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Case Digest

ODUNTAN V. AKIBU (2000)

Supreme Court of Nigeria

Coram
  • Salihu Modibbo Alfa Belgore, J.S.C. (Presiding)
  • Michael Ekundayo Ogundare, J.S.C. (Leading Judgment)
  • Uthman Mohammed, J.S.C.
  • Aloysius Iyorgyer Katsina-Alu, J.S.C.
  • Olufemi Akinola Ejiwunmi, J.S.C.
Parties

Appellants:

  • Alhaji Abudu W. Akibu
  • Alhaji Salisu Agoro
  • Badmus Agoro (for themselves and on behalf of the Dosunmu Family)

Respondents:

  • Alhaja Munirat Oduntan
  • Rafiu Yesufu Agunbiade
  • Mushafiu Saka Oluwa
  • Ganiyu Giwa
  • Lasisi Oduntan
  • Oluyole Dabiri (for themselves and on behalf of the Eletu-Iwase Chieftaincy Family)
Suit number
SC.43/1993
Delivered on

Background

This appeal arose from a prolonged dispute concerning succession to the Eletu-Iwase chieftaincy title of Lagos. Following the death of the last Eletu-Iwase, Bakare Gbajumo, in 1971, the Lagos State Government established a tribunal to investigate the ruling houses entitled to nominate candidates. The tribunal recommended five houses: Kumoku, Kusimi, Sajobi, Dosunmu and Erufa. A chieftaincy committee of the Lagos Island Local Government subsequently made a declaration on 20 August 1979 adopting those five houses and identifying the Dosunmu house as the next house entitled to produce a candidate.

The declaration was not approved and registered until 7 August 1980. During the dispute, the Lagos State Executive Council approved the appointment of Badmus Agoro, a member of the alleged Dosunmu family, as Eletu-Iwase on 19 March 1981. Members of the established Eletu-Iwase family commenced proceedings challenging the declaration, its approval and registration, the nomination and appointment of Badmus Agoro, and his occupation of the Eletu-Iwase palace.

The High Court found that only three ruling houses existed—Ogabi, Kusimi and Kumoku—and that the Dosunmu family was not a branch of the Eletu-Iwase family. It declared the relevant declaration and related acts void, granted injunctive relief, and awarded damages for trespass. The Court of Appeal affirmed the material aspects of the decision. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed against the refusal to grant a specific declaration that Badmus Agoro and members of the Dosunmu family were not entitled to be nominated or installed as Eletu-Iwase.

Issues

  1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction despite constitutional and statutory provisions purporting to oust the courts’ jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters.
  2. When the cause of action arose and which law governed the proceedings.
  3. Whether previous judgments admitted as Exhibits P7, P8 and P9 created estoppel or were otherwise relevant in resolving the conflicting traditional histories.
  4. Whether the concurrent findings that there were three, rather than five, ruling houses should be disturbed.
  5. Whether the Executive Council’s approval could validate the appointment of a person who was not a member of the eligible chieftaincy family.
  6. Whether the lower court properly dealt with the evidential value of Exhibit D3 and all the issues raised in the cross-appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

A ground of appeal must challenge a decision actually made by the court from which the appeal is brought. A ground complaining directly about a High Court decision, rather than the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming or dealing with it, is incompetent and must be struck out. Similarly, a ground of appeal on which no issue is formulated in the appellant’s brief is deemed abandoned.

The applicable law is the law in force when the cause of action arises, not the law existing when proceedings are commenced. A cause of action consists of the material facts which give a claimant the right to judicial relief, including the wrongful act and resulting damage. Under the Lagos State Oba and Chiefs Edict, a chieftaincy declaration did not become operative until it had been approved and registered. Consequently, the cause of action challenging the declaration arose upon its approval and registration in 1980, after the 1979 Constitution had come into force. The challenge to the appointment arose when that appointment was approved in 1981.

Section 14(c) of the Oba and Chiefs of Lagos Edict, which purported to exclude judicial scrutiny of acts done under the Edict, was inconsistent with section 4(8) of the 1979 Constitution. By virtue of section 274, an existing law could operate only with modifications necessary to bring it into conformity with the Constitution. The ouster provision was therefore invalid to the extent of its inconsistency, and it could not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction.

Previous judgments do not need to constitute res judicata before they may be relevant evidence. Judicial decisions and other acts in recent times may assist a court in resolving conflicts in traditional history, particularly where they illuminate the status of family members, family property and earlier claims to headship.

Where a person is not a member of the chieftaincy family entitled to nominate candidates, the appointment is void ab initio. An approval by the Executive Council cannot confer validity on an inherently void appointment. A saving provision may preserve a valid act made under a repealed law, but it cannot cure a fundamental nullity.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the concurrent factual findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal. The evidence established that Kupa founded the Eletu-Iwase title in Lagos and was succeeded by Ogabi, Kusimi and Kumoku. These three descendants constituted the recognised ruling houses. The defendants’ attempt to divide the Ogabi branch into Sajobi, Dosunmu and Erufa was rejected. The evidence was internally inconsistent, and there was no convincing proof that Erufa, a woman who had never held the title, could constitute a separate ruling house.

The Court held that Exhibits P7, P8 and P9 were properly used, not as binding judgments against persons who were not parties, but as relevant historical and documentary evidence. They demonstrated that Yesufu Agoro had previously failed to establish himself as head of the Eletu-Iwase family and that disputes involving the Agoro and Ojon families had historically been treated separately from the Eletu-Iwase lineage.

The Court also held that the defendants failed to show that the concurrent findings of fact were perverse, unsupported by evidence, or accompanied by a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court therefore declined to interfere with them. However, it agreed with the cross-appellants that the lower appellate court had failed to determine all the issues arising from the cross-appeal. Exhibit D3, described as an arbitration committee report, had serious deficiencies: not all relevant branches were represented, the participants were not shown to have authority to represent the family, and the document did not reliably establish recognition of the defendants as members of the chieftaincy family.

Conclusion

The defendants’ main appeal was dismissed. The plaintiffs’ cross-appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court declared that Badmus Agoro and any other member of the Dosunmu family was not entitled to be nominated or installed as Eletu-Iwase of Lagos. The plaintiffs were awarded N10,000 costs for the appeal to the Supreme Court and N2,500 costs for the appeal in the Court of Appeal.

Significance

The decision is important for Nigerian constitutional, appellate and customary law. It confirms that appellate grounds must be directed to the judgment under appeal and that abandoned grounds cannot sustain an appeal. It also illustrates how constitutional supremacy can invalidate an existing statutory ouster clause. In chieftaincy disputes, the case establishes that governmental approval cannot legitimise the appointment of an ineligible person and that courts may examine traditional evidence through recent historical acts, including earlier judgments, without treating those judgments as creating formal estoppel. Finally, it reinforces the Supreme Court’s restraint concerning concurrent findings of fact while recognising that a void appointment cannot be preserved by administrative approval or statutory saving provisions.

Counsel:

  • Chief H. J. Agoro, with A. Agoro and Mrs. O. Oshodi, for the Appellants/Cross-Respondents
  • M. D. Belgore for the Respondents/Cross-Appellants