OZOEMENA V. NWOKORO (2018)

Background

This appeal concerned a longstanding dispute over customary ownership and the right of occupancy to land known as Uhu-Okporikpo or Ulu-Okporikpo, situated in the Amuro area of Okigwe, Imo State. Chief Joseph Ozoemena and Nze George Ndukwe sued on behalf of Umulu Village in the Imo State Customary Court. They sought a declaration that Umulu Village was entitled to the customary right of occupancy over the disputed land, a perpetual injunction restraining interference with the land, and damages for palm fruits allegedly harvested by persons associated with the opposing villages. Related claims were also brought by representatives of Amaikpa Village and by Timothy Chukwu, resulting in the consolidation of several suits.

The Customary Court at Abo-Umulolo ultimately entered judgment in favour of the Amaikpa people. Umulu Village appealed to the Customary Court of Appeal of Imo State, which allowed the appeal and entered judgment for Umulu. The Amaikpa representatives then appealed to the Court of Appeal. That court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Customary Court of Appeal, and restored the judgment of the trial Customary Court. Umulu Village subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue

The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether grounds 2, 3 and 6 of the notice of appeal filed at the Court of Appeal raised questions of customary law, thereby making the appeal competent as of right under section 245(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The appellants argued that the challenged grounds dealt merely with facts, evidence, proof and procedure, and that the Court of Appeal consequently lacked jurisdiction. The respondents contended that the grounds concerned customary ownership of land, traditional history, customary grants, possession, oath-taking and customary arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court, in the lead judgment delivered by Ejembi Eko JSC, held that the disputed grounds were competent. When the grounds and their particulars were read together with the claims in the consolidated suits, they raised questions about whether title to the customary right of occupancy had been established according to the customary law prevailing in Amuro. Proof of ownership under customary law is itself an incidence of customary law. Accordingly, grounds challenging traditional history, customary inheritance, customary grant, possession as evidence of ownership, and the customary method of resolving land disputes may constitute questions of customary law.

The Court distinguished between section 240 and section 245 of the Constitution. Section 240 confers the substantive and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the Customary Court of Appeal of a State. Section 245 prescribes the manner in which that right is to be exercised. Under section 245(1), an appeal lies as of right where the ground of appeal raises any question of customary law or any other matter prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Where the proposed appeal raises a question other than customary law, the intending appellant must obtain leave, unless an applicable statute provides otherwise.

The Court further held that the absence of an Act of the National Assembly prescribing additional matters for appeals as of right does not abolish or suspend the general right of appeal guaranteed by section 240. Sections 240 and 245 must therefore be read together. The Constitution could not sensibly be interpreted as denying an aggrieved party any avenue of appeal from a decision of a Customary Court of Appeal merely because the complaint involved a question other than customary law. The distinction is between the existence of the substantive right of appeal and the procedural conditions governing whether the appeal is as of right or requires leave.

Court Findings

The Court found that grounds 2 and 3 directly challenged the respondents’ proof of title and their reliance on traditional evidence, customary grant and possession. Ground 6 challenged the treatment of local arbitration and oath-taking, both of which were connected with the customary law and dispute-resolution practices of the area. These grounds were therefore not purely factual or procedural in the narrow sense asserted by the appellants. They raised customary-law questions sufficient to invoke section 245(1).

The Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and relied on authorities including Golok v. Diyalpwan and Pam v. Gwom, which recognised that failure to prove a claim before a court administering customary law may involve failure to prove the claim according to customary law. The Court also considered Usman v. Umaru, Hirnor v. Yongo, Okereke v. Nwankwo, Ogolo v. Ogolo and Tiza v. Begha.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed for want of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had restored the judgment of the trial Customary Court in favour of the Amaikpa representatives. The Supreme Court did not itself undertake a fresh determination of the substantive ownership of Uhu-Okporikpo; the appeal was concerned principally with the competence of the grounds and the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

Significance

The decision clarifies appellate jurisdiction in Nigerian customary-law litigation. It confirms that an appeal from a Customary Court of Appeal is not restricted to grounds expressly using the label “customary law.” The substance of the complaint is decisive. Where the ground concerns the customary mode of proving land ownership, traditional history, customary grants, customary inheritance, oath-taking or customary arbitration, it may be appealable as of right. The case also provides an important constitutional explanation that section 240 creates the substantive right to appeal, while section 245 regulates the procedure and identifies when leave is unnecessary.