REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE HOLY APOSTOLIC CHURCH OF NIGERIA & ORS V. AYENI & ANOR (2001)

Background

This appeal arose from a prolonged leadership and administrative dispute within the Holy Apostolic Church of Nigeria. The respondents commenced an action in the Ekiti State High Court, Ikole-Ekiti, challenging the legality of a synod meeting held on 24 February 1994, the appointments made at that meeting, and the alleged effect of the will of the late founder of the church on the administration of the church and its properties. They also sought orders restraining the appellants from interfering with the respondents and other members of their faction at the headquarters church, an order compelling the seventh appellant to surrender church property in her possession, and a perpetual injunction against harassment.

The dispute had divided the congregation into two opposing factions. On 30 November 2000, the factions clashed during an early-morning prayer session at the headquarters church at Asin. The affidavit evidence disclosed physical violence, allegations of the use of weapons, injuries, theft of church money and property, and a serious threat to public order and the safety of worshippers. A previous judge had already ordered the church to be locked up in an attempt to preserve the building and restore peace.

On 4 December 2000, the respondents applied for interlocutory relief. On 15 March 2001, the trial court ordered that the headquarters church be locked up and made inaccessible to both factions and the congregation pending the determination of the substantive suit. It further directed that an inventory of the church’s movable and immovable property be prepared, that the keys and inventory be deposited with the Principal Registrar, and that two police officers be posted to the premises. The appellants appealed against that ruling.

Issues

1. Whether the interlocutory injunction was perverse, against the weight of evidence or prejudicial to the appellants.
2. Whether preventing the parties from using the church building violated the constitutional rights to freedom of religion and assembly under sections 38(1) and 40 of the 1999 Constitution.
3. Whether the preservation and consequential orders were outside, or inconsistent with, the respondents’ claims in the substantive action.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It explained that a decision is perverse where the judge takes account of matters that ought not to have been considered, ignores obvious or proved facts, or distorts the evidence in order to favour one party. A judgment is against the weight of evidence where, after placing the competing evidence on the imaginary scale of justice, the more persuasive evidence does not support the conclusion reached.

The court held that the evidence did not demonstrate perversity or a decision against the weight of evidence. The crucial fact—that there had been a violent confrontation in the church and that the church property was at risk—was substantially common ground. The trial judge was therefore entitled to conclude that immediate protective measures were necessary.

The principles governing interlocutory injunctions include whether it is just and convenient to grant the relief, whether the applicant has an existing or recognisable right requiring protection, whether damages would be adequate compensation, and where the balance of convenience lies. The discretion belongs primarily to the trial court and must be exercised judicially and judiciously. An appellate court will not interfere merely because it might have reached a different conclusion; intervention is justified only where the discretion was improperly exercised, based on irrelevant considerations, or otherwise shown to be unreasonable or unjust.

Court Findings

The court found that both factions were members of the same church and had equal rights to use the headquarters property. Neither faction could claim a superior right to worship there while the substantive dispute remained unresolved. Since the competing exercise of those rights had resulted in violence and threatened loss of life and destruction of property, the balance of convenience decisively favoured the preservation of peace and the church building.

The restriction was not treated as an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom. Freedom of worship must be exercised peaceably and does not authorise worshippers to engage in violence, disorder or the destruction of the property in which worship takes place. An injunction temporarily preventing both factions from entering the church, imposed neutrally to avert bloodshed and preserve the subject matter of the litigation, was therefore compatible with sections 38(1) and 40 of the Constitution.

The court also held that the order locking up the church was valid even though that precise relief was not expressly stated in the statement of claim. Order 33 rules 1 and 2 of the applicable High Court Rules permitted an injunction or an order for the detention, custody or preservation of property that was the subject matter of the action. Order 47 rule 1 further empowered the court to make any order necessary for doing justice, whether or not expressly requested. The inventory and police-posting directions were reasonable consequential orders designed to make the principal preservation order effective.

The court rejected the argument that closure might cause the building to deteriorate. In the circumstances, the risk of disrepair was preferable to the more serious and immediate possibility that continued factional occupation would result in the destruction of the church and its contents.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The ruling of the Ekiti State High Court in Suit No. HCL/29/95 was affirmed. The Court of Appeal made no order as to costs, taking into account the circumstances of the dispute and the need to encourage reconciliation between the two factions.

Significance

This decision illustrates the court’s protective and equitable jurisdiction in religious-property disputes. It confirms that interlocutory injunctions may be used not only to restrain unlawful interference but also to preserve disputed property and prevent violence pending trial. It further establishes that a temporary neutral restriction on access to a place of worship will not necessarily infringe religious freedom where access would foreseeably cause a breach of the peace. The case emphasises that courts must preserve the res—the property in dispute—for delivery to the party ultimately successful at trial, while using reasonable consequential orders to ensure that the preservation direction is effective.