ROBERT OBHAFUOSO & ANOR. V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2016)

Background

The appellants were petitioners before the Lagos State National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal. Their petition challenged the competence and validity of the nomination and sponsorship of Folajimi Jibril Mohammed, the second respondent, by the All Progressives Congress for the Lagos State House of Assembly election for Ikeja Constituency 01. They alleged, principally, that the APC failed to give the Independent National Electoral Commission the minimum twenty-one days’ notice required by section 85(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 before holding the congress or primary at which the candidate was nominated.

The appellants sought declarations that the second respondent was not qualified to contest, that the votes credited to him were invalid, that his return and certificate of return should be set aside, and that the first appellant should be declared the winner. The tribunal dismissed the petition and upheld the second respondent’s election. Dissatisfied, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the APC gave INEC the statutory notice of at least twenty-one days required by section 85(1) of the Electoral Act.
2. Whether the tribunal properly assessed the documentary evidence concerning the original, postponed and revised dates of the party primary.
3. Whether the appellants’ reply brief, filed outside the period prescribed by the Practice Direction, was competent.
4. Whether the notice of appeal, filed without counsel’s Nigerian Bar Association stamp and seal, was properly filed or could be regularised by the court.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that the Practice Direction governing election appeals had to be obeyed strictly. Paragraph 13 provided that an appellant might file a reply brief within three days of service of the respondent’s brief. The word “shall,” where used in a procedural rule or statute in circumstances indicating obligation, was mandatory. Consequently, the reply brief filed on 30 November 2015, after service of the respondents’ briefs on 27 November 2015, was filed out of time and was struck out. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to extend a period fixed by the Practice Direction.

The court further held that the notice of appeal was the foundational initiating process of an appeal. Under rule 10(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007, a legal document signed or filed without the required counsel’s stamp and seal was deemed not to have been properly signed or filed. The omission did not make the process permanently null and void; it was a defect capable of being cured through an application for extension of time, leave, and a deeming order. However, the appellants had sought only leave, failed to provide the necessary procedural basis for regularisation, did not adequately explain counsel’s omission, and had not complied with the applicable time and service requirements. The notice therefore remained incompetent.

Court Findings

Although the preliminary objection was upheld, the court considered the substantive appeal. It interpreted section 85(1) according to its ordinary and unambiguous language. The provision required every registered political party to give INEC at least twenty-one days’ notice of a congress, convention, conference or meeting for the purpose of nominating candidates. This requirement was compulsory and could not simply be waived.

The relevant exhibits were read together. One document constituted the earlier notice of the proposed party primaries; another notified INEC that the dates had been postponed; and the later communication announced revised or rescheduled dates. The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the revised notice amounted to a wholly new notice, thereby invalidating the earlier notice. “Revised” and “rescheduled” meant that an existing event had been altered or assigned a new date, not that the event had been cancelled and replaced by an entirely new process.

When the documents were considered chronologically and collectively, the original notice was given approximately sixty days before the relevant revised date. The court therefore concluded that the statutory period was satisfied. It would, in the court’s view, produce an unreasonable and absurd result to disregard the earlier notice merely because the date of the primary was subsequently postponed and revised. The appellants consequently failed to discharge the burden of proving non-compliance.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The judgment of the election tribunal upholding the election and return of the second respondent was affirmed. No order as to costs was made.

Significance

The decision emphasises the strict, time-bound character of Nigerian election litigation. Parties must comply precisely with Practice Directions, particularly deadlines for briefs and applications. It also confirms that failure to affix counsel’s stamp and seal is a curable procedural defect, but only where the party promptly seeks the appropriate extension and deeming orders. Substantively, the case illustrates that statutory notice of a political party primary may be established by reading related notices together: postponement or rescheduling does not necessarily erase an earlier valid notice. Courts will give clear statutory words their ordinary meaning while avoiding an interpretation that creates absurdity or defeats the evident purpose of the legislation.