UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN & ORS V. OBAYAN (2018)

Background

This appeal concerned the termination of the appointment of Dr. (Mrs.) Aize Imonokhome Obayan, a senior academic staff member of the University of Ilorin. The respondent was employed as a lecturer in the Department of Guidance and Counselling in 1986 and later became an Associate Professor or Reader. In 1997, the University approved her application for sabbatical leave to enable her undertake further studies at the Rosehampton Institute in London. After the sabbatical period, she obtained approval for a further one-year leave of absence.

Before the expiration of that additional year, the respondent requested a further four-month extension. The University contended that this request was refused by a letter dated 25 March 1999, allegedly sent to her address in the United Kingdom. The respondent denied receiving that letter. She eventually returned to Nigeria in August or September 1999 and formally notified the University of her resumption through her Head of Department. The University subsequently issued a letter dated 22 September 1999, stating that she had voluntarily terminated her appointment by failing to resume duty after the approved leave period.

The respondent commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court, Ilorin. She sought declarations that the purported termination was ultra vires, null and void; an order reinstating her to her academic position; restoration of her rights and entitlements; and payment of outstanding salaries and allowances. The trial court dismissed her claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and granted the respondent’s reliefs. The University and the other appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the lower courts properly evaluated the totality of the evidence concerning the respondent’s leave and resumption.
2. Whether the respondent bore the burden of proving that the additional four-month leave was granted.
3. Whether the University communicated the refusal of the extension and whether its conduct amounted to condonation or acquiescence.
4. Whether the case of Professor Oyewole was distinguishable from that of the respondent.
5. Whether the purported termination letter was issued by the proper authority.
6. Whether the University’s senior staff regulations were correctly interpreted and whether the respondent was afforded fair hearing.
7. Whether estoppel by conduct under the Evidence Act applied.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the classification of a ground of appeal as one of law or mixed law and fact depends on the substance of the ground and its particulars, not on the label attached to it by the appellant. A ground based on an inference drawn from admitted, proved and accepted facts may constitute a ground of law. On that basis, the Court overruled the respondent’s preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal in respect of the relevant grounds.

The principal evidential issue was whether the respondent received the letter allegedly refusing her four-month extension. Although the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta permits a court, in appropriate circumstances, to presume that official acts were regularly and properly performed, that presumption is rebuttable and must be applied in the context of the evidence. Section 167 of the Evidence Act permits presumptions based on the common course of natural events, human conduct and public business. However, once the respondent denied receipt and the University’s witness admitted that no fax or courier communication was sent to her between March and September 1999, the burden under section 136(1) of the Evidence Act rested on the University to establish actual communication or receipt.

The Court concluded that the appellants failed to prove that the refusal letter reached the respondent. The surrounding conduct of the University, including its treatment of her as having resumed her academic functions, supported the conclusion that the four-month extension had effectively been accepted or waived. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct under section 169 of the Evidence Act, formerly section 151, was therefore properly invoked.

Court Findings

The Court found that the respondent’s employment was not an ordinary master-and-servant relationship in which her services could be terminated at will. As a senior staff member of a university established by statute, she was entitled to the protections contained in the University’s governing legislation, applicable regulations and the rules of natural justice. Regulation 7.13.14, which stated that an officer who failed to return after the approved leave period would be deemed to have terminated his or her appointment, could not be applied mechanically without regard to the circumstances and the statutory protections governing the respondent’s employment.

The Court compared the respondent’s case with that of Professor S. O. Oyewole, who had overstayed his leave by more than ten months. In Professor Oyewole’s case, the University issued a query and afforded him an opportunity to explain himself before disciplinary action was taken. The respondent was not given a similar opportunity. The Supreme Court held that this denial of fair hearing rendered the process defective.

The Court further held that the letter purporting to record a voluntary termination of appointment was issued without proper authority. The appellants’ counsel conceded that the relevant exhibits did not emanate from the Governing Council. The letter was signed for the Registrar rather than on the direction of the Council. Since the Council was the authority competent to remove or terminate the appointment in the relevant circumstances, the Appointments and Promotions Committee acted ultra vires in treating the respondent as having voluntarily terminated her appointment.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed as totally lacking in merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal declaring the letter dated 22 September 1999 ultra vires, null, void and of no effect. The respondent was held to remain in the service of the University of Ilorin and was entitled to reinstatement and restoration to her position, rights, entitlements and other perquisites of office. The appellants were also ordered to pay her salaries, allowances and other entitlements from September 1999. Costs of N500,000 were awarded against the appellants.

Significance

The decision is significant for public-sector employment law in Nigeria. It confirms that statutory or regulated employment attracts procedural safeguards beyond the ordinary rules of private employment. An employer must comply with the applicable disciplinary procedure, observe fair hearing and act through the authority legally empowered to make the decision. The case also illustrates that a presumption of regularity cannot overcome clear evidence that a critical communication was not received. Finally, an institution’s conduct may create an estoppel where it treats an employee as entitled to resume duties after an alleged period of unauthorised absence.