PC. SALISU MAMUDA V. THE STATE (2019)

Background

PC. Salisu Mamuda, a police constable, was charged at the Kano State High Court alongside other accused persons in connection with the abduction and repeated rape of Hindatu Sani. The prosecution alleged that the victim was taken into captivity and sexually assaulted on 26, 27 and 28 October 2010. The appellant was prosecuted for rape under the Penal Code and ultimately convicted on three counts. The trial court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of N50,000 for each count, with the terms of imprisonment to run concurrently and additional imprisonment prescribed in default of payment of the fines.

The prosecution called several witnesses, including the victim and investigating police personnel, and tendered documentary exhibits, including the appellant’s extra-judicial statement. The appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim but maintained that she had consented and that the intercourse was undertaken for payment of N2,000. The trial court rejected this explanation, accepted the victim’s account that she had protested and had not consented, and found the appellant guilty. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the evidence before the trial court established the offence of rape beyond reasonable doubt and justified the concurrent decisions of the lower courts.
2. Whether alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were material and fundamental enough to destroy the prosecution’s case.
3. Whether the appellant’s right to fair hearing was violated by the refusal to grant an adjournment, the refusal to provide access to his statement in the case diary, and his absence when counsel adopted the final address.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent findings of guilt. Under section 282 of the Penal Code, the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the admitted sexual intercourse occurred against the victim’s will, without her consent, or in another circumstance specified by the statute. Since the appellant admitted having intercourse with PW5, the fact of intercourse required no further proof. The central question was whether the victim consented. That was a question of fact and credibility, and the trial court, having seen and heard the witnesses, was best placed to resolve it.

The Court held that only contradictions which are grave, material and go to the root of the case can render prosecution evidence unreliable. A mere difference in detail, variation in description, or inconsistency that does not affect the essential ingredients of the offence is not fatal. The alleged differences concerning the means by which the victim was conveyed, the condition of the room, and whether she had opportunities to escape did not contradict the core evidence that she was taken to the room and that the appellant had intercourse with her without her consent. Rather, the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 substantially supported the victim’s account.

The Court further reaffirmed that corroboration is not a legal prerequisite for a conviction for rape. Although corroborative evidence may be desirable as a matter of practice, a court may convict on the credible, uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. In this case, the victim’s testimony was additionally supported by surrounding evidence and the appellant’s own admission.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court emphasised that evaluation of evidence and the assessment of witness credibility are primarily matters for the trial court. An appellate court should not lightly substitute its own view where the trial court’s findings are supported by the record. The Supreme Court will ordinarily not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and Court of Appeal unless the findings are perverse, unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, or have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The appellant failed to establish any such exceptional circumstance.

On fair hearing, the Court held that section 122(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code restricted access by an accused person or counsel to the case diary. The appellant had not shown a legal entitlement to inspect the statement at the stage when the application was made, nor had he laid a proper foundation for production of the diary. The refusal of an adjournment was also a discretionary decision of the trial court, and appellate intervention was unwarranted because no wrongful or arbitrary exercise of discretion was demonstrated.

The appellant’s absence when counsel adopted the final address did not invalidate the proceedings. His counsel was present and did not object. The adoption of addresses is largely formal; cases are decided on credible evidence rather than on the addresses of counsel. To interpret the constitutional right to be present in a manner that automatically nullified the entire trial in these circumstances would produce an absurd and overly technical result, contrary to the Court’s preference for substantial justice.

Conclusion

The appeal was found to be without merit and was dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the appellant’s conviction and sentence for rape.

Significance

The decision restates important Nigerian criminal-law principles concerning rape, consent, corroboration, contradictions and appellate review. It confirms that an accused person’s admission of sexual intercourse may leave consent as the decisive factual issue; that the credible evidence of a prosecutrix can sustain a conviction without mandatory corroboration; and that only material contradictions affecting the substance of the charge will undermine a prosecution case. It also reinforces judicial restraint in disturbing concurrent findings of fact and confirms that procedural objections will not succeed where no real miscarriage of justice is shown.