TAYLOR WOODROW (NIG.) LTD V. AROMIRE (2023)

Background

This appeal arose from a land dispute concerning parcels known as No. 10 Abebe Village Road, Iganmu, Lagos. In 1945, Kolapo Belugbade Savage acquired substantial areas of land at Iganmu and subsequently leased portions to the first appellant and Nigerian Properties Company Ltd. A separate parcel was leased by the Suenu family to Nigerian Properties Company Ltd and later subleased to the first appellant. The relevant lease instruments were registered at the Lagos Lands Registry.

The respondents’ predecessors-in-title had earlier sued Savage and others in Suit No. LD/562/72, claiming title to extensive Ojora Chieftaincy Family land at Iganmu. Judgment was entered in their favour by the High Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in CA/L/81/2001, and finally affirmed by the Supreme Court in SC/54/2005 on 2009-04-03. The appellants maintained that the particular parcel derived from the Suenu family was outside the land covered by that judgment and that neither they nor their predecessors-in-title had been parties to the earlier proceedings.

After alleging that the respondents’ agents invaded, barricaded and interfered with the land in May 2019, the appellants commenced Suit No. LD/8671/LMW/2019 in the High Court of Lagos State, seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs and damages. The respondents raised a preliminary objection based on estoppel per rem judicatam, estoppel by conduct, lack of locus standi and abuse of court process. The trial court upheld the objection and dismissed the suit in limine.

Issues

1. Whether the appellants’ action was an attempt to relitigate the Supreme Court judgment in SC/54/2005 and therefore constituted an abuse of court process.
2. Whether the trial court was entitled to treat the other grounds of the preliminary objection as academic after disposing of the matter on abuse of process.
3. Whether the trial Judge’s alleged relationship with the Ojora family required recusal under the principle of nemo judex in causa sua and whether the appellants were denied fair hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that abuse of court process depends principally on the improper multiplication of actions involving the same subject matter, issues and parties. The doctrine is directed at the manner in which a right of action is exercised, rather than at the mere existence of that right. Each case must be examined according to its particular facts; there are no rigid rules for determining abuse. Although the motive for filing multiple actions is irrelevant, the party alleging abuse must establish its necessary ingredients, including the identity or legal privity of the parties.

The court explained that a party is a person named as plaintiff or defendant in an action, while a privy is a person legally connected with a party or property. Privies may be privies in blood, law or estate. However, the respondents failed to prove that the appellants or their predecessors, including the Suenu family, were parties or privies to the proceedings culminating in SC/54/2005.

The decisive holding was that the earlier land judgment was a judgment in personam, not a judgment in rem. A judgment in rem determines the status of a person or thing and binds the world, including non-parties. A judgment in personam determines rights and obligations between identified parties and binds only those parties and their privies. A judgment declaring title to land is ordinarily between the litigating parties; it is not a judgment against the land itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court judgment could not automatically bind non-parties merely because it concerned land situated in the same general area.

Court Findings

The Court of Appeal concluded that the appellants were entitled to approach the High Court to ventilate their claim that the parcel leased through the Suenu family was distinct from the land covered by the earlier judgment. This did not amount to relitigation or abuse of process, although the ultimate merits of the appellants’ claim remained to be determined at trial.

On the second issue, the court held that the trial Judge did not err by treating the remaining grounds of the preliminary objection as academic after ruling on abuse of process. The grounds all sought to terminate the suit for want of jurisdiction or capacity, and determination of the remaining grounds would have had no practical utility once the suit had been dismissed. Nevertheless, the court emphasised that the trial court’s underlying finding of abuse was legally wrong.

On fair hearing, the court rejected the allegation of bias. The appellants’ letter requesting reassignment had been attached to an application which their counsel withdrew, and the application was struck out. The letter consequently ceased to form part of the record. Without the necessary factual foundation in the record, the allegation that the Judge was biased was speculative. Section 36(1) of the Constitution protects genuine fair-hearing rights; it is not a procedural weapon to be invoked without proof.

Conclusion

The appeal was allowed. The ruling of the High Court of Lagos State delivered on 2020-03-10 was set aside, and the respondents’ preliminary objection was dismissed. The appellants’ suit, LD/8671/LMW/2019, was remitted to the Chief Judge of Lagos State for reassignment to a Judge other than S. A. Onigbanjo J. and for hearing on the merits. Each side was ordered to bear its own costs.

Significance

The decision is important for Nigerian civil procedure and land law. It confirms that a prior judgment concerning land is not necessarily binding contra mundum; its effect depends on the character of the judgment and the parties or privies bound by it. It also cautions courts against using the broad doctrine of abuse of process as an automatic means of terminating a claim at the preliminary stage. A party relying on the doctrine must demonstrate the required identity of parties, issues and subject matter. Finally, the judgment illustrates that allegations of judicial bias and breach of fair hearing must be supported by concrete evidence appearing on the record, not by assertion or speculation.