Background
This appeal arose from the death of Umaru Ahmed, also known as Masho, after an altercation with Sheevo Shonto at a maize farm near Mararaba Kunini in Taraba State. The deceased had allegedly taken his cattle into the respondent’s maize farm to graze. When the respondent challenged him, a confrontation followed. The respondent’s case was that the deceased produced a knife, that he struck the deceased’s hand with a stick causing the knife to fall, and that both men struggled over the weapon. During the struggle, the knife injured the deceased in the leg or thigh. The respondent maintained that he did not intend to kill him and reported himself at a police station after seeing that the deceased was bleeding.
The respondent was charged under section 221(b) of the Penal Code with culpable homicide punishable with death. The prosecution called five witnesses and tendered a medical report and the respondent’s statement to the police as exhibit 2. A further statement was rejected by the trial court following an objection by defence counsel. The High Court found significant weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence, including hearsay testimony and the absence of a reliable eyewitness to the actual struggle. It accepted the evidence of the defence witness and the respondent, held that the respondent acted in self-defence, and discharged and acquitted him. The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision.
Issues
- Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that exhibit 2 was not a confessional statement and that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in affirming that the defence of self-defence availed the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent decisions of the lower courts. Under section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011, a confession is an admission made by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. For a confession to sustain a conviction, it must be voluntary, direct, positive and unequivocal, and must contain some or all of the essential elements of the offence charged.
Although exhibit 2 admitted that the respondent had cut or stabbed the deceased and that the injury caused death, it did not admit the necessary mental element of culpable homicide. The respondent expressly stated that he had no intention to kill. His account was exculpatory: it described an unplanned struggle initiated by the deceased’s production of a knife. The statement therefore did not amount to a confession to culpable homicide, although it remained part of the prosecution’s case and had to be considered alongside all other evidence, including the defence.
The Court restated that the essential elements of culpable homicide punishable with death are: the actual death of a human being; that the death was caused by the accused; and that the act was done with the intention of causing death or with knowledge that death would probably result. The prosecution bears the burden of proving every element beyond reasonable doubt. That burden does not shift to the accused.
On self-defence, the Court applied section 33(2) of the 1999 Constitution, section 59 of the Penal Code and the corresponding principles under section 286 of the Criminal Code. The defence is available where a person responds to an unlawful or unprovoked attack with force reasonably necessary for the defence of his person or property. Its controlling requirements are necessity and proportionality. The court must ask whether self-defence was necessary on the evidence and whether the injury inflicted was proportionate to the threat or excessive.
Court Findings
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution witnesses did not establish what actually occurred during the struggle. The trial judge was entitled to find that PW1 was not truly an eyewitness and that the evidence of several other prosecution witnesses was hearsay. By contrast, the testimony of DW1, who was present at the scene, was substantially consistent with the respondent’s statement and oral evidence. The respondent’s account also showed that he suffered an injury during the struggle.
The Court emphasized the special position of the trial court in assessing primary facts. Findings made after observing witnesses and evaluating their credibility enjoy a rebuttable presumption of correctness. An appellate court will rarely interfere with such findings, particularly where they have been affirmed by another lower court, unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or would occasion a miscarriage of justice. The State failed to demonstrate any such basis for intervention.
The Court further clarified that the trial judge’s statement that the respondent had “exceeded the powers” of self-defence was an unfortunate and meaningless choice of words in the circumstances. The substantive findings showed that there was no proof of excessive force. The evidence accepted by the trial court was that the deceased produced the knife and that the fatal injury occurred while the parties struggled for it. The prosecution had not disproved the defence or established that the respondent deliberately used disproportionate force.
Conclusion
The appeal lacked merit and was dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the respondent’s discharge and acquittal by the High Court of Taraba State, was upheld. The Supreme Court held that a successful plea of self-defence is not merely a mitigating circumstance; it is a complete defence that negatives criminal responsibility and requires an acquittal.
Significance
The decision reinforces the constitutional presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s strict obligation to prove the actus reus and mens rea of culpable homicide beyond reasonable doubt. It also demonstrates that an accused’s admission to causing an injury does not automatically constitute a confession to the offence charged. The entire statement must be read in context, including any explanation of accident, struggle or self-defence. Finally, the case confirms that Nigerian courts assess self-defence through the twin tests of necessity and proportionality, while respecting credible concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.
Counsel:
- Y. N. Akirikwen Esq., Attorney-General, Taraba State; Hamidu Audu Esq.; E. T. Anderifun Esq.; Mohammed Umar Esq.
- F. K. Idepefo Esq.; U. C. Okeke Esq.