MAHMOUD ALIYU V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2026)

Background

This appeal concerned the criminal liability of Mahmoud Aliyu for accepting cash consideration in connection with the sale of a landed property. In 2002, the appellant, then a staff member of the Federal Housing Authority, sold a three-bedroom apartment at No. 3 (IH) 2 Road, Lugbe Housing Estate, Abuja, to Mrs. Hafsat Hamza Al-Mustapha. The appellant claimed that he acted as the agent of Major Sanusi N. Muazu, whom he described as the allottee of the property. The purchaser paid $10,000 and ₦600,000 in cash through her agent. Following the payment, the purchaser was placed in possession of the apartment.

Approximately three years later, the Federal Housing Authority ejected the purchaser on the ground that Major Sanusi N. Muazu was not the owner or lawful allottee of the property. The purchaser subsequently petitioned the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission. After investigation, the appellant was charged before the Federal High Court, Abuja, with accepting cash payment for the sale or acquisition of landed property, contrary to section 22(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Cap. F34, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, and punishable under section 30(2)(1)(a) of the Act.

The Federal High Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment or a fine. The Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, affirmed the conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, contending principally that the prosecution had failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence and that the courts below had failed to properly evaluate his defence of agency and the relevant documentary evidence.

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to affirm the appellant’s conviction for accepting cash payment for the sale of landed property.
2. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant personally received or accepted the prohibited cash payment.
3. Whether the appellant’s alleged agency relationship with Major Sanusi N. Muazu relieved him of criminal responsibility.
4. Whether the lower courts properly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence, particularly Exhibits 1 and 4.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent decisions of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court held that section 22 of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act prohibits any person in Nigeria from making or accepting cash payment, whether in foreign or local currency, for the purchase or acquisition of landed property, securities or motor vehicles. The prescribed mode of payment is by bank transfer or cheque drawn on a bank in Nigeria.

The Court identified four ingredients of the offence: first, that the defendant must be a natural or juristic person; second, that there must be landed property; third, that the property must have been sold for valuable consideration; and fourth, that the defendant received or accepted cash payment for the sale. The decisive issue was the fourth ingredient. The Court concluded that it was established by Exhibit 1, a receipt personally signed by the appellant acknowledging receipt of $10,000 as consideration for the transaction. The appellant also admitted during cross-examination that he received the money and signed an acknowledgment.

The Supreme Court described an admission as one of the most powerful methods of proving the commission of a crime. It further held that evidence elicited during cross-examination becomes part of the evidential case of the cross-examining party and may be relied upon against the witness who gave it.

Court Findings

The Court rejected the argument that Exhibit 4, a deed of assignment bearing Major Sanusi N. Muazu’s name, exonerated the appellant. The document did not establish that Muazu received the money or that the appellant had a genuine agency relationship with him. The appellant’s assertion that he later handed the money to Muazu was treated as uncorroborated evidence within the appellant’s special knowledge. Under section 140 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proving such a particular fact rested on the appellant.

The Court acknowledged that a criminal accused is presumed innocent and that the prosecution bears the general burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt under section 36(5) of the Constitution and the Evidence Act. However, the constitutional proviso permits the law to place on an accused the burden of proving particular facts peculiarly within his knowledge. The existence of the alleged principal, the appointment of the appellant as agent and the alleged transfer of the money to that principal were matters peculiarly within the appellant’s knowledge. He failed to provide credible evidence or call Major Muazu as a witness.

The Court also explained that agency is a fiduciary relationship under which an agent acts for a principal, and that it may arise by express appointment, estoppel, ratification, necessity or cohabitation. Nevertheless, agency does not transfer criminal responsibility. Criminal liability is personal and depends on proof of the relevant actus reus and mens rea. The doctrine of vicarious liability, generally relevant in appropriate civil cases, has no application as a defence to personal criminal liability in the circumstances of this case.

On evaluation of evidence, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the trial court ordinarily has the primary duty to assess oral evidence, observe witnesses and determine credibility. Appellate courts will not substitute their views where the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence, except where the findings are perverse, contrary to the evidence or occasion a miscarriage of justice. However, trial and appellate courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to evaluate documentary evidence. The Supreme Court therefore examined Exhibits 1 and 4 and found the lower courts’ conclusions sound and properly supported.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court resolved the sole issue against the appellant. It held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant accepted cash payment for the sale of landed property. The defence of agency neither displaced the clear admission in Exhibit 1 nor absolved the appellant from criminal liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the Federal High Court’s conviction and sentence was affirmed in its entirety.

Significance

The decision reinforces the strict statutory prohibition against cash transactions involving landed property under section 22 of the Foreign Exchange Act. It makes clear that liability may be complete upon proof that the accused accepted cash consideration, regardless of whether the payment was in naira or foreign currency and regardless of the accused’s asserted role as an intermediary. The judgment also illustrates the evidential importance of signed receipts and admissions made during cross-examination. More broadly, it confirms that an accused who relies on a special defence must provide credible evidence of facts peculiarly within his knowledge, while preserving the prosecution’s overriding obligation to prove the constituent elements of the charged offence beyond reasonable doubt.