Background
This appeal arose from a long-running dispute concerning the Oluwo of Iwo chieftaincy in the former Oyo State. After several commissions of inquiry and related litigation, the Chieftaincy Committee of Iwo Local Government made a Chieftaincy Declaration on 28 July 1981. The Declaration identified the three ruling houses as Alawusa, Adegunodo and Gbase, and prescribed the order of rotation for filling the chieftaincy stool. It was approved by the Governor-in-Council, registered, and assented to by the then Governor of Oyo State, Chief Bola Ige, in the course of his official duties.
A subsequent letter from the Secretary to the Oyo State Government stated that the Adegunodo Ruling House included, among others, the Tadese family. Taliatu Adio challenged the inclusion of the Tadese family, seeking declarations that the relevant instrument was illegal and void, together with an injunction restraining the State Government and Iwo Local Government officials from acting upon it. The High Court of Oyo State, presided over by Atinuke Ige, J., dismissed the claim on 28 November 1986.
On appeal, the respondent raised, for the first time, an allegation that the trial judge ought to have disqualified herself because she was the wife of Chief Bola Ige, who had signed the Chieftaincy Declaration as Governor. By a majority, the Court of Appeal accepted the allegation of a real likelihood of bias and declared the High Court proceedings void. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Attorney-General of Oyo State was granted leave to withdraw from the appeal.
Issues
- Whether the Court of Appeal was right to find a real likelihood of bias merely because the trial judge was the wife of the former Governor who had assented to the Chieftaincy Declaration in his official capacity.
- Whether the respondent’s failure to object to the judge’s participation at the earliest opportunity amounted to waiver or acquiescence under section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution, thereby preventing him from challenging the proceedings later.
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that a Chieftaincy Declaration made under the Chiefs Law of Oyo State was a form of subsidiary legislation declaring the customary law regulating the selection of a recognised chief. The Declaration was made by the competent governmental process: preparation by the relevant local-government committee, consideration through the prescribed administrative channels, approval by the Executive Council, registration, and assent by the Governor.
The Court distinguished between a Governor acting officially and the same person acting privately. Chief Bola Ige signed the instrument as Governor and constitutional assenting authority. He was not personally sued, had no demonstrated pecuniary, proprietary or personal interest in the chieftaincy dispute, and was not alleged to have participated privately in the decision to include the Tadese family. The Attorney-General was joined principally to represent and bind the State Government; he was not equivalent to Chief Bola Ige as a personal defendant.
The applicable test for disqualification based on non-pecuniary interest is whether there is a “real likelihood of bias.” This means a substantial possibility of bias assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person fully informed of the material facts. Mere suspicion, conjecture, surmise or the apprehension of capricious and unreasonable persons is insufficient. The court must examine the peculiar facts of each case and determine whether proved circumstances could reasonably suggest that the judge would favour one side unfairly.
Although justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, matrimonial relationship alone does not automatically disqualify a judicial officer. The relationship must be connected with an interest that is sufficiently direct and substantial to affect the judicial mind or create a genuine departure from the standard of even-handed justice. No such circumstances existed here.
Court Findings
The Court found that the Court of Appeal had wrongly treated Chief Bola Ige as the substantive first defendant and had incorrectly conflated his official act as Governor with a private act affecting his family interests. The issue before the trial judge was essentially whether the inclusion of the Tadese family conformed to the customary law and the proper composition of the Adegunodo Ruling House. It required interpretation of the Chieftaincy Declaration and evaluation of traditional and genealogical evidence, not adjudication of any personal wrongdoing by Chief Ige.
The Court also observed that the Secretary to Iwo Central Local Government was not itself a juristic person capable of being sued; the proper party would have been the Iwo Local Government Council. This procedural observation reinforced the conclusion that the Governor had not become a defendant merely because he signed the instrument.
On waiver, the Court stated that a party who knows of a disqualifying circumstance and has an opportunity to object may lose the right to challenge the proceedings by express or implied waiver. The respondent knew throughout the hearing that the judge was Chief Ige’s wife and allowed the matter to proceed, including after the Declaration was tendered in evidence. The objection was raised only in the Court of Appeal after judgment. Such delayed conduct could amount to acquiescence, and reneging on an election after benefiting from or participating in the proceedings may be unconscionable. However, the Court emphasised that acquiescence does not invariably constitute waiver; knowledge of the relevant facts and a real opportunity to object must be established.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court set aside the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal and restored the judgment of the Oyo State High Court dismissing the respondent’s claim. Costs of N10,000 were awarded to each set of appellants against the respondent.
Significance
The decision clarifies that allegations of judicial bias require concrete and legally relevant circumstances, not merely an apparent association. It protects the integrity of the judicial process while preventing the doctrine of apparent bias from being extended so far that judges become disqualified from interpreting every public instrument signed by a spouse or relative acting in an official capacity. The case also affirms the importance of raising objections to adjudication promptly and reminds counsel of their professional duty to disclose authorities that assist both sides of a dispute.