MADAM SAMIAT OMOTUNDE YESUFA V. SKYE BANK PLC (2021)

Background

This appeal arose from a ruling of the High Court of Lagos State, Judicial Division, delivered on 28 June 2016 in Suit No. LD/1937/2009. Madam Samiat Omotunde Yesufa, a former employee of Cocoa Producers Alliance, claimed to have maintained an account with Skye Bank Plc. Following her retirement in 1991, her former employer allegedly transferred her retirement benefit of $25,096.61 into that account. The appellant contended that the transfer instruction contained an account number incorrectly typed by the employer’s secretary, although her name and other identifying particulars were correctly stated.

According to the appellant, she travelled abroad to care for her seriously ill husband and returned to Nigeria in January 1995. After her husband’s death in June 1995, she went to the bank to withdraw money and discovered that the account contained no funds. She alleged that the bank denied that the account existed, claimed that she had closed it, and failed to provide records showing what happened to the retirement benefit. She later wrote letters to the bank in 2005 and instructed solicitors to make a formal demand in 2009. She also claimed a further balance of $168.69 in another account and alleged fraud, breach of banking duties, damages, interest and repayment of the sums involved.

The bank raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the action was founded on contract and had been commenced outside the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 8(1) and (5) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, 2003. The trial court upheld the objection and struck out the action. The appellant appealed, arguing principally that the banker-customer relationship was continuing and that the allegation of fraud prevented the limitation period from defeating her claim.

Issues

1. Whether the appellant’s action was statute barred under the Limitation Law of Lagos State.
2. Whether the continuing nature of the banker-customer relationship prevented limitation from running.
3. Whether the allegation of fraud postponed or otherwise defeated the operation of the limitation statute.
4. Whether the respondent’s brief was competent, and whether the failure to file a competent respondent’s brief entitled the appellant to automatic success.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It held that a banker-customer relationship, in respect of money deposited with a bank, is essentially contractual. The bank is a debtor and the customer is a creditor. Accordingly, a claim for recovery of money allegedly misapplied or withheld by a bank may constitute an action founded on simple contract or for an account within section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, 2003.

The court stated that limitation is determined by examining the writ of summons and the statement of claim to identify when the cause of action accrued, and then comparing that date with the date the suit was instituted. Oral evidence is generally unnecessary for this preliminary determination. A cause of action consists of the wrongful act of the defendant and the consequent damage, together with the facts necessary to establish entitlement to judgment.

In this case, the cause of action arose when the retirement benefit was allegedly paid into the appellant’s account in 1991 but was not available to her. The appellant commenced the action on 17 November 2009, approximately eighteen years later. The six-year limitation period had therefore expired.

The allegation of fraud did not save the action. Under section 58(1)(a) and (b) of the Limitation Law, where fraud is alleged or the right of action is concealed by fraud, time begins to run when the claimant discovers the fraud or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. On the appellant’s own pleadings, she discovered in 1995 that the retirement benefit was missing and that the bank could not satisfactorily account for it. The limitation period consequently began to run in 1995, meaning that the action filed in 2009 was still substantially out of time.

Court Findings

The appellate court also considered the competence of the respondent’s brief. The signature on the brief could not be attributed to either of the counsel named on it, and the document did not bear the required Nigerian Bar Association stamp and seal. By sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, only a person called to the Nigerian Bar and whose name appears on the Roll of Legal Practitioners may validly sign a court process. Under rule 10(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a legal practitioner’s seal and stamp are also required on a legal document signed or filed in that capacity. The brief was therefore struck out as incompetent.

Nevertheless, the absence of a competent respondent’s brief did not automatically entitle the appellant to judgment. An appellant must still demonstrate on the merits that the decision appealed against was erroneous. The appellate court retained a duty to determine whether the appeal was sustainable. It was also entitled to collapse or reframe the appellant’s proposed issues into the single controlling question of whether the action was statute barred, provided that the reformulated issue remained anchored on the grounds of appeal.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s suit was statute barred and unenforceable. The trial court had correctly found that the cause of action accrued in 1991, or, in the alternative, in 1995 when the alleged fraud was discovered. Both dates placed the 2009 action outside the statutory six-year period. The appeal was dismissed, the ruling of the High Court was affirmed in its entirety, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Significance

The decision reinforces the strict application of limitation statutes to banking and contractual claims. It demonstrates that the existence of an ongoing banker-customer relationship does not create a perpetual right to sue in respect of a specific historical default. It also clarifies that pleading fraud does not, by itself, defeat limitation; the claimant must show that the statutory postponement applies and must account for the date on which the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered. The case further emphasises that the competence of court processes depends on compliance with substantive statutory requirements governing who may sign them, as well as professional requirements concerning the NBA stamp and seal.