v. INEC, Osun State Government v. Dalami (Nig.) Ltd, and Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd. The Court applied the ordinary meaning of the constitutional language because the provision was precise, succinct, and unambiguous.

Conclusion

The preliminary objection succeeded. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the statutory 60-day period had expired. The appeal was consequently struck out as statute-barred and incompetent. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs, subject to the consequential orders stated by the Court.

Significance

The decision reinforces the strict and jurisdictional nature of constitutional timelines governing Nigerian electoral litigation. It demonstrates that the courts cannot extend or overlook a constitutionally prescribed period for deciding a pre-election appeal, even where substantial questions concerning party primaries, candidate qualification, forged credentials, nomination, or certificates of return remain unresolved. It also confirms that procedural limitation provisions may apply immediately to pending matters and will not necessarily be treated as impermissibly retrospective. The case therefore serves as a warning that litigants in electoral disputes must prosecute appeals expeditiously, since the expiry of the prescribed period may extinguish the court’s power to determine the merits.