OKAMGBA OKAMGBA V. IFEGWU URUM EKE (2009)

Background

This appeal arose from a dispute over ownership and possession of land known as 95 Ikot Ekpene Road, Ogbor Hill, Aba, Abia State. The respondent commenced proceedings at the High Court of Abia State seeking, among other reliefs, a declaration that he was entitled to the customary or statutory right of occupancy over the property, a declaration invalidating a power of attorney relied upon by the appellant, damages for trespass and a perpetual injunction.

The respondent traced his title through traditional inheritance and successive transactions. His case was that the land originally belonged by inheritance to James Wogu, P. E. Akpu and John Nwagbara of Ogbor Village, Aba. Those owners conveyed the land by a deed of lease dated 6 November 1956 to M. A. Nwakanma. Nwakanma subsequently granted a sublease to F. O. Ahukanna, who granted a power of attorney to the respondent. The respondent also alleged that the appellant’s father had occupied the property as a tenant and had paid rent to Ahukanna. An earlier possession proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court was decided in the respondent’s favour, but the appellant’s father allegedly retook possession by force and let part of the property to tenants.

The appellant denied the respondent’s root of title and asserted that the land belonged to the Umuegege family. Although he admitted that rent had been paid to F. O. Ahukanna, he contended that the payment was connected with a debt owed by Nwakanma and did not amount to recognition of Ahukanna’s title. The appellant also relied on a power of attorney dated 31 December 1990. The High Court found for the respondent, granted the relevant declaratory and injunctive reliefs and dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim. The appellant then appealed.

Issues

1. Whether the trial Judge properly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence before entering judgment for the respondent.
2. Whether the trial Judge was justified in treating the power of attorney relied upon by the appellant as forged or otherwise invalid.
3. Whether the evidence and documents relied upon by the respondent were sufficient to establish title to the disputed land.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the High Court. On evaluation of evidence, the Court applied the “imaginary scale” approach in Mogaji v. Odofin. A complaint that a judgment is against the weight of evidence requires consideration of the totality of the evidence, with the competing versions weighed against one another. The absence of an express classification of the relative weight assigned to each item of evidence does not mean that the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence.

The probative value of evidence depends on its admissibility, relevance, credibility, conclusiveness and probability. The primary duty of assessing testimony and determining the credibility of witnesses belongs to the trial court, which saw and heard the witnesses. An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with those findings unless they are shown to be perverse or unsupported by the evidence.

The Court further held that the disputed power of attorney was a public document because it had been registered at the lands registry. Under section 97(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1990, the appropriate secondary evidence of a public document is a certified true copy. The uncertified document was therefore inadmissible. The Court also accepted that, under section 108(1) of the Evidence Act, a court may compare a signature, writing, seal or finger impression with one admitted or proved to have been made by the relevant person in order to determine authenticity.

Wrongful admission of evidence does not automatically invalidate a judgment. The proper course is for the trial or appellate court to expunge the inadmissible evidence and determine whether sufficient admissible evidence remains. Reversal is warranted only where the improper admission has caused a miscarriage of justice. In this case, the appellant’s case substantially depended on the inadmissible power of attorney; once it was expunged, no lawful evidential foundation remained for the appellant’s claim.

Court Findings

The Court found that the trial Judge had properly considered the evidence of both parties. The record showed that the appellant’s witnesses made material admissions concerning James Wogu’s connection with the land and the grant under which Nwakanma occupied or developed the property. The respondent’s evidence tracing the title from James Wogu through Nwakanma and Ahukanna to himself was accepted as credible and substantially unchallenged.

With respect to title, the Court restated the five recognised methods of proving ownership of land: traditional evidence; production of duly authenticated and executed documents of title; acts of ownership extending over a sufficient period and sufficiently numerous and positive to justify an inference of ownership; acts of long possession and enjoyment; and possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances making it probable that the owner also owns the disputed land. A claimant need not establish all five methods. Proof of any one method, if accepted by the court and sufficient in the circumstances, may support a declaration of title.

The respondent had proved traditional history, acts of ownership, long possession and enjoyment. Consequently, even after the exclusion of uncertified public documents, there was ample legal evidence on which the declaration of title could stand. The appellant failed to discredit the respondent’s evidence by reference to admissibility, relevance, credibility, conclusiveness or probability.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Abia State. Costs of N30,000 were awarded to the respondent against the appellant.

Significance

The decision is important in Nigerian property and evidence law. It confirms that trial courts have the principal responsibility for evaluating evidence, while appellate intervention is limited. It also emphasises the strict requirement that public documents, including registered instruments, must generally be proved by certified copies. At the same time, the case illustrates that the admission of inadmissible evidence is not necessarily fatal: the evidence must be removed and the remaining admissible material assessed. Finally, a plaintiff claiming title to land is not required to prove every recognised mode of establishing ownership; a credible and sufficiently established single root or method may be adequate.