Background
The respondents commenced suit No. HOR/115/89 at the High Court of Imo State, Orlu, concerning the traditional rulership of Amucha Autonomous Community. Their pleaded case was that traditional rulership in Amucha was hereditary rather than rotational; that the Iheanacho family of Duruaku Kindred was the ruling house; and that the family was entitled to produce and present the traditional ruler. They also challenged section 44 of the Constitution of the Amucha Development Organisation, which purportedly confined the Ezeship to Umuorji, the eldest village in Amucha.
The respondents originally sought six declaratory reliefs. Two of those reliefs directly challenged the selection, identification and presentation of the first appellant as traditional ruler and claimed that the plaintiff was the rightful person to be selected and presented. During argument, counsel for the respondents orally applied to withdraw those two reliefs, namely paragraphs 26(5) and 26(6) of the statement of claim. The trial Judge permitted the withdrawal and concluded that the remaining declarations did not constitute a chieftaincy matter.
The appellants objected to the jurisdiction of the High Court, relying on the statutory and constitutional provisions that ousted the courts’ jurisdiction over chieftaincy questions. The objection was overruled in an interlocutory ruling, leading to the appeal.
Issues
- Whether the High Court’s jurisdiction was ousted by the applicable law if the facts pleaded disclosed a chieftaincy question, notwithstanding the withdrawal of some reliefs.
- Whether the trial Judge was wrong to allow the withdrawal orally and whether the appellants were denied a fair hearing by that procedure.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court of Appeal held that a chieftaincy declaration is a statement of the customary law relating, among other matters, to the appointment or recognition of a chief. Consequently, a claim seeking declarations about the hereditary nature of traditional rulership, the identity of the ruling house, and the entitlement to produce a traditional ruler raises a chieftaincy question.
The Court emphasised that jurisdiction is determined principally by the plaintiff’s statement of claim and the material facts pleaded, not merely by the form or label of the reliefs. Evidence is led to establish pleaded material facts and thereby obtain relief; it is not the relief itself that determines the factual nature of the case. Since the pleaded facts necessarily required proof of the invalidity of the first appellant’s selection and recognition and of the respondents’ entitlement to the rulership, the action remained a chieftaincy matter.
An ouster of jurisdiction is a direct prohibition against the court entertaining a matter. Where the language of the relevant statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to it. Whether jurisdiction has been ousted is assessed by reference to the state of the law when the cause of action accrued, rather than when proceedings were instituted.
Court Findings
The court rejected the argument that the withdrawal of paragraphs 26(5) and 26(6) removed the chieftaincy character of the suit. The remaining reliefs and the factual allegations supporting them were inseparably connected with the selection, appointment and recognition of a traditional ruler. The declarations sought would, in practical effect, undermine the recognition of the first appellant and determine which family had the right to produce the ruler.
The court also held that a “motion” may be written or oral. An oral application made in the presence of the opposing counsel may constitute sufficient notice, particularly where it is not opposed. Under the applicable High Court rules, a plaintiff could withdraw part of a claim after applying for and obtaining leave. The withdrawal did not introduce a new cause of action or overreach the defendants.
There was no denial of fair hearing. The appellants were present and had the opportunity to object or seek leave to reply on points of law, but elected not to do so. Fair hearing is a fundamental right, but it may be waived by a party who, after being afforded an opportunity to be heard, voluntarily declines to use it.
Conclusion
The appeal was allowed. The interlocutory ruling of the High Court, which had upheld its jurisdiction, was set aside. Suit No. HOR/115/89 was struck out for want of jurisdiction. Costs of N5,000 were awarded to the appellants.
Significance
The decision illustrates the importance of examining pleadings as a whole when determining jurisdiction. A claimant cannot avoid a statutory ouster merely by withdrawing consequential reliefs or recasting the remaining prayers as declarations. Where the underlying facts require the court to determine who was validly selected, appointed, recognised or entitled to become a chief, the matter remains a chieftaincy question. The case also confirms the procedural validity of oral applications in appropriate circumstances and clarifies that a party who fails to take an available opportunity to respond cannot subsequently complain of denial of fair hearing.
Counsel:
- Emeka Ngige, Esq., for the Appellant
- A. Ogbonna, Esq., holding the brief for the Respondents