THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LIMITED V. CPL TUNDE ADJOTO (2026)

Background

This appeal arose from an employment dispute between The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited and Cpl Tunde Adjoto. The respondent worked as a supernumerary police officer associated with the appellant from 11 September 1993 until 31 October 2008. He was served with a letter titled “Release for Services No Longer Required,” issued after allegations of insubordination, discreditable conduct and disobedience to lawful orders. Before the release, he had undergone an orderly room trial and had been found guilty of misconduct.

The respondent challenged the termination before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Lagos Judicial Division. He argued that the disciplinary process was irregular and that, being employed by the appellant in a private employment relationship, he was not subject to trial under the Police Act. The appellant denied being the respondent’s employer and contended that the respondent was an employee of the Nigerian Police Force, which alone could be responsible for the consequences of his release.

The National Industrial Court found that the respondent had directly applied to the appellant, had received his salaries and other employment benefits from the appellant for approximately fifteen years, and was therefore an employee of the company. The court held that the Nigerian Police Force could not dismiss him from the appellant’s employment. It declared the employment subsisting, ordered payment of salaries from 1 October 2008 until judgment, and directed the appellant to recognise and treat the respondent as its employee under its general conditions of service.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Lagos. The respondent raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the proposed grounds did not fall within the constitutionally permitted right of appeal from the National Industrial Court. The Court of Appeal upheld the objection and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue

The principal issue was whether, having regard to section 243(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended by the Third Alteration Act, the appellant’s appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal was competent and within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously held that the appeal was incompetent. Section 243(2) permits an appeal from the National Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal as of right where the appeal concerns a question of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution, insofar as it relates to matters within the National Industrial Court’s jurisdiction. Under section 243(3), other appeals lie only as prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly and, where prescribed, require the leave of the Court of Appeal.

Most importantly, section 243(4) provides that, subject to section 254C(5), the decision of the Court of Appeal in any appeal arising from the civil jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is final. The Court held that the present dispute was a civil employment or master-and-servant matter falling squarely within section 254C(1). It was not, in substance, a Chapter IV fundamental-rights appeal. The appellant could not transform an ordinary complaint about employment termination and fair hearing into a constitutional-rights appeal in order to obtain a further appeal to the Supreme Court.

Court Findings

The Court applied the golden rule of statutory interpretation: clear and unambiguous constitutional language must be given its natural and ordinary meaning unless that interpretation produces absurdity or inconsistency. The words of section 243(4) were considered unequivocal. The appellate journey in civil matters originating from the National Industrial Court ends at the Court of Appeal, which is the final appellate court for such matters.

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the Third Alteration Act was invalid because the voting threshold allegedly used by the National Assembly was insufficient. Once the constitutional amendment had been passed and assented to in accordance with the constitutional process and incorporated into the Constitution, the courts were bound to apply it. The Supreme Court could not investigate or adjudicate upon the Legislature’s internal voting records or invalidate the amendment based on speculation about the number of votes cast.

The Court also reaffirmed that a preliminary objection challenging jurisdiction must be determined before the merits of an appeal. Since jurisdiction is fundamental, a court lacking jurisdiction cannot examine the substantive issues. The proper order where an appeal is incompetent for want of jurisdiction is to strike it out, rather than determine its merits.

Conclusion

The respondent’s preliminary objection was sustained, and the appeal was struck out for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court awarded costs of ₦5,000,000 against the appellant in favour of the respondent, holding that costs are compensatory rather than punitive or enriching.

Significance

This decision reinforces the constitutional finality of Court of Appeal decisions in civil appeals arising from the National Industrial Court. It confirms that ordinary labour, employment and master-and-servant disputes cannot be brought to the Supreme Court by presenting them as fundamental-rights cases. The judgment also stresses judicial fidelity to constitutional text and limits the Court’s role in questioning the legislative process behind an enacted constitutional amendment.