EDDY I. ONAH V. SCHLUMBERGER (NIG.) LTD & MR. PHILIP MAQUET (2018)

Background

Eddy I. Onah, the Managing Director of Chilkied Security Services and Dog Farms Ltd, was engaged by Schlumberger (Nig.) Ltd to provide security services at its residential camp, office and warehouse in Rivers State. The contract was later terminated. According to the second respondent, Mr. Philip Maquet, the termination caused dissatisfaction and led to threats allegedly made by the appellant through messages. In response, Mr. Maquet, acting as the East Nigeria District Manager of Schlumberger, wrote a letter dated 2 March 1992 to the Commissioner of Police, Rivers State Command. The letter reported allegations that the appellant had threatened to arrange the shooting of named persons, maintained armed robbers on a monthly payroll and threatened to set fire to the company’s residential camp.

The appellant contended that the letter was defamatory and commenced an action in the High Court of Rivers State, claiming N7,000,000 in general damages and an injunction restraining further publication of similar libels. The respondents relied principally on justification and qualified privilege. The trial court found for the appellant, awarded N2,500,000 damages and granted an injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside that judgment and ordered repayment of monies paid under it. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the defence of qualified privilege availed the respondents in respect of the letter sent to the Commissioner of Police.
2. Whether the appellant’s second ground of appeal was competent, having challenged comments of the Court of Appeal concerning the defence of justification.
3. Whether the alleged malice had been pleaded and proved sufficiently to defeat qualified privilege.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that qualified privilege arises where the maker of a communication has a legal, social or moral duty or interest to make it and the recipient has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it. This reciprocity of interest was established because the respondents had a legitimate duty to report alleged threats to the police, while the Commissioner of Police had an official responsibility under the Police Act to prevent and investigate crime, preserve law and order, and protect life and property.

The Court reaffirmed that qualified privilege is defeated by express malice, but the burden lies on the claimant to prove that the publication was actuated by malice. Malice is not established merely by pleading particulars; it must be proved by credible evidence. The truth or falsity of the defamatory words is generally irrelevant when the defence of qualified privilege is being considered. The Court also distinguished justification, which requires proof that the defamatory words and their imputations were true, from qualified privilege, which depends on the occasion and the absence of malice.

The Court further explained that an appeal lies against the ratio decidendi—the legal principle forming the foundation of the decision—not against an obiter dictum, which is a collateral observation. Although courts must exercise caution where observations and the ratio are intertwined, the appellant’s second ground substantially attacked comments on justification that were not the basis of the Court of Appeal’s decision. The lead judgment therefore struck out that ground and the issue derived from it, while the concurring judgments treated the objection differently but reached the same ultimate result.

Court Findings

The Court found that the letter was written, published and referred to the appellant. Publication was complete when the letter was communicated to the Commissioner of Police, a person other than the appellant. The words were capable of being defamatory because they portrayed the appellant as a person involved in threats, armed robbery and intended arson. Nevertheless, the respondents had robustly pleaded qualified privilege with sufficient particulars, thereby giving the appellant proper notice of the defence.

The appellant failed to produce convincing evidence that Mr. Maquet wrote the letter out of hatred or an improper motive. The alleged deterioration in the parties’ relationship and the appellant’s assertion that a witness may have had an ulterior motive did not, without more, prove express malice. The pleadings were not evidence, and allegations of malice unsupported by testimony or other credible proof could not sustain the claim. The evidence showed that the respondents considered the alleged threats serious and reported them to the proper law-enforcement authority. The Commissioner of Police had a corresponding official duty to receive and act upon such a complaint.

The Court also held that the preliminary objection was properly raised against the competence of the appeal where its success could terminate the entire appeal. It accepted that a preliminary objection may be incorporated in a respondent’s brief, avoiding the need for a separate notice. Although failure to file a reply brief may amount to concession, the court must still independently ensure that it does not entertain a fundamentally incompetent appeal. An ambiguous ground of appeal is incompetent where it leaves the opposing party uncertain about the complaint.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The defence of qualified privilege completely protected the respondents because the communication was made on an occasion of reciprocal duty and interest, and the appellant failed to prove malice. The damages and injunction awarded by the trial court therefore remained set aside.

Significance

The decision provides an important statement of Nigerian defamation law. It confirms that a bona fide report of alleged threats to the police may attract qualified privilege, even if the report later proves to be untrue, provided the report is made within the scope of the occasion and without malice. It also emphasises the evidential distinction between pleading material facts and proving those facts, and reinforces the appellate rule that grounds must challenge the operative reasoning of the judgment rather than incidental observations.