S.C.E.S. LTD. V. UMARU ADAMU ENT. LTD. (2026)

Background

This appeal concerned the validity of the purported revocation of Umaru Adamu Enterprise Limited’s right of occupancy over Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/ABU/MISC 4849, covering Plot 595, Adetokunbo Ademola Crescent, Wuse II District, Abuja. The 1st respondent had obtained the certificate of occupancy, secured building-plan approval from the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), and commenced construction on the property. During a re-certification exercise, it submitted its title documents to the relevant authorities.

Shortly thereafter, the FCDA and the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory allegedly revoked the title by issuing a notice of revocation, exhibit 6, and subsequently allocated part of the property to Sharing Cross Educational Service Limited. The 1st respondent denied receiving the notice and asserted that the address to which it was sent—No. 1 Yusuf Ali Link, Sharada Phase II, Kano—was not its correct address. It maintained that its proper address was No. 10 Bauchi Street, Jos. Agents of the public authorities later entered the property and demolished some structures being erected there.

The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory found for the 1st respondent, declared the revocation and subsequent entry unlawful, and awarded N50,000,000 against the 2nd and 3rd respondents for trespass and unlawful acts. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal and allowed part of the 1st respondent’s cross-appeal. Sharing Cross Educational Service Limited then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that the FCDA and the Minister failed to prove that the address to which the notice of revocation was sent belonged to the 1st respondent.
2. Whether the proceedings and judgments of the lower courts were nullities because the amended statement of claim allegedly bore a defective or unauthorised signature.

A preliminary challenge was also raised against the competence of ground five of the appellant’s amended notice of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. On the preliminary issue, the Court held that a preliminary objection is principally appropriate where a respondent seeks to terminate the entire appeal as incompetent. Where the complaint relates only to one ground or a separable portion of an appeal, the proper procedure is a motion on notice directed at that ground. Since the 1st respondent’s objection challenged only ground five, it was procedurally incompetent and was struck out.

On the alleged defective signature, the Court distinguished a true jurisdictional defect from a procedural irregularity. A mere visual discrepancy in the signature of counsel on an amended statement of claim did not establish that the document was signed by a stranger or by a person unknown to law. The name of O. I. Olorundare, SAN was printed on the process, and no expert handwriting evidence or admission was produced to show that he had not signed it. The alleged defect was therefore a patent irregularity, not a fundamental nullity affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The Court further held that the appellant had waived any objection to the irregularity by participating fully in the trial for several years, filing a defence, joining issues, cross-examining witnesses, and contesting the case on its merits. Under section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the appellant was estopped by its conduct from raising the complaint only after suffering an adverse judgment. Procedural objections that do not concern jurisdiction must be raised promptly or they may be deemed waived.

On the land issue, the Court applied sections 28(6) and (7) and 44 of the Land Use Act, 1978. A revocation of a right of occupancy must be carried out in the manner prescribed by statute, including the giving of effective notice to the holder. The burden of proving valid service rested on the FCDA and the Minister because they asserted the validity of the revocation.

Section 44 permits service by personal delivery, leaving the notice at the usual or last known abode, sending it by prepaid registered letter to that address, serving an incorporated company at its registered or principal office, or, after reasonable inquiry, addressing and affixing the notice to the premises. Sending a notice to an address is not enough unless the party alleging service proves that the address was in fact the holder’s usual, last known, registered, or otherwise legally recognised address.

Rule 5 of the Federal Capital Territory Land Use Regulations, 2004, which requires the use of the most recent data from official digital records, did not alter this substantive requirement. It prescribed the data source or administrative mechanism for service but did not dispense with proof that the address in the data belonged to the affected holder. The computer-generated printout, exhibit 8, merely showed what address the FCDA had entered into its system. Without the original re-certification form or other foundational document showing that the 1st respondent supplied that address, the printout was self-serving and insufficient.

Court Findings

The Supreme Court found that the FCDA and the Minister failed to provide sufficient and credible evidence that exhibit 6 had been served on Umaru Adamu Enterprise Limited. The specific denial of the address placed a clear evidential burden on them to establish its source and accuracy. Their failure to tender the original form or explain its absence justified the adverse inference that the document would not have assisted their case.

Because service of the notice was a statutory condition precedent to a valid revocation, the purported revocation was null, void, and of no effect. The subsequent allocation of part of the property to the appellant was also a nullity: the public authorities had no valid title to transfer because the original title had never been lawfully extinguished. The Court emphasised that public authorities exercising extensive powers over land must adhere strictly to statutory procedure and cannot deprive a person of proprietary interests on the basis of defective processes or unsubstantiated computer records.

The Court also noted that the 2nd and 3rd respondents had filed briefs seeking that the appeal be allowed, although they had not cross-appealed. A respondent’s role is ordinarily to defend the judgment under attack, not to challenge it. Their briefs were consequently struck out as incompetent.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed unanimously, and the judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal were affirmed. The appellant was ordered to pay N2,000,000 in costs to the 1st respondent. The challenged preliminary objection was struck out, the allegedly defective signature was treated as a waived procedural irregularity, and the revocation and subsequent reallocation of the Abuja property were held invalid for want of proved statutory notice.

Significance

This decision reinforces the strict procedural safeguards surrounding the revocation of rights of occupancy under the Land Use Act. It confirms that government agencies must prove actual compliance with statutory service requirements and cannot rely solely on internal digital records. It also clarifies that administrative regulations such as Rule 5 of the FCDA Regulations cannot amend or dilute the substantive obligations imposed by the Land Use Act. More broadly, the judgment illustrates the Supreme Court’s distinction between jurisdictional defects, which may be raised at any stage, and curable procedural irregularities, which must be challenged promptly and may be waived through participation in the proceedings.